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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**INFLUENCE OPERATIONS: REDEFINING
THE INDIRECT APPROACH**

by

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June 2011

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ABSTRACT

Across today's spectrum of contemporary warfare, the human terrain is routinely recognized as the center of gravity, but disconnects exists between how states or power holders seek to influence target audiences and how insurgents, terrorist groups, and similar nonstate actors fight to seize the population's cognitive terrain. Insurgents and nonstate actor threats increasingly seek the influence advantage through grassroots processes to subvert populations and establish asymmetric advantages against the United States and other state actors. U.S. policy recognizes the need to influence the behavior, perceptions, and attitudes of foreign audiences through an indirect approach, but its influence methods, in reality, remain tied to Cold War constructs unable to generate the desired effects needed for current/future threats. This thesis examines case studies of insurgent and nonstate actor influence operations to analyze their effects on the perceptions and attitudes of various disparate audiences at a grassroots level. The analysis then identifies methodology, vulnerabilities, and opportunities to engage these asymmetric threats within their own influence safe havens.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
A.	BACKGROUND	2
B.	WHAT ARE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS	5
C.	INFLUENCE ACTORS AND EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS	6
D.	PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE	7
E.	RESEARCH QUESTION AND SCOPE	7
F.	INFLUENCE FRAMEWORKS	8
G.	PREVAILING U.S. INFLUENCE METHODOLOGY (PIM).....	8
H.	INSURGENTS, NONSTATE ACTORS, AND SMT	9
	1. Social Change.....	11
	2. Opportunities and Threats	11
	3. Mobilizing Resources and Structures	12
	4. Frame Alignment.....	13
	5. SMT Process	13
I.	HOW INSURGENT AND NONSTATE ACTOR INFLUENCE OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED	14
	1. Deeds and Messages.....	15
	2. Channels.....	16
	3. Mediums.....	17
J.	CASE STUDIES	19
II.	THE VIETCONG	21
A.	BACKGROUND	21
B.	MESSAGE AND DEEDS.....	24
	1. Exploiting and Subverting the Competition	25
	2. Indigenous Resonance	31
	3. Synchronization and Massing of Message and Deeds	34
C.	CHANNELS	35
D.	MEDIUMS.....	39
E.	CASE CONCLUSION AND EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES ...	42
	1. Summary of Viet Cong Influence.....	42
	2. Viet Cong Influence Vulnerabilities.....	44
III.	SHINING PATH.....	51
A.	BACKGROUND	52
B.	MESSAGE AND DEEDS.....	57
	1. Indigenous Resonance	58
	2. Exploiting and Subverting the Competition	62
	3. Synchronization and Massing of Deeds and Messages	66
C.	CHANNELS	68
D.	MEDIUMS.....	77
E.	CASE CONCLUSION AND EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES ...	82

1.	Summary of Shining Path Influence	82
2.	Message and Deeds	83
3.	Channels.....	84
4.	Mediums.....	85
5.	Shining Path Influence Vulnerabilities	86
IV.	THE JEMAAH ISLAMIAH.....	89
A.	BACKGROUND	89
B.	MESSAGE AND DEEDS.....	94
1.	Exploiting and Subverting the Competition	96
2.	Indigenous Resonance	99
3.	Synchronization and Massing of Message and Deeds	101
C.	CHANNELS	103
D.	MEDIUMS.....	107
1.	Interpersonal Communication	108
2.	Publishing.....	109
3.	Multi-Media Production.....	111
4.	Radio, Internet, and Social Media.....	112
5.	Assessing JI Mediums.....	116
E.	CASE CONCLUSION AND EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES ..	116
1.	Summary of JI Influence Operations.....	116
2.	Vulnerabilities.....	118
V.	HEZBOLLAH.....	121
A.	BACKGROUND	121
B.	MESSAGE AND DEEDS.....	125
1.	Exploiting and Subverting the Competition	125
a.	<i>Subverting Amal in Southern Lebanon.....</i>	<i>126</i>
b.	<i>Subversion Through Social Services.....</i>	<i>127</i>
c.	<i>Subverting Israel’s Domestic and International Support... ..</i>	<i>129</i>
d.	<i>Subverting Israeli Support Through the Press</i>	<i>131</i>
2.	Indigenous Resonance	132
3.	Synchronization and Massing of Deeds and Messages	134
C.	CHANNELS	136
D.	MEDIUMS.....	141
1.	Organic Hezbollah Owned Mediums.....	142
a.	<i>Hezbollah TV</i>	<i>142</i>
b.	<i>Radio-Journalism-Publishing</i>	<i>143</i>
c.	<i>Internet Presence</i>	<i>144</i>
d.	<i>Facebook.....</i>	<i>146</i>
2.	Nonorganic Mediums.....	147
3.	Interpersonal Mediums	149
4.	Assessing Hezbollah’s Mediums.....	152
E.	CASE CONCLUSION AND EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES ..	152
1.	Summary of Hezbollah Influence.....	152
2.	Message and Deeds	154
3.	Channels.....	155

4.	Mediums	156
5.	Hezbollah Influence Vulnerabilities	156
VI.	CONCLUSION	159
A.	INTRODUCTION	159
B.	CASE STUDY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES	159
1.	The Viet Cong	159
2.	Shining Path	160
3.	Jemaah Islamiyah	161
4.	Hezbollah	162
5.	Trends	163
C.	OPERATIONALIZING THE INFLUENCE MODEL	164
D.	LIMITS AND CONSTRAINTS TO IMPLEMENTATION	166
E.	THE WAY FORWARD	167
F.	FUTURE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES	168
G.	CONCLUDING COMMENTS	168
	LIST OF REFERENCES	171
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	185

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	SMT Attributes and Functions for an Influence Strategy	11
Figure 2.	Insurgent Influence Model.....	15
Figure 3.	Decisive Influence.....	18
Figure 4.	Maoist Influence on Shining Path's Propaganda	81
Figure 5.	JAT Organization and Affiliations.....	93
Figure 6.	Arrahmah Mobile Web Access.....	113
Figure 7.	Arrahmah.com Uses eSocial Networks like Facebook for Message Propagation.	114
Figure 8.	JAT's Effort to Utilize the Internet Openly through .net.	115
Figure 9.	Examples of Hezbollah's Facebook Impact.....	147
Figure 10.	Today Show News Report on Hezbollah's Theme Park	150
Figure 11.	Time Video Screen Captures Documenting Hezbollah's Anti Israel Theme Park.....	151
Figure 12.	The Influence Operation Model.....	163
Figure 13.	Operational Implementation	165

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Vietnamese Communist's Lines of Influence (LOIs)	24
Table 2.	Shining Path's Lines of Influence (LOIs)	56
Table 3.	Ji, MMI, and JAT Combined Lines of Influence (LOIs)	94
Table 4.	Hezbollah Lines of Influence (LOIs)	124

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APRA	American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Peru)
AQI	Al Qaeda Iraq
BBC	British Broadcast Corporation
BUR	Bottom up Review
CAC	Civil Affairs Committee
CAP	Civil Action Program
CBA	Capabilities Based Assessment
CCP	Peasant Confederation of Peru
CEP	Community Engagement Programme
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
COSVN	Viet Cong Office of South Vietnam
DI	Darul Islam
DINCOTE	National Directorate Against Terrorism (Peru)
DoD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	Doctrine Organization Training Materiel Leadership Personnel and Facilities
DVD	Digital Video Disc
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FMLN	Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (El Salvador)
GVN	South Vietnamese Government
IAF	Israeli Armed Forces
ICPVTR	International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
IMF	International Monetary fund
IO	Information Operations
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
IU	Izquierda Unida or United Left (Peru)
IW	Irregular Warfare

JAT	<i>Jama'ah Anshorut Tauhid</i>
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
LOI	Line of Influence
MISO	Military Information Support to Operations
MMI	<i>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</i>
MOIS	Ministry of Intelligence and Security (Iranian)
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
PA	Palestinian Authority
PCP	Peruvian Communist Party
PCP	Bandero Rojo Peruvian Communist Party—Red Flag
PCP-SL	Peruvian Communist Party—Sendero Luminoso
PIM	Prevailing Influence Methodology
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PSYACT	Psychological Action
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PUPJI	<i>Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah</i>
RAD-D	Radical Destabilization
SAIS	Agrarian Society of Social Interest
SC	Strategic Communications
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SIU	Special Information Unit
SL	Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path
SLA	Southern Lebanese Army
SMT	Social Movement Theory
SMU	Special Mission Unit
SNA	Social Network Analysis
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOF	Special Operation Forces
SOTF	Special Operations Task Force
SP	Shining Path
STRATCOM	Strategic Command

UAE	United Arab Emirates
U.S.	United States
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VC	Viet Cong
VCD	Video compact Disc

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I. INTRODUCTION

Perceptions are as important as any physical reality of the battlefield. Adept adversaries plan their actions around sophisticated influence strategies enabled by the globalization of information and technology. In this age of instant communication, actors have become proficient at crafting their accounts of events into a compelling story or narrative. The intent of this narrative is to influence not only the local population but the global community as well. The battle of the narrative, as this struggle for influence has been called, is waged primarily through critical elements of the population who have formal or informal power or standing to sway the sentiments or induce the compliance of the general population.¹

Across today's spectrum of contemporary warfare, the human terrain is routinely recognized as the center of gravity for achieving success. While the United States recognizes this center of gravity and the importance for an indirect approach to affect it, the United States continues to treat influence warfare methods as supporting efforts to other lines of operations within traditional warfare constructs. In 2006, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, recognized this flaw when he stated; "if I were grading, I would say we probably deserve a *D* or *D-plus* as a country on how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's taking place in the world today."² This shortfall was recognized again in 2010 when the House Armed Services Committee admonished the Department of Defense for its execution of influence warfare activities.³

U.S. military influence efforts are traditionally secondary operations, often seen as a support mechanism for a conventional approach to war.⁴ Within unconventional operations, the use of influence warfare and influence operations is more prominent. U.S.

¹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept Ver. 2.0*, 2010, 13, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc2_0.pdf.

² Robert J. Kodosky, *Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 227, <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0722/2007028974.html>.

³ United States, Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, *The FY 2010 Defense Appropriations Act*, 2009.

⁴ Kodosky, *Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond*, 227.

Unconventional Warfare (UW) doctrine recognizes the need to influence the behavior, perceptions, and attitudes of foreign populations as a cornerstone for successful unconventional warfare, but the application of influence warfare and psychological warfare actions is executed with the same methodology as it is in the conventional approach. It remains top down and reactionary.

U.S. influence efforts typically target a general populace for supporting the shaping of the operational environment or used to support counterinsurgency operations, but they are traditionally directive in nature, and maintain a readily apparent U.S. and/or authoritarian attribution and stigma modeled from conventional forms of warfare. These efforts are often predicated on formulaic, standardized, and inflexible methods with a preoccupation for reorganizing structures and technologies instead of focusing on conducting influence centric operations.⁵ This methodology is inadequate for current and future threats because insurgents and nonstate actors prioritize, design and resource their influence warfare operations to affect the perceptions and attitudes of various disparate populations. These groups operate at a local, or grassroots, level with the intent of mobilizing multiple audiences toward a set of desired effects.

A. BACKGROUND

Since 2003, regional and global insurgent and terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Hezbollah, have increased their means and methods of influencing targeted audiences. In September 2010, Ronald Noble, the Head of INTERPOL, warned that extremist websites were skyrocketing, and their growth was making recruitment easier.⁶ The number of these websites in English alone has grown so fast that the total number is now unknown.⁷

Despite the investment of millions of dollars by the United States and allies, the enemy's influence effectiveness appears undiminished, unless the enemy commits

⁵ Kodosky, *Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond*, 227.

⁶ "Extremist Websites Skyrocketing, Says INTERPOL," *BBC News Europe*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11382124>.

⁷ Ibid.

tactical and operational mistakes that countermand its own efforts, which occurred in the case of Al Qaeda—Iraq (AQI) in 2008. U.S. and state actors often neglect to capitalize on such mistakes using sustained and deliberate influence operations. Adversaries’ influence operations are routinely anchored in interpersonal interactions exemplified by relevant physical examples. These operations typically focus on affecting social networks and are reinforced through, but not exclusive to, the use of social media interaction, text messaging, blogs, Internet chat rooms, traditional audio-visual and visual media, Mosque and Madrassa indoctrination, and electronic social networks (eSocial networks). Hezbollah and Al Qaeda continue to exemplify these methods.

From Indonesia to Sub-Saharan Africa, “Jihadist” influence paraphernalia like DVD’s, magazines, and posters can be found with street vendors and within affiliated terrorist or insurgent camps. Al Qaeda and Hezbollah actively maintain, or are affiliated with, personal and eSocial networks, blogs, chat rooms, and other social media outlets to connect their influence actors and actions with individual and group participants, which encompass local and international audiences,⁸ who are active in nearly every first power nation, to include China and Russia.⁹ Their influence efforts are portrayed and translated into a myriad of languages other than Arabic to include English, French, Spanish, Indonesian, and Farsi.¹⁰ Although these trends show a global outreach, their influence efforts intuitively tap into principles of social movement theory that enable them to exploit grassroots channels, methods, and messages for mobilization and propagation,¹¹ which is in stark contrast to U.S. methodology.

U.S. Strategic Communications, Public Diplomacy, and Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and comparable foreign agencies, traditionally rely on employing a top-down

⁸ D. E. Denning, “Information Operations and Terrorism,” *Journal of Information Warfare (Draft)*, <http://www.Infowar.Com> (2004): 1–2.

⁹ Marc Ambinder, “Al Qaeda’s First English Language Magazine is Here,” *The Atlantic*, June 20, 2010, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/06/al-qaedas-first-english-language-magazine-is-here/59006/>.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Reuven Erlich and Yoram Kahati, “Hezbollah As a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” *Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israel Intelligence, Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC)*, June 2007, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_e_0607.pdf, 3.

methodology to affect the beliefs, perceptions, and attitudes of various population groups and audiences. States and expeditionary forces are predominantly reactionary, with their influence endeavors aimed at validating the action instead of the action validating the message.

A disconnect exists between how a state, or power holder, strives to influence target audiences and how the insurgent, terrorist groups, and similar nonstate actor fights for the support or control of the population.¹² The advantage and momentum resides with the insurgent or other irregular group until either they succeed or self-destruct based on their ability or inability to achieve their influence objectives favorably. A wealth of articles and research exist on how nation states, specifically the United States, should conduct psychological operations, strategic communications, and public diplomacy to deny popular support to the insurgent and terrorist group. Most research does not address or analyze the enemy's means and methodology in conducting influence campaigns within the context of assessing how it is able to impact audiences within and outside of its operational environments. The existing research lacks analysis of the adversary's influence warfare activities for the purpose of developing and employing an effective methodology to prevent and defeat the growing trend of insurgent activity to mobilize social groups against the United States and its allies. Meaningful advancements in changing U.S. methodology and policy for waging a war of influence cannot be instituted until the manner in which adversaries wage influence warfare against the United States is deconstructed or understood.

In her thesis on Hezbollah's psychological war against Israel, Lisa Brennan succinctly exemplified Hezbollah's effective psychological and influence warfare campaign targeting Lebanese and Israeli audiences. Hezbollah's grassroots methodology portrays a stark contrast to that of the U.S. and its allies.

Hezbollah's military strategy was unique because of the way it combined conventional and psychological warfare. Specifically, the group subjected almost all of its military operations to its media requirements. Al-Manar [a Hezbollah owned TV station] was a central part of this strategy. Every

¹² Gordon McCormick, "Seminar on Guerilla Warfare," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, January 2010.

Hezbollah unit deployed with a cameraman who recorded their operations. After making appropriate edits—such as deleting scenes or adding music and narration—the clips would then be broadcasted on Al-Manar. The footage was selective in that it only showed scenes that favored Hezbollah, even if the fighters eventually were defeated by the IDF in that particular operation. Consequently, Al-Manar helped give the perception that Hezbollah was doing better on the battlefield than it actually was.¹³

Although this example displays a top-down approach from Hezbollah to the local level to influence several types of audiences, it illustrates how Hezbollah uses combat actions to reinforce and validate the messages and narratives generated by its propaganda division. Examples also exist of how similar efforts reinforce the influence operations occurring within local Lebanese communities, as well as electronic social media interaction with Israeli communities. Hezbollah’s approach to influence warfare is but one example of a systematic approach to waging a war of influence and psychological warfare as a means to disrupt and defeat a superior state sponsored adversary. To understand Hezbollah’s use of influence methodology, a clear and concise definition of influence operations and influence warfare is essential although “no agreed-upon Joint force or Army definition of influence operations exists.”¹⁴

B. WHAT ARE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS

For the purpose of this thesis, influence operations are defined as deliberately planned and synergized actions designed to produce desired effects using coordinated and multidimensional methods.¹⁵ Focused at the local and community levels, they shape

¹³ Lisa M. Brennan, *Hezbollah: Psychological Warfare Against Israel* (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2009), 23, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA496916>.

¹⁴ Eric V. Larson et al., “Foundations for Effective Influence Operations,” *A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities* (RAND, 2009), 2, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG654.pdf. RAND and the U.S. Air Force definitions of influence operations remain focused and grounded on a strategic messaging methodology. Their definitions gloss over the importance of physical and nonphysical methods of persuasion that validate the influence message. These definitions neglect the actions of actors and entities embedded with the local populace and their immediate social audience, and the importance of affecting audiences within their interpersonal social networks.

¹⁵ Thomas Scanzillo, *Influence: Maximizing Effects to Create Long-Term Stability* (Master’s thesis, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2010), 3, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA538741&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.

operational conditions by fostering changes in the behavior, attitudes, civil disposition, and operating environment across targeted social groups, populations, and political-military organizations.¹⁶ They are continuously refined to address evolving conditions within a community or at an interpersonal level from within the social structure of the targeted audience(s). These operations use both physical and nonphysical methods of persuasion to affect vulnerabilities across diverse and complex social networks to generate advantageous behavior, perception, and attitude changes.¹⁷ Ultimately, these methods affect the wider social and political environment and facilitate the accomplishment of desired effects.

C. INFLUENCE ACTORS AND EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS

According to the RAND Corporation and Arizona State's Consortium on Strategic Communications, the United States and other states traditionally rely on elements of national power to action influence efforts to affect various audiences, with subordinate organizations echoing the strategic messages.¹⁸ In contrast, insurgents and similar actors employ ideological or vanguard elements who embed with local communities to conduct comprehensive actions using propaganda and coercive actions to isolate existing political structures, establish shadow administrative functions, conduct re-education program, conduct psychological operations, collect social intelligence, identify individuals for exploitation or replacement, and establish support mechanisms.¹⁹

Successful influence operations are based on whether or not the influence purveyor achieves its short-term and long-term objectives. Influence operations comprise a carrot and stick approach to affecting targeted and wider audiences. They can serve to fulfill expectations, needs, and requirements of the audience to achieve favorable effects. Simultaneously, these operations can be coercive, repressive, violent, and threatening to divest their adversary of support, or prevent resistance to the influencing of an actor's end

¹⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, "Field Manual 3-05.130 Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare," September 2008, 2–11, <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf>.

¹⁷ Scanzillo, *Influence: Maximizing Effects to Create Long-Term Stability*, 3.

¹⁸ Larson et al., "Foundations for Effective Influence Operations," 5.

¹⁹ Erlich and Kahati, "Hezbollah As a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds," 3.

state objectives. Their influence efforts and objectives are inexplicably linked to everything they do. They are subject to the successful leveraging of channels, mediums, messages, and deeds pertinent to each target audience.

D. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE

This research examines nonstate and state sponsored insurgent and terrorist influence operations to recruit, subvert, coerce, and/or repress various target audiences. Insurgents and terrorist groups intuitively or purposely utilize aspects of prevailing social movement theories (SMT) when conducting influence warfare against target audiences, states, and the United States. This thesis assesses how insurgent and terrorist influencing actors apply combined influence activities to gain operational or strategic advantages over adversaries and population groups. The analysis presents methods and means to combat insurgent lines of influence more efficiently and effectively in volume, parity, sophistication, impact, and reach through attributable and non attributable U.S. sponsored special influence operations.

E. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SCOPE

How are insurgent and terrorist influence operations effective and how can these be exploited or subverted to U.S. advantage? Insurgent and terrorist influence operations can be exploited or subverted to U.S. advantage by analyzing their methodology, vulnerabilities, mediums and influence conduits. Case studies from the late 20th century to the present demonstrate successful and unsuccessful methods of influence, as well as the actions of intended and unintended audiences. Although this research uses SMT to derive conditions for successful influence operation and social network analysis (SNA) to assess the impact and causal relationships of insurgent influence warfare initiatives, it is not an attempt to add to the body of SMT and SNA. Rather, they serve as a lens for understanding the role of new and emerging methodologies in influence operations.

F. INFLUENCE FRAMEWORKS

Two prevailing conceptual frameworks exemplify influence factors at a macro, meso, and micro level, prevailing influence methodology (PIM) and social movement theory (SMT). PIM encompasses U.S. and western doctrine and policy governing communications used for influencing and informing various audiences that can be described as top-down and reactive methodology to achieve influence,²⁰ which is predicated on strictly controlled information messaging to justify the actions and policies of the state.²¹ SMT is a broad field of theory, with nuanced and interrelated theories including collective, relative deprivation, resource mobilization and frame alignment approaches to understanding the emergence and growth of a social movement. Apparent causal relationships exist between insurgent and terrorist influence warfare methodology and facets of SMT. Insurgents employ a network construct that invariably leverages factors identified by SMT that mobilize people in desired ways.²² SMT also demonstrates a need for influence operations to be more proactive and personally relative in nature.

G. PREVAILING U.S. INFLUENCE METHODOLOGY (PIM)

PIM is inherently reactionary and predicated on a defensive rather than a proactive posture. U.S. expeditionary influence efforts are not anchored in a synchronized approach to affect a disparate foreign audience below a state or national level. Historically, U.S. military influence efforts are intended to operate at tactical and operational levels to inform and influence the local population, but current methods and practices are directed toward the population and maintain a U.S. attributable and authoritarian stigma.²³ Exceptions exist, but they typically manifest themselves through a few adept culturally and operationally leaders attuned in understanding how to influence

²⁰ Steven R. Corman and Kevin J. Dooley. “Strategic Communication on a Rugged Landscape,” (2008), <http://comops.org/article/121.pdf>, 2.

²¹ Ibid.

²² “The term “netwar” denotes an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at a societal levels... in which protagonists use—indeed, depend on using—network forms of organization, doctrine, and strategy, and communication.”; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *The Advent of Netwar* (RAND, 1996), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR789/, 5–8.

²³ Ibid.

and affect their immediate operating environments. Additionally, U.S. activities attempt to inform, not influence, the population using a centrally controlled message from information managers far removed from the tactical and local population environments.²⁴

Despite some examples of past success in influence operations, PIM does not display a pattern of successful influence efforts (Figure 4). When PIM approaches have been successful, it is typically because they are in conjunction with or tied to facets of SMT. In cases where PIM was the exclusive influence methodology, insurgent and state operations were predisposed to failure. U.S. doctrine and policy, and their inherent tie to PIM, appear to lack efficacy. Due to PIM's apparent shortcomings, the case studies examined in this thesis are analyzed based on SMT concepts, and the insurgents' and nonstate actors' intuitive application of SMT principles.

H. INSURGENTS, NONSTATE ACTORS, AND SMT

For purposes of this thesis, social movement theory is identified as a bottom-up, proactive, and interactive methodology used intuitively by insurgents and comparable nonstate actors to affect an audience's social and daily environments. Effective influence operations are assessed based on their achievement of active or passive support by the population, and increase or decrease of active or passive support to the state or power holders. One of the traditional advantages insurgent and terrorist groups possess is their ability to operate and exist within and among the population. Sufficiently garnering support to grow, operate, and achieve their objectives are inherently tied to their ability to influence the population both physically and ideologically.²⁵ Understanding how the insurgent adversary conducts influence warfare against population groups and to what degrees it attains effectiveness provides insight into undermining those same efforts.

The cognitive alignment that spurs individuals to participate in or support collective action falls along the methods of influence presented in social movement

²⁴ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *The Advent of Netwar*, 5–8.

²⁵ Gordon McCormick and Frank Giordano, "Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerilla Mobilization," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2007): 296.

theory.²⁶ Cognitive alignment begins with an individual's relationship within its interpersonal social networks. These networks and their associated environments directly influence the micro level (individual) and meso level (social group) within various cultures and sub cultures.²⁷ Effective influence activities can favorably affect behavior through deliberate offensive and defensive influence actions, both of which are done through a coupling of physical acts and messages.

Whether by design or intuitive action, insurgent groups and other nonstate actors demonstrate the capacity to operationalize SMT as they seek to affect local and wider social constructs either directly and indirectly. Figure 1 displays an aggregate of prevailing SMT factors that serve as the foundation for an influence strategy.²⁸

²⁶ David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (August 1986): 464, <http://www.nd.edu/~rmcveigh/reap/snow.pdf>.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Sean Everton, *Lecture on Social Movement Theory* (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2010).




Figure 1. SMT Attributes and Functions for an Influence Strategy²⁹

1. Social Change

Social change is the disequilibrium between segments of the population and the state. According to Chalmers Johnson, if disequilibrium exists between a portion of the populace and the prevailing social strata, and no homeostatic mechanism exists to bring them into equilibrium, the rift between the two will create an increasing climate for social change.³⁰

2. Opportunities and Threats

Opportunities and threats represent the contribution of the political process model to the development of SMT. As proposed by Sidney Tarrow, in his written work, *States*

²⁹ Everton, *Lecture on Social Movement Theory*.

³⁰ Chalmers A. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 54–60.

and Opportunities, the political process model reflects the convergence and exploitation of political, economic, and social vulnerabilities.³¹ Insurgencies typically do not emerge merely because of widespread political instability, but also due to broad social processes that have strengthened the aggrieved population’s political power.³² Insurgents use their inherent strengths to exploit ungoverned free space, ideological friction points, and “the presence of certain shared cognitions within the minority community” to canalize a social movement’s malleability to its cause to emerge and grow.³³ These factors, “in combination with a fourth factor: the shifting control response of other groups to the movement,” enable the insurgents’ influencing agents to exploit grievances while simultaneously disrupting the status quo and threatening the validity and presence of potential competitors.³⁴

3. Mobilizing Resources and Structures

Mobilizing resources and structures is the ability to gather logistical and financial resources, as well as human capital. It incorporates the gathering and use of relatively ungoverned or under governed political areas within a state that an insurgent or other nonstate actor can exploit for control and growth. The encompassing scope of structure and resource mobilization includes the “micromobilization [of] structural locations that are not aimed primarily at movement mobilization, but where mobilization may be generated,”³⁵ which includes family networks, friendship networks, professional networks, social networks, and individuals or groups that bridge the various structures.³⁶

³¹ D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge University Press Cambridge, MA, 1996), 58–59.

³² Everton, *Lecture on Social Movement Theory*.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ John D. McCarthy, “Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing,” in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 142.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 141.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

Conversely, resource mobilization can be an influence target when the influence actor initiates activities and messages that may serve to disrupt or deny resources to an existing or potential influence competitor.

4. Frame Alignment

Frame alignment is the linkage of individual or groups with a social movement organization's ideological orientations in which sets of individual interests, values, and beliefs are congruent and complimentary with the activities, goals, and ideology of the sponsoring social movement organization.³⁷ Frame alignment is the mechanism in which insurgents, terrorists, and other nonstate actors adapt their purpose and reasoning (aka their narrative) to resonate with the target population's cognitive interests. Exploiting grievance, discontent, and political free space is their primary access point. McCarthy and Zald demonstrated that grievances and discontent can be defined, created, and manipulated by issue "entrepreneurs and organizations."³⁸ Misinformation, disinformation, and selective disequilibrium exploitation allow an elite/professionalized influence element to manipulate the disequalized population and channel it into a support base, generate passive tolerance/support, or at a minimum, repress it from resistance. The same methods can likewise be employed for influencing population dispositions toward dissent, discord, or even fear.

5. SMT Process

These factors set the conditions for the cognitive susceptibility of target audiences toward desired influence objectives and collective actions or inactions.³⁹ These objectives and actions can include active or passive support for the influencing agent, establishing a rift between the audience and the state or establish power holder, and or generating discord within the status quo of an adversary's social structure.

³⁷ Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 464.

³⁸ Ibid., 469.

³⁹ McAdam et al., "Introduction," *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 5–6.

SMT and SNA theories help identify the links that influence and mobilize people toward desired behaviors, dispositions and actions. Insurgents and nonstate actors operationalize factors identified by SMT through a relatively decentralized approach allowing them to extend and bridge their influence framework across diverse and disparate social networks using adaptive influence efforts relevant to the target audiences.⁴⁰ Insurgents and other nonstate actors intuitively identify this rift as a critical or key opportunity to exploit the discontent between disparate populations and the state or prevailing power holders. Insurgents and nonstate actors possess an intuitive knowledge for mobilizing resources and social structures, while also taking advantage of social opportunities and threats. They generate a target audience consciousness susceptible or malleable to align with the insurgent ideological framework. Successful adaptation of the frame alignment processes enables the insurgent or nonstate actor to influence target audiences towards a desired set of collective actions or inactions,⁴¹ which articulates a general strategy for affecting various target audiences.

I. HOW INSURGENT AND NONSTATE ACTOR INFLUENCE OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED

Success or failure is dependent upon the insurgent or nonstate actor's ability to conduct influence using deeds and messages, channels, and mediums successfully and succinctly. Figure 2 illustrates the framework and methodology in which an insurgent or nonstate actor intuitively or deliberately executes influence warfare against audiences in their confrontation against a state or power holder.

⁴⁰ Corman and Dooley, "Strategic Communication on a Rugged Landscape."

⁴¹ Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 464–481.




Figure 2. Insurgent Influence Model

1. Deeds and Messages

The verbal and nonverbal narratives facilitate ideological purpose by shifting the audience’s cognitive alignment toward the insurgent’s or influence an actor’s ideology and objectives. To affect perceptions and behaviors using positive or repressive actions, the messages and deeds must resonate with local indigenous population groups to be credible. Moreover, adversarial or competing groups within the target population affect the propagation and validity of the insurgent’s influence effort. Exploiting, subverting, marginalizing, or eliminating the competition is a necessary condition to build and achieve influence superiority in the shortest amount of time with the least of amount of required resources. Equally essential is the synchronization and massing of deeds and messages.⁴² Through synchronization and massing, the insurgent or influencing agent

⁴² The “massing of words/messages and deeds” is in keeping with the joint military definition of concentrating force, effort, capability, and combat power against an adversary or target set. Concentrating the influence effort along multiple lines of influence activities is the massed effort to affect a target set, erode and adversary's ability to influence the same target set, and prevent effective counter narratives in order to seize the influence initiative. The influence effort is the combination of messages and actions (deeds).

builds credibility and legitimacy while simultaneously diminishing the credibility, legitimacy, and control capability of the existing political system or competing narrative. Concentrating multiple lines of influence activities is the massed effort to affect a target set, erode an adversary's influence, and prevent effective counter narratives to seize the influence initiative. In summation, the following causal mechanisms exist with respect to deeds and messages.

Indigenous resonance states that the more local norms and idioms are used, the more effective the message (verbal or nonverbal) will be. The degree in which the messages and deeds of the influencing agent are emotionally relevant and fit within the audience's daily patterns of life determines the degree of resonance leading to the audience alignment with the desired influence effect.

Exploiting/subverting the competition means that the more an adversary's (or influence competitor's) mistakes and vulnerabilities are exploited, the more effective the influence operation becomes in repressing or swaying the audience. Mistakes made by either actor serve to reduce the opponent's influence saliency. Exploiting mistakes may also induce emotional reactions that create dissonance.

Massed and synchronized messages and deeds assert that when deeds and messages are synchronized and mutually supportive, the greater the impact and resonance will be among the target audience(s).

2. Channels

Channels are individuals within a social network who propagate information to a greater number of actors, nodes, or groups within and across networks in the shortest amount of time. These actors populate the interpersonal and electronic gossip grape vines within and across informal social networks, inherently affecting the formal social and socio-political structure of a community and society. Although other actors and nodes exist within social networks, such as brokers, bridges, monitors, and leaders, channels are the natural retransmitters of the verbal and nonverbal narratives that amplify the desired influence effect. Insurgents and similar nonstate actors inherently understand the need to

send a message (verbal and physical) to a community through its natural social lines of communication. The causal mechanism for activating the channels is the influence message naturally or artificially infiltrating the local networks and propagating.

Infiltrating local networks maximizes the use of local actors with high levels of centrality propagate a message, and as such, the more effective the delivery will be. Central actors are those who serve as informal links between social or information networks within the wider target audiences. They occupy positions within a network where their visibility is low but they spread information to a greater number of people or nodes in the shortest amount of time. This characteristic may increase or reduce the negative implications of actions or messages due to their ability to spread information rapidly at a homogeneous (audience) level. These agents may also reduce negative implications for the counterinsurgent or insurgent.

3. Mediums

Mediums are the interpersonal, physical, and electronic conduit used by the channel(s) and the influencing agents to convey the message. Those used for discussing daily events and exchanging information range from local face-to-face gossip grape vines, to neighborhood gathering points, and to leveraging mass media outlets. This method also includes intermediate conduits for information flow, such as text messaging, eSocial networks, blogs, and low-tech examples to include community plays, councils, etc. The causal mechanism for mediums is the method and mode in which the channels and their associated audience propagate the influence message through technological or gossip grapevines. When the latter use locally diffused technology for message dissemination, the more the message's level of validity and acceptance increases among the targeted audiences.

Utilizing commonly used technological methods of social interactions and information gathering will increase the distribution of the intended influence, as well as its legitimacy. Examples include cell phone text messages, local gathering points where people discuss daily events or gossip, Internet social networks, and locally owned and operated broadcast stations.⁴³

As illustrated in Figure 3, the successful and congruent employment of the influence causal mechanism will create a decisive influence effect.




Figure 3. Decisive Influence

While each one of the causal mechanisms can lead to effective influence, case study analysis should illustrate that when these causal mechanisms are in synergy, a decisive influence effect is achieved. The decisive influence effect is directly proportional to the success of all three variables and their causal mechanisms. A degree of effective influence can be achieved if one variable is less prominent than the other two, but decisive influence cannot be achieved unless they are proportionally employed.

⁴³ Current events in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Bahrain, and Iran exemplify this mechanism.

J. CASE STUDIES

Using SMT and the variables of message and deeds, channels, and mediums, this thesis analyzes four case studies to illustrate how insurgents and nonstate actors execute influence warfare. Case selection includes the Viet Cong's fight for control of the rural hamlets, the evolution of Hezbollah and its fight against Israel, Jemaah Islamiyah's (JI) violent extremist insurgency in South East Asia, and the rise and fall of Shining Path in Peru. These cases display a grassroots approach to insurgent and nonstate actor influence warfare, and provide insight toward answering the question: what are effective insurgent and terrorist influence operations and how can these be exploited or subverted to provide the United States with an advantage?

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II. THE VIETCONG

A. BACKGROUND

How did the Vietnamese communists, who possessed inferior and limited resources, win the war of influence, and ultimately, the Vietnam War itself against the South Vietnamese government and the United States? Throughout the 1960s, North Vietnam and its sponsored insurgent force, the Viet Cong (VC), waged a “people’s revolution” against the South Vietnamese government (GVN) and U.S. military forces.⁴⁴ Under the guidance of Ho Chi Minh and the direction of General Nguyen Giap, an insurgency and irregular war was fought to gain control over the people, territory, and natural resources in South Vietnam with the ultimate goal of reunification and national independence.⁴⁵ Based in Mao’s strategies for mobilizing the population, the communist’s military campaigns spanned three strategic phases: social movement, liberation, and legitimization/militarization.⁴⁶ These phases supported the insurgency’s primary effort, a struggle for “hearts and minds,”⁴⁷ and not a war in the conventional sense as defined by prevailing U.S. and western military doctrine. The Viet Cong utilized holistic influence tactics and techniques as their preeminent grassroots weaponry to ensure the defeat and fall of the South Vietnamese government.⁴⁸ The following quote epitomizes North Vietnam’s and the Viet Cong’s warfare effort by focusing all military and political actions toward defeating the United States and South Vietnam through a war of influence:

⁴⁴ William R. Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 156.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: the Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1966), 154.

⁴⁷ Douglas Pike, “Second Indochina War Symposium,” spon. the Center of Military History and comp. John Schlight (presentation, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 101.

⁴⁸ American Embassy Saigon, *Vietcong Foreign Affairs and Propaganda Activities* (Saigon: 1967), <http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?yPVVd6uMgyNbLm8ZF@GuXEqND1Zqr4jgVUIW5@f1fnNWghKBwlxEWUAndAp.GFVnQTCNPOi.4V3Vi.BP8WmdkaWqAqsG06X.snhh@TIDNYk/2120801035.pdf>.

Every military clash, every demonstration, every propaganda appeal was seen as an integrated whole; each had consequences far beyond its immediately apparent results. It was a framework that allowed us to view battles as psychological events and to undertake negotiations in order to strengthen our military position. The Americans seemed never to appreciate fully this strategic perspective, which among ourselves we most often simply called *Danh va dam, dam va dahn* (“fighting and talking, talking and fighting”). It was, after all, a traditional Vietnamese approach to warfare, a technique refined over centuries of confrontation with invaders more powerful than ourselves.⁴⁹

The incongruent social conditions between the rural population and the urban focused South Vietnam government generated a wealth of exploitable conditions. The South Vietnam government was largely inactive throughout the rural villages, creating large swaths of political and security uncontested regions, or free spaces. The rural population remained a village-based society, a stark contrast with the urban populations’ more national focused ideology. Local grievances were far more important to the village-based segment of society who saw little relevance in the calls for reunification or resistance to communism. The Vietcong recognized this political opportunity and adapted their ideological framework to align with the needs and expectations of rural villages to mobilize sufficient resources, while also exacerbating the growing discord between the people and the South Vietnamese government.

Vietnamese society endured centuries of “foreign occupation,” instilling a heritage of clandestine social organizations that served as the only outlet for political discourse and preservation of their culture.⁵⁰ Due to the clandestine nature of these organizations, a series of clandestine social networks were in place for exploitation and easy infiltration by the Vietcong into the rural Vietnamese society. Consecutive years of foreign occupation also created a history of resentment and mistrust for “foreign occupiers” and fostered a spirit of independence, or *Doc Lap*.⁵¹ Through subjugation and

⁴⁹ Trương Như Tảng, David Chanoff, and Van Toai Doan. *A Vietcong Memoir* (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 86.

⁵⁰ Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 1.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

self-preservation, conditions were ripe for Vietnam's communist-backed insurgency to appropriate and mobilize these organizations on behalf of Vietnamese "independence" from the South Vietnamese government, which followed on the footsteps of the French defeat to the Vietminh and the subsequent division of North and South Vietnam.

As early as 1955, communist insurgents were actively conducting influence operations to infiltrate and subvert the population against the new Government of South Vietnam (GVN).⁵² From 1955 through the 1960s and '70s, communist insurgent influence operations systematically targeted villages as the "fundamental unit of peoples' war."⁵³ Vietnamese communist party leadership developed a comprehensive process to take control of a village using clandestine teams to infiltrate and socially embed within target villages allowing the insurgents to subvert the village social structure. Communist cadres established secret village councils, socially marginalizing political rivals affiliated with the GVN. They repressed any opposition or potential ideological competition using propaganda, coercive activities, social intelligence, social targeting, and tailoring "party" goals to fit the short-term socio-political demands of local populations.⁵⁴ The communist insurgents' organizational structure and their use of psychologically impacting deeds to validate their propaganda messages enabled the insurgents to subvert a village's political and social status quo. The influence effort was individually tailored to each village's unique social dynamic, which allowed for rapid consolidation and expansion throughout and within rural provinces.

A review and analysis of Viet Cong operations shows their influence operations were implemented using three Lines of Influence (LOIs) as detailed in Table 1. The use of specific messages, deeds, channels, and mediums under each LOI at the village level mutually supported the other influence lines of effort in pursuit of social mobilization along with military and political objectives.

⁵² Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960-1964*, 22.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 26.

<u>Influence Line of Effort</u>	<u>Message and Deeds</u>	<u>Channels</u>	<u>Mediums</u>
Dissent and Discord (Separate People from Government)	Civil Affairs, Land Reform, Shadow Gov't Entertainment Programs (Ideology Focused) Targeted Assassination / Coercion Proselytizing in Villages	Family Members Covert Village Informants Overt Infiltration	Primary: Interpersonal Communication Supporting: Print, Audio, Audio-Visual
Disrupt/Attack Government Control Mechanisms and Social Structures	Post US/GVN Visit Counter-Propaganda Efforts (Countersweep Operations) Counter Strategic Hamlet Operations Social Margilization of Gov't Leaders Reduction of Prestige of Families Re-Education Anti-GVN Conscription Anti-US "Imperialism" Targeted Assassination / Coercion	Family Members Influential Saigon Leaders Government Spies Overt	
Repression, Consolidation and Expansion	Co-opt Outside Groups (such as Buddhist and Catholic) Information Manipulation (Media) Control Village Movement Coercive "police-like" Efforts Intra Village Mistrust via "Neighborhood Watch" Recruitment Proselytizing in Villages Targeted Assassination / Coercion	Youth Movements Families Overt	

Table 1. Vietnamese Communist's Lines of Influence (LOIs)

B. MESSAGE AND DEEDS

Western political-military doctrines tend to regard civilian population groups within a theater of conflict as an obstacle or object, which impedes the ability to engage and defeat the enemy quickly and decisively.⁵⁵ In Vietnam, the Viet Cong's main effort was the political mobilization of the population down to and including the village level,⁵⁶ which was a unique relationship completely alien to the U.S. and South Vietnamese government attempting to counter the insurgency.⁵⁷ The Viet Cong's organizational structure was designed to influence a population alignment shift toward Vietcong objectives. The Vietcong designated a committee to manage an influence campaign for each village, hamlet, and targeted surrounding areas. Each village committee possessed Civil Affairs Committees (CACs), agitation propaganda cells, administration cells, social intelligence agents, and security personnel. Each entity executed a unique function, generating an equally unique influence effect. However, the simultaneous and synchronized efforts always contributed toward the same end state with each subordinate

⁵⁵ Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961–1971* (Department of the Army, 1973), <http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/90-23/90-23C.htm>.

⁵⁶ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 23.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

cell trading primacy of action dependent on the necessary desired effect. Cadre cells, such as those within the Civil Affairs committee, had unprecedented latitude to develop messages, institute social structural changes, use deliberate violence, attack opposition (physically or nonphysically), and promise desired deliverables. By integrating into a village and hamlet, special cadre cells tailored messages and deeds to the local populace's interests in pursuit of overall influence objectives.

1. Exploiting and Subverting the Competition

Using a network-like approach, the Viet Cong established a comprehensive methodology for taking control of a hamlet or village. Each hamlet and village within a province underwent a four-step process to subvert the existing socio-political structure within a village and province. Special cadre teams (such as social recce teams) conducted overt and covert social intelligence to develop comprehensive area and village assessments, building robust intelligence databases to further the Viet Cong's understanding of even the most subtle nuances of daily village life and socio-political actions. Their implementation is similar to U.S. unconventional warfare doctrine but is much more interpersonal and comprehensive across the operational and strategic levels.⁵⁸

Cadre teams surveyed villages to identify concentrations of Roman Catholics, families with ties to the government and military, government representatives, formal and informal social committees, police, tax collection personnel and their schedules, micro to macro level social grievances, personal feuds, day-to-day patterns of life, and also assess ideological openness.⁵⁹ When compared to other groups analyzed in this thesis, the Viet Cong were more willing to co-opt other religions to use in the social mobilization process. For example, Shining Path demonstrates the ramifications marginalizing or attacking religious groups, which impedes cognitive alignment and social movement. Vietcong civil affairs committees subverted and eventually replaced existing village socio-political systems by exploiting the vulnerabilities identified in their social

⁵⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, "Field Manual 3-05.130 Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare," 2-1.

⁵⁹ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960-1964*, 42-45.

intelligence and through the nature of their socially embedded status.⁶⁰ The communist agents socially embedded themselves into a village in such a way that they became “symbiotic,” rather than parasitic.⁶¹ Comprehensive understanding and familiarity gained by Viet Cong cadre enabled them to conduct specific and tailored messages against potential rivals, simultaneously gathering increased support from amiable or indifferent members of a village. Communist messages were framed in ways to resonate with the individual, ranging from building rapport and support, to vilification of government agents or representatives, manipulation and co-opting social structures, and eventually focusing messages on consolidating and expanding social alignment. These messages were indoctrinated through deliberate actions that fall into five general categories: targeted violence and coercion, “counter sweeps,”⁶² responsive and present local shadow governments, proselytizing, and social marginalization.

After infiltrating a village, the communist cadres focused on destroying the “social adhesiveness” that historically had integrated a villager into the local social strata⁶³ to eliminate the traditional sense of identity. Rather than targeting individuals within the populace, key institutions and their functions were targeted to disrupt established social norms and complacency.⁶⁴ Discontent between the population and the government regarding various social needs and expectations was targeted using rumors and local forums to vilify the ineffectiveness of the status quo. Coupled with actions to disrupt key government institutions, such as security and subsistence activities, the messages became ratified as discontent turned into dissent.⁶⁵ Once dissent took shape, the communist CACs expanded lines of influence (LIO) through overt actions to further

⁶⁰ Alex V. Simmons, *Socially Embedded Insurgencies* (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA514335&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.

⁶¹ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 132.

⁶² Central Office for South Vietnam, *A COSVN Standing Account of the Situation in South Vietnam from the End of 1961 to the Beginning of 1964, Captured National Liberation Front Document, Vietnam, 1969*, 1-17-20, <http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/232/2320113002a.pdf>.

⁶³ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 51.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

divide the population and subvert the existing social framework. With government institutions increasingly discredited, villagers with ties to the government, direct or indirect, were vulnerable for deliberate targeting.

Villagers who opposed the Viet Cong, who had ties to the government or military, or whom represented potential obstacles to influence objectives were left physically unharmed but became socially marginalized.⁶⁶ Social marginalization was a psychic shock to Vietnamese society, which places a high value on dignity and virtue.⁶⁷

They treated me rather well and I was not beaten.... I was, however, blindfolded and tied up all the time. On the sixth day, they led me back to [my village] and I had to stand up in front of the villagers gathered in meeting to acknowledge my errors and apologize to them. I was only released thereafter because the Party judged that I had not yet been a party to any bloody affairs. This was a reduction-of-prestige campaign aimed at me and I felt very ashamed when, from the villagers' ranks, some people came out to curse me. My emotional life was then very hard. I felt wretched. None of the villagers were willing to talk to me....."⁶⁸

The reduction-of-prestige campaign was a subordinate influence effort within the line of influence aimed at disrupting and attacking the socio-political system. After targeting an individual for attack, the propaganda and agitation cell would spread messages denouncing the target, which would then be followed by sudden disappearance. Once a person was disconnected from the social hierarchy and marginalized, the cadres exploited the event to assert their ability to administer the village in lieu of the previous status quo. This cyclical process coerced villagers opposing or wanting to be perceived as opposing the communist cadres.

These efforts were done with "a scalpel, not a broadsword."⁶⁹ Influence directives from the strategic echelon of the insurgency were succinct, but also facilitated sufficient latitude for cadre cells at the tactical and operational levels to tailor and execute village

⁶⁶ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 132.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 41.

and provincial influence campaigns. The VC, through Ho Chi Minh's insight and leadership, codified organizational guidelines that stressed not to “smash the existing social system; don't destroy opposition organizations, take them over.”⁷⁰ To attack larger opposing organizations, the VC's influence front maintained an amorphous existence, which allowed them to infiltrate opposing organizations socially. They accommodated rivals while working to subvert them. Messages and deeds were tailored to bridge or amplify common grievances or interests between the VC and rival organizations in an overall effort to absorb the targeted organization. Consequently, the opposing organization's leadership was fragmented through terror, coercion, and/or marginalization. The message was muted into base terms, and specific messages and agenda regarding communism's “class struggle” was only discussed among cadre. Cadres blended the “materialistic appeals of communism” with patriotism so the populace would see themselves as nationalists rather than communists. Conceptually, this process bred conditions for the population's cognitive alignment shift toward a social movement in line with the Viet Cong's and North Vietnam's strategic end state.⁷¹ Broad guidance and operational flexibility given to tactical and operational cadre facilitated the communist's overall strategic objectives, rather than the strategic endeavors dictating actions of cadre at the grassroots level.

This flexibility also enabled the use of violence through controlled and deliberate targeting. The Viet Cong incorporated violence, coercion, and targeted killings as a direct method for subversion and exploitation of its competition. In contested areas, CACs received the greatest leeway in executing enemies and possessed the “absolute right” to kill those who were overt opponents and government agents.⁷² Violence was used primarily against political groups or GVN organizations/programs to create a security vacuum that the Viet Cong would fill. It was not violence for military gains or lack of rationale. Violence was also leveraged to eliminate effective opposition leadership.

⁷⁰ Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 41.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁷² Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 61.

However, ineffective and corrupt opposition leadership was not eliminated. If violence was required to influence the population, the Viet Cong would also use or create a scapegoat to reinforce their narrative. Additionally, reprisals would also create a self-policing commune-like culture. Captured Viet Cong documents stated:

In each village...We compiled a detailed dossier of the various local despots. If someone merited the death penalty we sent a group to deal with him. Afterwards we used loudhailers to explain the crimes committed...we posted names of other tyrants who would be dealt with if they did not cease their activities...The executions...and the warnings played a major role in breaking the grip of the enemy throughout the country...and created conditions under which we could move back into the villages, either permanently or in organizational visits...⁷³

Violence against institutions or individuals (real or created by the VC) representing the government demonstrated the Viet Cong's messaging credibility. Moreover, targeting an individual or organization focused public attention and provided an outlet for the populace's grievances, which continued to align the population with the VC, or at a minimum, against the government.⁷⁴

In addition to violence, one of the most robust methods used by the Viet Cong for subverting opponents and competition were "counter sweep" operations. Any time a GVN or U.S. entity entered a village, the Viet Cong would subsequently enter and engage the villagers. "After leaflet drops, loudspeaker broadcasts, or government sweeps through the village, the cadre frequently called meetings to discuss the government propaganda. One technique was to point out that government actions always went counter to what it said..."⁷⁵

Rallies were often organized to foment dissent against the GVN. Items left behind by U.S. or GVN forces were exploited and used as props during rallies. Corpses, regardless of who killed them or how they died, were a primary tool of the VC's

⁷³ United States Mission in Vietnam, *Viet Cong Use of Terror* (Saigon: United States Mission in Vietnam, 1966), 24, www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/229/2293801019A.pdf.

⁷⁴ Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 58.

⁷⁵ W. Phillips Davison, *Some Observations on Viet Cong Operations in the Villages* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1968), 112, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/2007/RM5267.2.pdf.

propaganda and agitation teams.⁷⁶ Cadre recited biographies, focusing on the deceased's sympathetic hardships, and tying them to actions or inactions of the United States and the government.⁷⁷ Messages were redistributed among insurgent combat forces with ties to respective villages undergoing counter sweeps. This perpetuated discord toward the government, galvanizing morale among the Viet Cong's rank and file fighters.

Proselytizing ideological themes, entertainment, and villager education were also essential in subverting GVN and U.S. efforts at the village level. Young males were cultivated into active participants, typically undergoing indoctrination while being used as a source of labor. Viet Cong schools spent roughly 60% of their time teaching literacy, supporting understanding of cadre messages and also building support for the communist cause because of the provided education services.⁷⁸

A significant deed employed by cadre, and perhaps the tipping point⁷⁹ in their message and deeds portion of their influence operations, was land reform. Land reform solidified messages of dissent against a "corrupt" South Vietnamese government and an "imperial" United States, while simultaneously validating messages echoing the communist's validity and support for the people.⁸⁰ By addressing and capitalizing on grievances in this manner, the Viet Cong were able to develop further an "insurgent consciousness" necessary for social mobilization. Cadres confiscated land from 'imperialists and their agents' and subsequently redistributed it to local farmers and families possessing no direct or indirect ties to the government or military.⁸¹ Cadres performed the redistribution through public ceremonies. New landowners received prestigious land titles to enhance further their social standing, but not all land was

⁷⁶ Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 284–285.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 281–283.

⁷⁹ Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2000), 7–9.

⁸⁰ Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 276–277.

⁸¹ Ibid., 277–279.

seized.⁸² Cadres would identify “patriotic” farmers and landlords whose land would not be targeted. So long as their rent to villagers working their land was deemed reasonable, the land was safe from confiscation. This created a repressive atmosphere of conformity among the various village social classes, providing the opportunity for villagers to purchase land previously unattainable under the GVN system. It also prevented the alienation of the rural landlords and farming class.

Simultaneous implementation of the Vietnamese communist’s multiple lines of influence enabled the Viet Cong to establish shadow governments throughout villages, hamlets, and provinces by incorporating the use of fines, regulations, penalties, police power, and terror.⁸³ The Viet Cong influence efforts created a GVN power vacuum, while filling it with their own form of government. The goal was to build and field competent armed forces, taxation systems, schools, regulated commerce, and dispensed justice that would rival and subvert GVN efforts at the village level to shift popular alignment and increase social mobilization.⁸⁴

2. Indigenous Resonance

For message and deeds, indigenous resonance was the critical component in achieving desired effects. By tailoring messages and their supporting acts at an introspective and personal level, VC cadres ensured individuals adopted the issues and themes into their daily hierarchy of concerns. Influence efforts enabled messages to infiltrate local villages with minimal disruption because of situational awareness developed by social recce cells well before any attempts to initiate active influence on the village.

The Viet Cong used cohabitation in the village as a primary method to achieve indigenous resonance. By living with the villagers, all influence efforts could be continuously adapted to actual conditions occurring within communities. VC cadre (and

⁸² Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 277–279.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 279.

⁸⁴ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 140.

eventually converted local family members used as trusted proxies) achieved acceptance because of the personal interaction established through social network ties throughout the immediate and surrounding communities.⁸⁵ This process enabled the gradual introduction of “soft-pedaled” Marxist intentions to attain short-term gains over time.⁸⁶ The effectiveness of this technique was expressed by a villager during an interview:

...he thought [Viet Cong] propaganda was effective because it was very specific (how many pigs and oxen were killed in a bombing attack, how many houses burned, etc.), it was carefully tailored for each audience (“the Vietcong analyze every one of their targets of activity, and try to find the likings and wishes of each”), it stresses a person-to-person relationship (the cadre lives close to the people; they wear the same clothes, behave amicably, and in turn, gain trust and friendship), and it is persistent (the cadres talk constantly, and eventually the people have to listen). He contrasted this approach with the one used by the government propaganda teams, which set up their loudspeakers, give [sic] public lectures, and then move [sic] on.⁸⁷

This exemplifies the strategy of socially mobilizing the population by adapting ideological framework to align with the needs, expectation, and conditions within each village. The comprehensive process to “take control of a village” was specific in its purpose but broad enough to allow precise implementation.⁸⁸ Messages, deeds, subversion, and coercion techniques were effective because the cadres understood the local population’s psychological pressure points and how to manipulate them. Exploiting these cognitive vulnerabilities ensured messages and supporting actions impacted the population in such a way that the combined messages and deeds affected the audience emotionally and subconsciously. The captured Viet Cong document, *Entertainment Plan of Tay Ninh Province from 20 July to 20 December 1966*, illustrates how Viet Cong cadre used unique methods to resonate emotionally with local village members:

⁸⁵ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 132.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁸⁷ Davison, *Some Observations on Viet Cong Operations in the Villages*, 11–12.

⁸⁸ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 26.

...district and village entertainment cadre should develop their [local] cultural knowledge of the people, encourage them to write plays which can be published in time to stir up the [local villagers]. Along with the above mission, villages should organize children's dances, popular entertainment groups and village entertainment groups if possible. In particular, children's dances should be popularized. Thus, the entertainment activities can be stirred up in a broad front.⁸⁹

Other examples are evident in a U.S. Government document, *The Vietnamese Communist Agit-Prop System: A Short Study (1967)*, which highlights instructions taken from a captured Viet Cong manual:

Good technique does not consist in collection of materials about our policies and programs and then giving a “certified copy” to the masses. Neither does it mean picking up a megaphone and explaining general policies in a general way. It means ceaseless effort and taking detailed care to persuade the [local] masses, to clarify their thinking... Many cadres simply distribute slogans and the result is that the masses know the slogans but do not know what actions to take. Agitation to create public opinion, the easiest way to attack the enemy, is best based on some sudden incident created either by the enemy or by us, such as regrouping of the people, drafting young men... or a people's victory. When an incident takes place, hang flags, make an effigy, [and] distribute leaflets... Organize [local] meetings for the masses to discuss the event. Recount, or invent concrete stories.⁹⁰

Continuous emotional and subconscious impact reinforced LOI objectives toward the overarching goal of shifting the village's cognitive alignment. The effects of the cohabitation and interaction process constantly fed the influence cycle through continuous proactive, reactive, and adaptive messaging and actions, which, in turn, reinforced the process and enabled infiltration into new areas of expansion.

⁸⁹ National Liberation Front, *Entertainment Plan of Tay Nih Province from 20 July to 20 December 1966*, trans. (United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam Combined Document Exploitation Center 1966), 2, <http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?1P2h8tOmMT11PilvECWjguzhyqxFoSBfZfK0mohcq5Uyx9HkVncXgoz6V1XGm.cEba veN67gjpGxl61lcqAbU.pLSVj2KpQc0g0LWmC9Tc/11271002006.pdf/>.

⁹⁰ United States Government, *The Vietnamese Communist Agit-Prop System: A Short Study (1967)*, 1967, 16, <http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?23P2xwwClf5ND0tuWcZ6y7fLOm3ixwoTPHEI416x7MAFDQO81zLElqiLLKG.H2P.FulTKt6DwmM8mUASvIIKfo6R1R6wFQAexhcuxeF5FQI/2311612009.pdf>.

3. Synchronization and Massing of Message and Deeds

The increasingly synchronized and mutually supportive nature of messages and deeds ensured compounding desired effects and resonance with targeted audiences. For the Viet Cong, a successful influence strategy meant every message possessed corresponding supporting action to validate the message and extend the message's shelf life.

When the VC conducted an assassination (deed), the killing supported a larger influence message, but it was also supported with leaflets, letters, or other literature in combination with face-to-face interaction on the justification of the action.⁹¹ The United States Mission in Vietnam published a 50-page document in 1966 entitled *Viet Cong Use of Terror*. Captured Viet Cong correspondence in this document outlines the methodology used:

The plan for elimination of tyrants (i.e. assassinations) must be very carefully worked out. Investigation of those to be eliminated must be meticulously conducted. Leaflets must be disseminated to make the people clearly understand the crimes of the tyrants to be executed and our motives in executing them and to warn other tyrants. The plan for the elimination of tyrants must be very detailed so that our personnel can withdraw safely after accomplishing their mission. Men must be deployed to prevent enemy pursuit, if any, and leaflets disseminated (by those departing) as mentioned above...⁹²

Targeted killings were not isolated events but were deeds in support of a corresponding line of influence. From 1957 to 1966, the Viet Cong conducted 5,801-targeted assassinations.⁹³ This number only reflects planned and targeted killings used to support overall influence efforts. The document is laden with numerous first-hand examples of the synchronized effects inherent in targeted killings. One small example states:

August 23, 1960—Two school teachers, Nguyen Khoa Ngon and Miss Nguyen Thi Thiet, are preparing lessons at home when Viet Cong arrive

⁹¹ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 56.

⁹² United States Mission in Vietnam, *Viet Cong Use of Terror*, 23.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 8.

and force them at gun point to go to their school, Rau Ran, in Phong Dinh province. There they find two men tied to the school veranda. The Viet Cong read the death order of the two men, Damed Canh and Van. They are executed. The Viet Cong stage the execution...to intimidate the school teachers.⁹⁴

When psychologically attacking a village, the VC would use messages and deeds sequentially, consecutively or both, depending on the nature of the targeted community. For example, a counter sweep operation would implement land reform or social marginalization, reinforced with reduction of prestige campaigns or targeted assassinations. Not only did cadres mass efforts within a village, the organizational structure from the tactical to the strategic level massed influence efforts across multiple villages and provinces. This exemplified massing effort and deliberately affecting adjacent and distant villages based on the various degrees of closeness centrality,⁹⁵ which linked both geographically and demographically separated villages.⁹⁶

C. CHANNELS

Upon infiltrating a village overtly or covertly, the Viet Cong similarly used a combination of natural and artificial channels to begin the propagation process, which ensured influence effort consistency across established information channels for the village and neighboring communities. When the individuals who served as the natural information channels in a village adopted communist messages, the messages and their effects would virally propagate, which further enabled cadre cells to infiltrate new villages physically and begin generating the social intelligence needed to initiate, expand, or increase influence efforts.⁹⁷ As cadres increasingly exploited (directly or indirectly), planted, and/or used channels across a mix of social networks, their influence operational

⁹⁴ United States Mission in Vietnam, *Viet Cong Use of Terror*, 9.

⁹⁵ For example, targeting villages A and D that are connected to each other through villages B and C ensured both B and C received secondary influence effects from operations ongoing in villages A and D. This targeting not only prepared the environment for future influence operations within villages B and C, but also began the initial steps to take control of those villages.

⁹⁶ Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 220–222.

⁹⁷ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 42.

effectiveness increased. The Viet Cong realized that finding and utilizing channels was not an easy task but recognized it as a critical task. Hanoi would send older revolutionaries to serve as recruiters and organizers in the south, who would find every conceivable way to find and exploit channels.⁹⁸

The most common and widespread channel used by the Viet Cong to infiltrate and initiate influence operations occurred using family members. For example, a son's occupation played an important role in determining the sympathies of the whole family.⁹⁹ Families with members involved with the Viet Cong not only gave more assistance to the Viet Cong, but also were also more susceptible to its propaganda and influence.¹⁰⁰

In at least one province (Puoc Tuy) the procedure was to persuade a family to work for the [VC] and then to have that family move in to the strategic hamlet. Once inside, the mission of this family was to make friends with other families and recruit more supporters for the insurgents. Agents in the hamlets, who were known as “secret young men,” were instructed to exploit any conflict between the population and the local officials.... He was instructed not to identify himself as a Viet Cong agent, but to pretend that he was passing on gossip that he had heard somewhere else.¹⁰¹

In 1966, the Rand Corporation published a 274-page document entitled *Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join*. The text contains hundreds of interviews with active or former Viet Cong members. The document repeatedly illustrates how the Viet Cong used family members as channels for recruitment and influence efforts. One powerful example from the document reflected the story of a former youth recruiter who operated near the city of Cantho:

I was with a youth proselyting [sic] group. We made propaganda among the young men from 18 to 25 years old and their families. As for the young people, we would arouse their hatred for the enemy and urge them to join the Revolution. With regard to the families, we would make

⁹⁸ Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (Army) Washington, DC, *A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam.(PROVN), Volume II*, 1966, <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD0377744>.

⁹⁹ Davison, *Some Observations on Viet Cong Operations in the Villages*, 161.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 10–11.

propaganda and then urge them to call their sons in the cities back to the village to join the Revolution. We investigated very efficiently; we knew exactly which family had a son in the cities. When we succeed in making the young man join the Front [thorough use of his family] we would turn him over to the local men, i.e. the guerillas.¹⁰²

The Viet Cong also relied on children as channels. The susceptible nature of children combined with their access across multiple social structures made them uniquely suited to serve as channels to propagate messages, but also bridged influence operations across multiple networks:

Emotional and fearless, the youth groups could be used to catalyze other factions and movements, and to provide cadres who could direct the street revolution when it came.... Dang now asked me to create a city-wide youth movement that would gather all the various youth movements not yet associated with us - the Buddhist youth, Catholic youth, high school and university student associations, working class youth, and others...this was not to be done directly. Instead the aim would be to create an umbrella organization that we would control surreptitiously, bringing forceful antigovernment leadership into play when conditions had sufficiently matured.¹⁰³

Learning from years of experience with the Lao Dong Youth League during the French occupation,¹⁰⁴ the Viet Cong saw young people as a key element in their influence operations. They developed extensive programs to recruit, train, and utilize the youth because of their unique ability to infiltrate social networks and overall utility for the long-term fight. The Viet Cong established the Youth Liberation Association, Village Children's Group, the People's Revolutionary Party Youth League, and the Student Liberation Association illustrating some of the more formal elements of Viet Cong targeting of the youth.¹⁰⁵ The Viet Cong also targeted youth outside of the formal organizations. The document *Children of the Viet Cong* discusses how "about 200

¹⁰² John C. Donnell, "Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join," *The Rand Corporation*, November 2, 1966, 120, www.rand.org/pubs/documents/2006/D14436.pdf; see the remainder of the document for more examples of Viet Cong use of family members as channels.

¹⁰³ Tàng, Chanoff, and Doan. *A Vietcong Memoir*, 105.

¹⁰⁴ Pike, *Viet Cong; the Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 183.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 150–153, 186.

sappers from the N-10 and N-13 Viet Cong Battalions had infiltrated Saigon and were recruiting high school students to carry out terrorist attacks in the capital.”¹⁰⁶ The document continues to address how the Viet Cong ultimately developed and pursued a nationwide program for using children:

Official intelligence sources in Saigon disclosed...that the Viet Cong had launched a stepped-up nationwide drive to recruit South Vietnamese children...when indoctrinated, these children...[serve] as guerrillas, sappers, political cadres, spies, and terrorists.¹⁰⁷

The use of natural channels (local individuals who adopt and innately spread information and gossip to various connectors and mavens within and across social networks) increased the validity of communist cadre messages and actions. The use of natural channels allowed messages and effects to diffuse virally because individuals serving as natural channels existed in traditional and trusted social network information conduits. In many cases, the use of natural channels facilitated access to social networks higher in the Vietnamese social hierarchy. Local landowners with social and political status, targeted directly or indirectly, who fell under cadre influence and authorized to keep their land, were dubbed “political landlords.” Although “political landlords” possessed political influence at the local level, they were used as channels and persuasive voices against the GVN at the district level and higher because of their political and economic status, which allowed them to tap into multiple social structures.¹⁰⁸ The Viet Cong reinforced the use of natural channels at the local level with natural and artificial channels at the national level to create an inflated level of influence within regional and national level government systems. For example, within government and social networks in Saigon, the Viet Cong covertly used powerful “Saigonese” personalities (such as respected government officials, celebrities, etc.) to pressure the GVN to steer political

¹⁰⁶ Vietnam Feature Service, “Children in the Viet Cong,” April 1970, 3–4, <http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?SMM2FdLXJ3O.zYQ0Xv3rHc2WNVHDPT.FS5AL5KuCM8yVvosqzXEz9eGRktFARTrQJFdmAWGeajKTnKrCNeheFYAZiFAPWs73YEtXdmGdET8/2321415022.pdf>.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰⁸ Pike, *Viet Cong; the Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 278–280.

discourse in favor of Viet Cong aims in response to direct Viet Cong actions at the local or district levels.¹⁰⁹ These “Saigonese” level personalities used their political status to convince government officials to negotiate with, rather than try to destroy, the VC because “the VC were too powerful to be destroyed.”¹¹⁰ Malicious petitions, supported by print propaganda, were also generated to influence the government to negotiate with the VC citing military direct action against the VC as harmful and unproductive for the local villager.¹¹¹ The use of “Saigonese” personalities as channels provided a natural and artificial channel hybrid for exploitation by communist cadre at the operational and strategic level. These channels disrupted GVN counter influence efforts at the strategic and operational levels, which shielded communist cadre influence at the tactical levels. In short, tactical and operational levels of their influence campaigns were bottom up and supported or reinforced by strategic and operational (or top-down) influence activities. Meanwhile, GVN and U.S. influence activities attempted to counter communist influence at the strategic level with supporting efforts occurring at the tactical and operational levels. While the United States achieved some successes in countering VC influence, they were isolated and strategically unsupported.

D. MEDIUMS

The Viet Cong used a variety of mediums integrated into its influence campaign across South Vietnam. However, they placed primacy on face-to-face and direct interpersonal communication/interaction; other mediums were solely designed to facilitate and support this end.¹¹² Vietnamese communist leadership believed mediums

¹⁰⁹ Tàng, Chanoff, and Doan. *A Vietcong Memoir*, 95.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 95–96.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² Pike, *Viet Cong; the Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 120–124, 398–399.

were mechanisms to mobilize potential insurgents, with face-to-face delivering the greatest effect.¹¹³ *The Vietnamese Communist Agit-Prop System: A Short Study (1967)* explains this philosophy in detail:

Mass media, to the [Vietnamese] Communists, are reinforcement tools only, and not considered strong enough to carry the burden of convincing the unconvinced. Thus, VC agit-prop cadre are employed to explain to ordinary citizens the current line of the party and also to justify by whatever arguments are most likely to be effective, the current party line and whatever changes are necessary. The complex VC political infrastructure is in fact part of the VC propaganda apparatus; the Communists, since about 1961, enmeshed the rural Vietnamese in a network of so-called “liberation associations”...and under the guidance of propaganda cadre, these are used as the vehicle for the communication of ideas. In every village where they operate, the VC uses this organizational weapon to indoctrinate the people at rallies, mass meetings, etc.¹¹⁴

Noninterpersonal mediums, such as print and audio, were mostly used in denied areas to shape the environment and support influence operations implemented through face-to-face efforts. For example, the Vietnamese communist party had a specific use for print mediums, which were often covertly disseminated. Leaflets were often left in contested areas at night by Viet Cong cadre or sympathizers channels inside social networks.¹¹⁵ These mediums would support conditions for activation or introduction of overt and covert channels into a social structure, and expand political-military tactical level influence effects to the operational and strategic levels.

Cadres at the village level used mediums, such as radio and motion pictures, and coordinated all cultural activities, such as operas and plays, to reinforce face-to-face interaction. Although the Viet Cong did operate larger mediums, such as “Radio Liberation” and “Liberation Film Studio,”¹¹⁶ these outlets ultimately served to support

¹¹³ Douglas Pike, *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam* (New York, N.Y.: Da Capo Press, 1991; 1986), 236.

¹¹⁴ United States Government, *The Vietnamese Communist Agit-Prop System: A Short Study (1967)*, 14.

¹¹⁵ Pike, *Viet Cong; the Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 405–406.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 406, 409.

the operations of entertainment cells in the villages, which provided various forms of entertainment, nuanced with Viet Cong messages. In addition to putting on plays, dances, and other forms of entertainment,¹¹⁷ these cells would also directly explain print and radio broadcasts in an interactive, face-to-face manner. An excerpt from a captured Viet Cong manual on the Tay Ninh Province entertainment plan explains how this portion of the village program was conducted:

...[operate] reading cells, radio listening cells and children's newspaper reading cells by using and explaining [to the locals] all news contained in the information Bulletin (sic), and the Giai Phong [liberation] newspaper of the province...¹¹⁸

Although the Viet Cong used radio and other conventional media platforms, they were only utilized if the Viet Cong could maintain control to ensure the messages to support the face-to-face influence operations.¹¹⁹ While the exploitation of foreign media and press was conducted and supported Viet Cong influence efforts, it was executed by North Vietnam, but the effects were a byproduct that favored Viet Cong influence efforts.

Regardless of the medium, cadre members would elaborate on messages conveyed in the mediums, further generating social intelligence and refining future efforts toward social mobilization. Without the face-to-face medium, other mediums lacking interpersonal contact were insufficient to “convince the unconvinced.”¹²⁰ The face-to-face medium not only allowed better cognitive reception with the target audience, it also allowed Viet Cong cadre to refine and increase indigenous resonance, as well as discover new channels for exploitation against new social networks and villages.

¹¹⁷ National Liberation Front, *Entertainment Plan of Tay Nih Province from 20 July to 20 December 1966*, 3–5.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹¹⁹ Pike, *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam*, 237.

¹²⁰ Pike, *Viet Cong; The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 121.

E. CASE CONCLUSION AND EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES

1. Summary of Viet Cong Influence

Influence operations were not the Vietnamese communists' end state in and of itself (such as the classic statement of winning hearts and minds). Influence operations were used as a tool to shape conditions effectively, which ultimately facilitated some form of control over a sufficient portion of the population. As is the case with many insurgencies, the control was malicious in nature rather than benevolent. To shape the operational environment and establish desired levels of social control, Vietnamese communist influence operations were divisive in nature. These operations used deceit, misinformation, manipulated logic, emotional resonance, social vulnerabilities, and the manipulation of truth to shift behavior and cognitive alignment, which in turn, created a divergence to the social status quo in those areas in which the Viet Cong was allowed to thrive and spread. The VC battled to shape the environment by establishing influence and control over people, groups, and social networks, resulting in a relative influence superiority (real or perceived) that enabled them to persevere through multiple conventional military defeats.

The Viet Cong maximized the use of messages and deeds, channels and mediums to illicit cognitive social alignment and social mobilization in South Vietnam. Their bottom-up/grassroots/village-level approach, facilitated by the adaptability of local cadres, exemplified the causal mechanisms captured in the first chapter. This case study is the strongest example for highlighting the causal mechanisms leading to successful influence warfare and special influence operations. Although the Viet Cong made mistakes, the United States failed to assess and address the Viet Cong's influence operations sufficiently.

VC influence operations epitomized the carrot and stick methodology, presenting positive and violent characteristics to coerce, persuade, deceive, and eventually compel targeted population centers to align with their cause. One of the Vietnamese communist's largest vulnerabilities for exploitation emerged during the consolidation of power

phase.¹²¹ During this phase, overt repression was levied against a village or province's populace to ensure compliance. Once the true nature of Vietnamese communist intentions was revealed, the populace often seemed to appear isolated from reaching out to the United States and GVN who were not perceived as trustworthy. This mistrust placed the population in a catch-22 situation.

The destruction of the village social framework left the villager physically unharmed but socially isolated.¹²² This social vacuum enabled communist cadres to build and operate armed militia forces, taxation systems, schools, commerce regulation, and justice services.¹²³ In areas in which high levels of targeted violence were an unnecessary tool for the communist cadres, these systems substantially validated cadre interpersonal and nonverbal messages favoring their cause. By living among and/or maintaining an active presence with villagers, the VC developed and used social intelligence to tailor influence locally to increase feelings of discontent on the part of the people before trying to mobilize them. This influence occurred in areas in which aggressively repressive tactics were not used or needed. Cadre cells and communist propaganda teams explained efforts the "enemy" made to divide the Viet Cong from the population; they educated the people about the "struggle's" purpose, and stressed the importance and legality of the effort, basic policies, and other selective world news.¹²⁴

The Vietnamese communists recognized a dedicated, resourced, and capable influence opponent as a critical vulnerability to their overall operations and took deliberate measures to remove local competitors systematically. This removal was especially easy in the rural villages in which the GVN and United States were not readily providing security and stability for the populace. Communist counter sweep operations exemplify a focus on pre-empting and countering GVN and U.S. psychological special influence operations. Counter sweep operations were a mission-essential task of every

¹²¹ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960-1964*, 104.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 132.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 140.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 53.

cadre cell. Captured Viet Cong documents (such as an internal review from the Viet Cong Central office of South Vietnam (COSVN)) indicate counter sweeps were key operations to counter any GVN or U.S. attempt to disrupt VC influence. Counter sweep operations were an integral component toward ultimately mobilizing the populace. The Viet Cong Central office of South Vietnam stated:

At present, the troops, militia and guerrilla forces realize that countering sweeps is one of their primary duties and they are confident in the success of countering sweeps, are constantly and determinedly resisting sweep operations, have adopted countering sweeps as a mission to annihilate the enemy and train ourselves in effectively supporting the mass movement, and through countering sweeps were indoctrinated in improving their ideological, technical, and tactical standards. This marks a great maturity of our armed forces.¹²⁵

Local VC cadres vehemently challenged even the most benign influence endeavors of the GVN and United States through passive and active means. No opposing influence was tolerated. In many documented instances, communist cadre would bait GVN and U.S. forces into areas, knowing conventional forces would ultimately create destruction, alienate local villagers, and create exploitable influence vulnerabilities against the GVN and United States. Once allied forces cleared an area, communist cadre would re-enter it and exploit the second- and third-order effects created by the conventional security operations. The use of vilification and misinformation techniques allowed VC cadres to redirect the focus away from any shortfalls of their own.

2. Viet Cong Influence Vulnerabilities

Many shortfalls, vulnerabilities, and mistakes existed throughout the Vietnamese communist's influence warfare execution and methodology. The communist-led insurgency was not attempting to sway the population to their cause for some selfless purpose. The goal of the communist influence campaign was control of the population and the destruction of all opposition in support of the ultimate goal of seizing control of South Vietnam.

¹²⁵ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 18.

Prior to the robust commitment of U.S. ground forces in 1965, captured VC documents portray a somber view of communist insurgent operations. Communist cadre believed over half of the population of South Vietnam was still under the direct control and influence of the GVN and United States. While the Viet Cong believed they held the influence advantage at the local village level, they were greatly concerned about the dominance of the GVN and United States at the urban, district, province, and national levels.¹²⁶ A significant effort to conduct grassroots influence warfare could have reversed previous gains by cadre cells infiltrating rural villages. If the United States had committed to programs, such as the Marine's Civil Action Programs (CAPs) and Special Operations Forces' (SOF) hamlet security programs, communist cadres would have faced an influence competitor not susceptible to the communist cadre's social exploitation waged against the local populace. U.S. Marine and SOF village programs experienced significant successes, but these were limited to the immediate operating environment of these U.S. teams. Even when U.S. messages and deeds were synchronized at the local level, support from the operational and strategic levels were inconsistent at best. For example, the Viet Cong had taken masonry, carpentry, and metal-smithing tools from villagers. The CAPs requested replacement tools to regenerate local economies and re-establish previous social structures, but the CAPs received western tools that were too heavy or too culturally different from traditional Asian tools.¹²⁷ This lack of understanding at the operational and strategic level stymied the efforts of the CAPs in the villages. Ultimately, the CAPs had to search for support from humanitarian organizations in an attempt to correct these deficiencies, but even then, support was usually insufficient to meet the missions' needs.¹²⁸ The Marine CAPs vignette serves as a small example of isolated successes not exploited through a comprehensive and appropriately designed U.S.-led influence methodology.

¹²⁶ Central Office for South Vietnam, *A COSVN Standing Account of the Situation in South Vietnam from the End of 1961 to the Beginning of 1964, Captured National Liberation Front Document, Vietnam, 1969*, 13.

¹²⁷ Lewis Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General's Report on Vietnam* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1970), 82–83.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

Supported with deliberate messages and deeds designed to influence the operational environment directly and indirectly, the successes developed by the Marines and SOF units could have spread and allowed an island hopping type of influence war that would propagate similar to the Vietnamese Communist infiltration and infection of the South Vietnamese villages. Using comparable influence principles, the communist insurgency could have suffered and potentially lost its ability to influence the population. Instead, the United States essentially snatched defeat from the jaws of victory in 1964–1965. The U.S. operations methodology ignored the VC’s critical vulnerability of operating above the local village level, and allowed sufficient time and space for the Viet Cong to overcome their self-identified shortfalls to improve social mobilization efforts discussed throughout this case study.¹²⁹

The Viet Cong did not possess overwhelming support throughout the rural masses, with far less support in urban areas.¹³⁰ However, the VC benefited from the perception that they were widely supported. This influence effect permeated the strategic level and affected national decision-making and international perception. VC cadre also used terror, conscription, land reform, seizure of personal property, and denied access to government sponsored markets to reinforce their authority. Throughout the process of fighting for control of a village and consolidating said control, communist cadre’s use of repressive measures created gaping vulnerabilities susceptible to exploitation. Local villagers were not blind to the nature of the Viet Cong and were not deceived for long periods of time. Early on, the rural uneducated population did not understand the VC, and initially, believed the misinformation and disinformation. One village elder wrote:

My people are very poor. Only a few of them went to school. They did not understand the Viet Cong in the first years. They believed what the Viet Cong said. After nine years of living with the Viet Cong they can now

¹²⁹ Central Office for South Vietnam, *A COSVN Standing Account of the Situation in South Vietnam from the End of 1961 to the Beginning of 1964, Captured National Liberation Front Document, Vietnam*, 66.

¹³⁰ The Catholic Church was also a direct competitor to the communist leadership. Any attempt to overly abuse or violently target the Church risked mobilizing the masses against their cause. Elimination of church systems and leadership required provincial communist approval, exemplifying higher-level authority control systems and situational awareness for sensitive and secondary effects that could impair the influence campaign.

understand. The people do not want the Viet Cong. They fear them and hate them. The villagers have learned that what the Viet Cong say is from the mouth alone; it is not from the heart. The people know that the Americans have come to help them. The Marines have not taken rice from the people. They do not take farm tools. They do not murder and torture. They do not take money. They do not take hostages.¹³¹

Once the VC consolidated their power over a village or hamlet, repressive controls were instituted and individual liberties sacrificed. Local villagers would need permission to leave the area to travel to markets or neighboring villages. In doing so, their families were held as collateral (or hostage) to ensure the travelers returned. Village cadre established an intra village spy network in which villagers would spy on one another to ensure compliance with cadre policies in hopes of either building favoritism with cadre leadership, preventing perceptions of loyalty shortfalls, or both.¹³²

When communist cadres began the elimination of influence operations targeting village leadership and accused GVN agents, and failed to follow this with the development of a mass base, those same cadres defaulted to repressive measures to maintain their control and authority over villages.¹³³ This reversed favorable supportive influence from the local population for the VC and NV cadres, but without a counter force to confront VC repression, villages lacked the ability to resist.¹³⁴

The use of targeted assassinations and an over use of violence were also exploitable vulnerabilities but similarly overlooked or ignored by GVN and U.S. strategic and operational leadership.¹³⁵ The killings terrorized villagers into obedience to save their own lives; “the same frame of mind pushed the youths to join guerrillas.”¹³⁶ Lacking the choice of not having to pick a side between the VC and GVN and the United

¹³¹ Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General's Report on Vietnam*, 111.

¹³² Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 133.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 134.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 58.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

States, locals would often tacitly support, or fall in line with, VC influence operations because of the lack of GVN credibility, local resonance, lack of responsive for security and stability, and or a heavy handed direct action approach by conventional military operations against the VC. Aside from the small number of U.S. SOF, Marine, and even fewer Army village security and civil action programs, most GVN and U.S. operations treated civilians as a terrain obstacle rather than a decisive point for their operations.

The strength of the Vietnamese communists operated nearly exclusively at the tactical level, with some strategic operations (such as Saigonese channeling) but lacking a balanced use of strategic mediums, which was an almost insignificant vulnerability because of their effective influence manipulation at the tactical level, which overlapped with operational level activities. The inflated perception of mass support was propagated by national and international media, which provided a sufficient level of strategic communication support for disrupting GVN and U.S. strategic leadership.

Simultaneous implementation of the Vietnamese Communist's multiple lines of influence enabled the Viet Cong to establish shadow governments throughout villages, hamlets, and provinces by incorporating the use of fines, regulations, penalties, police power, and terror.¹³⁷ The Viet Cong influence efforts created a GVN power vacuum, while filling it with their own form of government. The goal was to build and field competent armed forces, taxation systems, schools, regulated commerce, and dispensed justice that would rival and subvert GVN efforts at the village level to shift popular alignment and increase mobilization.¹³⁸ Multiple attributable, miss-attributable, and nonattributable messages supported by overt and covert deeds could have diffused VC efforts. Eliminating VC influence effects required a long-term commitment and investment, but those costs would have paled in comparison to the cost in lives, dollars, and material the conventional military campaign waged to destroy physically the communist-backed insurgency. Without disrupting and denying VC influence operations, the longevity perceptions of NVA and VC capabilities and message credibility grew. The

¹³⁷ Pike, *Viet Cong; The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, 279.

¹³⁸ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 140.

inability to destroy the VC decisively, coupled with a lack of locally relevant messages, security actions, and credible governance, created an influence and power vacuum readily filled by the communists' own activities.¹³⁹

Continuously executing the primary lines of influence across the three variables of message and deeds, channels, and mediums in a cyclical and comprehensive manner, enabled the Viet Cong to seize and retain control of villages once all competition was marginalized or eliminated. Creating a resonance chain reaction depended on the Viet Cong's ability to duplicate the process across villages and communities tied with one another. In contrast to U.S. methodology governing a centralized and highly controlled message, mass media was a tertiary effort, and strategic party propaganda was a secondary effort.¹⁴⁰ Instead, a dedicated communist cadre was assigned to influence and attack each target village and province. Unlike the United States and GVN whose strategy epitomized an outdated 20th century strategic influence model, communist cadre's possessed sufficient latitude and authority to identify, develop, and target social pressure points that would separate the targeted audience from the social status quo and subsequently create a control vacuum.¹⁴¹ Local effects spread across the rural village social network structure creating a cascade of desired effects in favor of the Viet Cong and Vietnamese communist leadership. Cadre cells would deliberately, accidentally, and sometimes blunder their way through filling the influence vacuum ultimately to seize cognitive control of the village, but without a capable competitor to oppose these efforts, the communist cells had sufficient time and space to adapt their messages and support the messages with planned kinetic or nonkinetic actions. This vacuum also allowed cadre leadership to react to emerging or unforeseen reactions by the local populace. Marine CAPs, SOF village security programs, and similar programs, were isolated examples capable of disrupting communist influence operations, but they lacked strategic resourcing and synchronization with messages and deeds to achieve galvanizing and replicating effects with local populations.

¹³⁹ Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964*, 140.

¹⁴⁰ Corman and Dooley, "Strategic Communication on a Rugged Landscape," 2.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

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III. SHINING PATH

Because guerilla warfare basically drives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation.¹⁴²

- Mao Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare

On September 12, 1992, Peru's National Directorate Against Terrorism (DINCOTE) arrested 58-year-old Carlos Abimael Guzman, the self-proclaimed "Forth Sword of Marxism," and fellow central committee members of Sendero Luminoso, known commonly as "Shining Path." After the rather anti-climatic raid on the committee's middle-class home in the capital of Lima, Guzman warned his arresting officers that, "even if [a leader] is killed, his followers will remain."¹⁴³ Two weeks later, Guzman, who was known by his followers as "Chairman Gonzalo" and the "Red Sun," was presented to the world's media in a cage dressed in striped prisoner garb. He ranted over the playing of the Peruvian national anthem that Maoism would continue to "shape the new wave of proletarian world revolution." Yet approximately two years later, and contrary to his assertion, many of Shining Path's members did not remain.¹⁴⁴ Such an ending seems especially peculiar. Up to that point, Guzman had orchestrated what was seen as a highly successful Maoist insurgency. Prior to his capture, Shining Path was styled as "the largest threat" to the Peruvian government.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 46, <http://www2.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/FMFRP%2012-18%20%20Mao%20Tse-tung%20on%20Guerrilla%20Warfare.pdf>.

¹⁴³ Simon Strong, *Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru*, 1 U.S. ed. (New York: Times Books, 1992), 267–268; Simon Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, Conflict Studies 260 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1993), 1–2; Carlos I. DeGregori, "The Maturation of a Cosmocrat and the Building of a Discourse Community: The Case of the Shining Path," *The Legitimization of Violence*, December 1, 1996, 33; Cynthia McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 63.

¹⁴⁴ Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, 1–2.

¹⁴⁵ Gordon H. McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1990), 5, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3781.html>.

At face value, Shining Path appeared to incorporate proven methods of influence used by other successful Maoist-based movements, such as the previously discussed Viet Cong. Likewise, much of the analysis regarding Shining Path prior to Guzman's capture had forecasted, at worst, a collapse of the Peruvian government, and at best, a stalemated continuation of this protracted, hyper-violent struggle.¹⁴⁶ Despite such predictions, and despite the fact that Shining Path maintained a stranglehold on the countryside and shantytowns around the capital of Lima, the group fell into rapid decline without Guzman.

While it may seem odd beginning this case study with Shining Path's disruption and loss of equilibrium with the Peruvian government, doing so simply illustrates that this movement is no longer what it once was. Pursuant to this thesis's purpose, this chapter demonstrates that Shining Path's misuse of social movement influence accelerated its loss of power rather than prolong it. This chapter shows that the Shining Path's narrative, with its preoccupation on dialectic violence, did much to undermine its ability to influence broader support and limited its ability to topple the Peruvian state.

A. BACKGROUND

To appreciate the Shining Path's messages, deeds, use of channels, and its use of media better, it is first necessary to provide a broad overview in understanding Guzman himself. Second, it is crucial to understand the environment in which the Shining Path grew. Having completed these two tasks, it is then possible to put its narrative and organization into context, which will prove exceedingly important because Shining Path's narrative lays the groundwork for why and how it used influence.

So who was Guzman? Guzman grew up as the illegitimate son of a wealthy import wholesaler.¹⁴⁷ As a young man, Guzman's acquaintances remembered him as a

¹⁴⁶ McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 9–10; all sources cited and written prior to Guzman's capture make this assessment.

¹⁴⁷ Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, 6–7; Guzman's relationship with his father was strained and adversarial. He reportedly held a grudge against his father because his father favored his brother over him. A friend of his father even stated that Guzman's own father wished he were dead.

student who was aloof, a loner, and yet a hard worker. Teachers noted his neatness, good behavior, and passion for organizing students. After his high school years, he “excelled as a student at the exclusive La Salle College.” At 19 years of age, Guzman attended the National University of San Agustín, where he became the protégé of Miguel Ángel Rodríguez Rivas, who was a teacher of Kant and an inflexible “masochistic disciplinarian.” Under Rivas’ friendship and mentorship, Guzman was educated in German philosophy and studied socialist-themed works of contemporary Chilean and Peruvian poets. Guzman soon gravitated towards Marxist convictions based on inspiration from the Cuban Revolution and a Stalinist painter named Carlos de la Riva. Guzman then joined the Peruvian Communist Party but became increasingly critical of it because the party had become “idle, bureaucratic, and lacking in political presence.” Further insight into Guzman’s worldview can be learned from his two doctoral dissertations. The first, *The Kantian Theory of Space*, reflected his growing distance from Rivas’s mentorship and his “firm adherence to a dialectic materialism and Marxism.” The second, for a doctorate in law, *The Bourgeois Democratic State*, “poured scorn” on both notions of liberty and equality and argued that electoral law, the press, and media manipulate elections.¹⁴⁸ Perhaps the capstone experience for Guzman’s as a devout communist was his studies in Maoism at a cadre school in Peking, China during 1964, 1967, and 1975. Guzman’s subsequent political thought and works adopted much of Mao’s vocabulary in framing his notions and narrative of true communism.¹⁴⁹

While Guzman was on the path of becoming a committed Marxist and Maoist, Peru was simultaneously facing serious challenges as a nation. Despite the fact that Peru had a free press and demonstrated a unique political culture in Central America, one that accepted divergent political thought and participation in the government, random peasant uprisings began to occur by the early 1960s. From the 1960s onward, Peru would be a

¹⁴⁸ Strong, *Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru*, 4–9.

¹⁴⁹ McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 65.

nation in which the lack of economic opportunity would lead to the political opportunity for Shining Path to exploit.¹⁵⁰ With decades of economic turmoil and scant prosperity, Peru was ripe for a sweeping change.¹⁵¹

Shining Path's rise began in 1964 because of a split within the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP). While the entire party sought political control of the country, the split resulted from a fundamental disagreement over the role of armed conflict against the Peruvian government. More specifically, the fissure was along Sino-Soviet lines, with pro-Soviet members opting to abandon revolutionary violence to work within the current political system as a means for political change. It was this very split that gave birth to Shining Path. It was during this time that Guzman began his insurgency. Originally calling his group "Partido Comunista del Peru," Guzman soon added the moniker, Shining Path, in deference to Peru's first prominent Marxist, Jose Carlos Mariateguima, who asserted that Marxism-Leninism would become a 'shining path' for revolution.¹⁵²

Guzman's overall military strategy was based on Mao's peasant based, three-phased war. This strategy begins with a defensive posture in ungoverned and rural areas, then reaches a strategic equilibrium with the state, and lastly, conducts overt offensive

¹⁵⁰ Tina Rosenberg, *Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1991), 191–192; Peru's previous conservative, leftist, and social democratic governments all proved to be ineffectual from the peasants' perspective in turning around Peru's bad economy and social issues. By the time the social democrat Alan Garcia took office in 1985 as a member of the leftist American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), the economic crisis in Peru had reached epic proportions. Despite initial economic growth rates of 8.5 percent, Garcia's Peru was forced to pay back thirty percent of Peru's national debt totaling over 13.7 billion dollars. The IMF blacklisted Peru and made the country ineligible for new loans. Compounding this, promised investments did not arrive in Peru. By 1986, Garcia's fifth year in office, Peru set the world record for hyperinflation at two million percent while losing a hundred million dollars a month in hard currency. The minimum wage also fell behind the rate of inflation. The economy was so bad that Army officers canceled a rumored military coup in 1989 because "they could not win a battle with the Peruvian economy." This situation is a classic example of an exploitable political opportunity.

¹⁵¹ David S. Palmer, *The Shining Path of Peru* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 2; As Palmer observed, "the high cost of these failures... could not help but give Shining Path new opportunities to gain at the government's expense."

¹⁵² McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 64–65.

operations for total control.¹⁵³ In accordance with Mao's first phase, Shining Path initially maintained a low profile during the majority of the 1970s, during which it was content with educational activities of its members and cadre. Then Guzman solidified the movement's ideological base, its theory of victory, and began to establish its initial support base.¹⁵⁴ As the primary architect for Shining Path's ideology, Guzman crafted an ideology that combined an interpretation of a Maoist peasant-based revolution with aspects of Peruvian "native socialism."¹⁵⁵ Therefore, it was, no coincidence that he chose to educate students in Ayacucho since it had little governance and a poor ethnic Indian population.¹⁵⁶ Like Mao, Guzman would first seek a strong footing in that which was ungoverned; he would "attack the hollow."¹⁵⁷

As Guzman refined Shining Path's Andean-Maoist narrative into what was called "Gonzalo Thought," its messages, deeds, channels, and mediums reflected accordingly (Table 2).¹⁵⁸ Armed struggle would be Shining Path's hallmark. It would be the lens through which history and their future would be viewed. Unlike most leftist movements, which attempt to form coalitions among left and Marxist groups, Shining Path was "sectarian and uncompromising in its Maoism." The group held what was described as "total conviction of their own rectitude against a pervasively corrupt society." All other communist parties and governments were forsaken as sellouts and revisionists, including the Soviet Union, and especially Deng Xiaoping's China. Guzman considered Deng Xiaping's supporters as "dogs" that betrayed their Cultural Revolution and regarded Fidel

¹⁵³ Cynthia McClintock, *Sendero Luminoso in Comparative Perspective* (Washington, DC: George Washington University), 65, <http://www.cholonautas.edu.pe/modulo/upload/lasaclintock.pdf>; Guzman's devotion to Mao was characterized as 'slavish'; Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1992), 51: Unlike Mao, Guzman reinterpretation of Maoism, or "Gonzalo Thought," applied 'scientific' and 'universal laws' of violence and contradiction to the revolutionary process. He modifies Mao's principles of encircling cities from rural areas by also seeking to engage in armed struggle in the city in a parallel struggle.

¹⁵⁴ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 4.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁵⁶ Strong, *Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru*, 11; Ayacucho totaled 450,000 people, with three quarters living by subsistence agriculture, and one fifth essentially acting as serfs on a patrons' haciendas. When haciendas were sold or divided, dependent peasants "had no protection."

¹⁵⁷ Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*.

¹⁵⁸ Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 52–56.

Castro as a “puppet” to socialist imperialism. Its Marxist rivals in Peru were especially hated for participating in Peru’s elections during the 1980s. Guzman considered the *Izquierda Unida* (United Left) coalition the “sewer of contradictions.” This rival was considered nothing but an opportunistic electoral front that would not bring true transformation of the political landscape. In summary, any other form of government was considered the antithesis to Guzman’s thesis; they were to be destroyed.

Shining Path’s dialectic messages, violent deeds, artificial channels, and its mediums were used in both urban and rural areas. Their influence lines of effort left little room for positive change and placed great emphasis on “propaganda of the deed.”¹⁵⁹ While Gonzalo Thought has strands of influence requirements, all are hinged on the primacy of armed struggle for frame alignment of the peasants.

<u>Line of Influence</u>	<u>Message and Deeds</u>	<u>Channels</u>	<u>Mediums</u>
Violence "Gonzalo Thought" Society must militarize and conduct "armed struggle" against non-Shining Path groups - violence precedes political change	Cosmic War Non-Participation in Government Educate the Young Self Sufficiency Puritanical Law Assassination Sabotage Recruitment Through Acts of Violence Social Mobility	Guzman Armed Cells "Generated Organisms" Students Teachers	Face-to-face Newspapers Graffiti Violence National Media Songs Night Letters Radio Psychological Acts (mutilation, etc.)

Table 2. Shining Path’s Lines of Influence (LOIs)

This prognosis for change, along with a failing state, motivated members of Shining Path. Its members waged a hyper violent and protracted struggle that lasted 13 years and cost 30,000 lives. They sowed terror by attacking government institutions, rival organizations, and assassinating noncompliant members of the populace. In sum, Shining Path’s attacks cost Peru approximately 20 billion dollars in economic losses, equivalent

¹⁵⁹ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 25.

to ninety percent of the total national debt.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, Shining Path essentially rendered vast portions of loosely governed southern highlands completely ungovernable by the state.¹⁶¹ From the core 50 members of the early 1970s, the group grew steadily by 1992 to over 5,000 members and thousands of supporters in the field.¹⁶² Shining Path seemed to have the upper hand against the government in all facets of the conflict, including support from the populace.

Despite this success, examples demonstrate that Shining Path's overall ability to sustain influence was flawed. Despite Peru's poor economy and the populace's dislike of the government, Shining Path was still unable to motivate people completely in undertaking a sustained armed struggle. While Guzman's arrest may have been a single point of failure in terms of the group's hierarchy, it does not lessen the fact their influence efforts were flawed and faltering prior to his capture. The following sections also demonstrate that the movement's method of influence did not advance its cause as rapid as it may have by using influence techniques founded in the principles of social movement theory.

B. MESSAGE AND DEEDS

Let's go Peruvian people, let's go to war, with dynamite and lead we will
topple the old state. I want to be outside in the burning fields, tears, sweat
and blood. That's how we sing; that's how we dance.

- Shining Path Song¹⁶³

As mentioned previously, Shining Path's dialectic narrative transcended fundamental methods of influence used by other communist groups and the legal left.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, 1.

¹⁶¹ Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 30.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 30; Rosenberg, *Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America*, 147.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 196; This song personifies Shining Path's message and was sung by female members while in prison.

¹⁶⁴ McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 63; The Khmer Rouge is the exception to this rule. Both groups attributed violence as a necessary condition for change and a fundamental requirement in the revolutionary process. It has been surmised that Guzman may have even met Pol Pot during his visits to China during the Cultural Revolution.

Beyond its Maoist appeal, its narrative evoked notions of a legendary history of armed conflict and bifurcated the struggle in the simplest of terms—good versus evil. As a result, Shining Path’s deeds and messages often resembled those used in religious-based extremism. Only through manifest, ‘cosmic’ conflict, could Shining Path collapse the existing Peruvian government and build upon that foundation of ruin.¹⁶⁵ In this section, numerous examples show how Shining Path’s use of all facets of armed ‘cosmic’ struggle to gain compliance from the Peruvian populace was ultimately ineffective. These examples demonstrate that even using violence in pursuit of its cosmic war, Shining Path was unable to garner the peasants’ complete buy-in to ‘Gonzalo Thought.’ Additionally, Shining Path’s violent deeds and message ultimately acted as a self-limiting construct for growing its movement that could not even capitalize on the Peruvian state’s errors.¹⁶⁶

1. Indigenous Resonance

Shining Path was simply not concerned with using local norms and idioms in its messaging (verbal or nonverbal) or trying to influence the populace at an individual’s needs-based level. Its messaging and deeds more often seemed preoccupied with reinforcing its narrative to current members rather than to external audiences. While this created an almost cult like devotion among its members, it may have possibly accounted for lost opportunities in influencing people outside the group and explain its rapid demise after Guzman’s capture. While peasants were certainly compliant in most of the areas governed by Shining Path, such compliance does not translate well into meaningful influence.

¹⁶⁵ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 149–150; Images in a cosmic war appear larger than life, and take on a history of their own. This draconian view of a divine-like struggle shapes and propels a groups’ worldly political battle. Juergensmeyer contends that “absolutism of cosmic war makes compromise unlikely, and those who suggest a negotiated settlement are as excoriated as the enemy.” In such a narrative, acts of violence seemingly eclipse their political purpose and become ritualistic in and of themselves. Violence is almost script like, purifying and sacred. Moreover, a “bellicose stance fundamentally contradicts the purpose of compromise and understanding, and adopting an inflexible position of militancy early in a dispute calls into question the motive for doing so.”

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 149–150.

Shining Path moved cadres into the countryside and began party work in rural villages in 1977 and 1978. Its schoolteachers, theatre groups, and students all lent a hand in attempting to teach young peasants their dialectic messages. From these initial efforts, many rural youths were recruited during the subsequent years. Most were unwilling to continue living in abject poverty with no positive outlook on life. Oftentimes, according to a young man interviewed in Cangallo, the youth of a village would simply join Shining Path because “they were desperate to learn about arms... for them handling dynamite was a big thing.”¹⁶⁷ Many Senderistas felt they would also gain social mobility as a member. During an interview with Carlos Ivan Degregori, one youth echoed this sentiment saying “in 1985 the revolution is going to triumph and then those of us here in Sendero, those who have more time as militants in Sendero, we are going to be Ministers.”¹⁶⁸ This rationale, while it may have motivated the young, does not show that Shining Path’s strict ideology was itself a motivation for recruits to join, but more of an excuse. Recruitment seems to have often been more of a function of the poor economy and personal empowerment rather than an embrace of Marxist ideology.

Once Shining Path began its campaign of violence, its deeds were far more oppressive.¹⁶⁹ For example, when occupying a contested village, Shining Path would first enter a town, and bomb municipal and government buildings, along with financial institutions. ‘People’s trials’ were then performed after the town was herded together, with local leaders executed on the spot. Special malevolence was reserved for leaders and members of other communist parties or legal leftwing parties. After the murders, Shining Path members would then review the town’s civil registry and line up the remainder of

¹⁶⁷ Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 61–62.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 68; All who stood in Shining Path’s way were to be killed. A Shining Path poem reflects this notion by stating “blood does not drown the revolution, but irrigates it.” McClintock also notes, “only 17 percent of Shining Path’s victims were members of the military or police; most victims were unarmed civilians.” Moreover, “between 1980 and 1992, Sendero murdered at least eight ecclesiastics, nine foreign development workers, 44 grassroots leaders, 203 businessmen, 244 teachers, 303 students, 424 workers, 502 political officials (primarily local officials such as mayors), 1,100 urban residents, and 2,196 peasants... eyes were gouged out; men were castrated; children disemboweled; and human bonfires were set. Sendero socialized its young recruits to violence; children of five and six were taught to kill chickens so that they would be accustomed to blood.” This predication on violence would be an asset and a liability.

the people, who would be informed they were now Shining Path members and placed into artificial committees. A youth chief would be designated, along with a food and health chief. Prudent villagers went along with this coercion into service lest they be shot themselves.¹⁷⁰ While its use of violence allowed Shining Path to occupy and control numerous towns in the Sierra successfully, it did so at the expense of cultural norms.

The use of messaging predicated on cultural resonance was often extremely weak. First, Shining Path's messages often claimed it represented the 60 percent of Indians that comprise Peru's population. In reality, and contrary to popular sentiment, little about Shining Path was Indian. Their core leadership was predominantly of Spanish heritage. Additionally, most of the symbols used in its messaging dealt with Marxism and Maoism and reflected its narrative that "posits class as the sole form of social contradiction." For the Shining Path, ultimately class rather than ethnic identity mattered. Its messages also often referred to Chinese historical figures rather than Andean ones. Shining Path's literature was also purely Marxist in content. Little effort was used to place it in social context that most peasants could understand. One member of Shining Path interviewed in prison reinforces Shining Path's lack of concern in using lines of persuasion that would resonate with locals, "Many times the *campesino* wants only a piece of land and he's happy... whether he's happy or not doesn't matter."¹⁷¹ Another member summed up the perspective regarding peasants, "you talk to the masses in simple language... and the clearest is with bullets and dynamite." This same individual emphasized that Shining Path did not want to "personalize the revolution."¹⁷²

Despite Shining Path's lack of cultural messages and resonance, many people initially accepted it because of the central government's equally harsh response to

¹⁷⁰ Rosenberg, *Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America*, 199; Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 27–29. Shining Path has a long list of atrocities. In 1987–1989, five miner's union leaders were killed. In 1980–1990, over 100 agronomists, development specialists, and NGO workers were murdered. Hundreds of mayors from both APRA and IU were murdered. More than 40 of the United Left's most militant members were murdered. Most of SP's victims were peasants and their leaders, particularly those in the Peasant Confederation of Peru (CCP) [a national union]. As an example of one year's violence, 1990 alone saw over 1,249 peasants killed by Shining Path, with 27% of the victims classified as slum dwellers.

¹⁷¹ Rosenberg, *Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America*, 212.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 152, 193; Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 63.

Shining Path's emergence. Over 6,000 people in Ayacucho "disappeared" from 1982–1988 alone. Put into perspective, General Pinochet of neighboring Chile was responsible for 3,000 deaths during his entire 17 years of military rule. Pinochet was a dictator, while Peru's president at the time, Garcia, was a democratically elected leftist and a "reformer committed to social justice." As a result of this abuse, the idea of tearing down Peru's government resonated with the populace, especially since the government often behaved just as bad if not worse than Shining Path. Peasants often accepted Shining Path as a lesser of two evils.¹⁷³

As Shining Path occupied more towns in the countryside, it was also quick to preach a strict code of morality required in a corrupt world. It would impose rigid, puritanical laws. Drug addicts, alcoholics, adulterers, wife beaters, thieves, and homosexuals were warned and then shot if they persisted in their behavior. Armed cadres also provided security from cattle rustlers and punished abusive bandits and merchants. During the early years enforcing these laws, many peasants, especially women and the young, viewed the Shining Path positively for providing order where the Peruvian government did not.¹⁷⁴ In terms of winning the war of support by the peasants, a lack of meaningful governmental influence existed in the region. In other words, Shining Path did not have to undermine competing influence initiatives by central authorities in Lima, which may have also led to Shining Path believing that its influence efforts were adequate and sufficient.

This admiration was often short lived because Shining Path also considered traditional social events and traditions as 'archaic'. Luis Arce Borja, a Shining Path spokesman, remarked that Andean religious practices were 'irrationalities which continue to have influence over the most backward inhabitants of Peru... [Andean] cultural tradition has nothing to absolutely nothing to do with the war and the revolutionary struggle.'¹⁷⁵ A pro-Shining Path newspaper further echoed this belief in its attack on intellectual and political programs that take into account "Andean peasant traditions."

¹⁷³ Rosenberg, *Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America*, 200–202.

¹⁷⁴ Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 62.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 62–63.

The paper likened Andean traditions to ‘magical whining nationalisms’ and called for their eradication because they were the ‘residue of a moribund bourgeois ideology.’ Consistent with this attitude, Shining Path also banned “fiestas, rituals, and festive drinking.”¹⁷⁶

Many peasants were simply not willing to concede all facets of their life to the party. Many peasants openly rejected Shining Path’s heavy-handed interventions into the operation of farming collectives, local methods of marketing, or dismantling existing authority hierarchies based on experience and age.¹⁷⁷ Attempts at denying peasants access to markets deprived them of basic sundry items, and would sometimes create minor classes against the insurgents.¹⁷⁸

In summary, the preceding examples illustrate a generally low degree in which Shining Path’s messages and deeds were emotionally relevant and fit Andean peasant’s social and cultural norms, let alone their daily patterns of life. While its membership continue to grow, it is unlikely that much of its support was generated from the message of Gonzalo Thought, but rather was more of a reflection of compliance based upon the threat of violence for noncompliance with the movement.

2. Exploiting and Subverting the Competition

Shining Paths used all facets of sabotage and violence in its attempts to exploit Peru’s weak central government. This attempt created a general perception that it was able to dislodge the government and rival groups at will in rural and regions and the urban slums of Peru. As stated previously, Shining Path simply had little competition in

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.; Most peasants eventually saw Shining Path’s enforcement of puritanical laws as akin to their historic discrimination under Spanish rulers. Many villagers saw the world in terms of race, culture, and ethnicity and considered Shining Path no better than their ruling elite *mistis* (a derogatory term used for landlords, merchants, and government officials derived from the Spanish word *mestizo* meaning of mixed blood).

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.; Dwight B. Billings, “Religion as Opposition: A Gramscian Analysis,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 96, no. 1 (July 1990), 1, 17–8, 22, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2780691.pdf>; Shining Path’s contempt for local practices mirrored that of an American union in the early 1900s. In this case, the contempt for local striker’s practices and lack of indigenous resonance proved to be an ineffective strategy.

¹⁷⁸ Billie Jean Isbell, “Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho,” in *The Shining Path of Peru*, ed. David S. Palmer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 66–67; a peasant interviewed complained, “where would we get our salt and matches?”

these remote regions. Government control was nominal at best. As a result, it was able to establish structure in these areas, but its deeds often went too far for it to establish a robust and resilient level of influence. The effect was a populace that looked supportive but was merely compliant.

Shining Path's subversive attacks began during 1980 in the central highlands to disrupt and sabotage the national economy, deny food and energy to Lima, and undermine the viability of independent peasant and labor groups. These actions were designed to prepare for overt confrontation with the government in 1986. As armed Shining Path groups often entered villages and forced villagers by gunpoint to listen to *Senderista's* propaganda on armed struggle, 'quotas' of money were taken from villagers while they distributed literature and painted hammer and sickle symbols on buildings. One villager of Cochabamba summarized how Shining Path members would also threaten to kill any villager who attempted to remove its graffiti or communist flags from building walls. A sense of paranoia would take hold among the villagers; Shining Path reminded villagers that they were always being watched. It would also stop peasants and stamp their electoral identification cards with PCP-SL's hammer and sickle logo.¹⁷⁹

By 1988, Shining Path's acts of violence and sabotage in support of their message reached climactic levels. In December of that year, it conducted over 18 bombings of the Central Railway to cut Lima from mines in Junín and Pasco. In August, a Jesuit-run development and educational center was destroyed in Jarpa, along with communal farms in Yanacancha and Cachi.¹⁸⁰ From November to December, Shining Path also destroyed vast portions of Cahuide's largest agricultural units belonging to the Agrarian Society of Social Interest (SAIS) and one of Peru's largest milk and dairy plants in Concepción.¹⁸¹ This plant was a cooperative that employed over 800 workers and supplied Huancayo and

¹⁷⁹ Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 80; McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 68.

¹⁸⁰ Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 80–81.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

Lima with milk. Adding to this, Shining Path murdered so many mayors throughout the central highlands that 195 out of 298 mayors resigned from their office. Union activists, leaders, and their families were also threatened.¹⁸²

While these attacks played into Shining Path's narrative, they also reinforced peasant resistance to them. Cahuide's general assembly opted to create a new agricultural collective from remaining SAIS facilities despite the threats and retaliation by Shining Path.¹⁸³ Despite Shining Path establishing its own popular committees in former SAIS communities, many peasants still resisted it. In one such instance, Shining Path members in 1989 stopped a bus in the Mantaro valley and killed 12 prisoners from the town of Chongos Alto who attempted to recover their lands and livelihoods. Due to Shining Path's attacks on miners, who represented the "core of the Peruvian labor movement," mining collectives formed self-defense brigades and drew government intervention in the region through a general strike. During a congress held by these miners, along with other peasant and women's organizations, all parties agreed to oppose Shining Path's rampage of violence. Furthermore, rank and file residents of Lima were becoming harder to intimidate. After murdering a handcart merchant named Ramirez Huaranga, Shining Path also killed his daughter and her husband because they opted to keep the business going and refused to bow to the threat of violence.¹⁸⁴

While the Peruvian government initially downplayed Shining Path's initiation of violence in 1980, it was forced to respond by early 1981 with broad anti-terror laws and penalties to anyone supporting such activities. By 1982, over 2,000 government troops attempted to enforce a state of emergency in eight of Ayacucho's districts.¹⁸⁵ Due to the government's overreaction to Shining Path, acceptance appeared in the eyes of many people in Shining Path's message of tearing down Peru's government, especially since the government often behaved just as bad if not worse than Shining Path.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 80–82.

¹⁸³ Shining Path killed a peasant organizer, Victor Lozano, and university professor, Manuel Soto, who were working with peasants to rebuild their collective farms.

¹⁸⁴ Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 82–84.

¹⁸⁵ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 17–18.

¹⁸⁶ Rosenberg, *Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America*, 200–202.

Seeing this escalation by government forces and their atrocities against civilians, Shining Path simply ramped up its own operations; it conducted between 450–550 attacks in Ayacucho emergency zone alone by 1983, and up to 700 by 1984. By the end of 1983, the insurgency gained significant ground throughout Peru’s sierra region. Shining Path’s struggle had moved into the Maoist third phase of conflict and was directly challenging Lima’s competitive influence over the populace. In attempts to gain lost influence, the government continued to play into Shining Path’s narrative by committing repeated atrocities by its forces on Shining Path members and villagers.¹⁸⁷ Shining Path capitalized on an overly oppressive Peruvian police and military’s mistakes in the beginning of its struggle. It exploited the government’s inability to govern remote areas and provide meaningful forms of due process. Due to historic regional mistrust of the central government, sympathies of the urban population in Ayacucho and Huanta initially leaned towards Shining Path despite its authoritarianism. However, such support, which at face value seemed to be receptive of their message calling for armed struggle, hid its true nature: that of individual self-interest.¹⁸⁸

An example of this self-interest occurred in 1982 during the burial of Edith Lagos, who was killed by police. During the burial of this well-known *Senderista*, thousands of mourners attended her funeral. While Shining Path used this event to create the perception of mass support for its cause, this event transcended its ideology. Many of the attendees saw Prada as a romantic figure who had the courage to fight the central powers in Lima. Many identified with her because they had lost relatives to police death squads. Moreover, her funeral was presided over by the anti-communist Catholic bishop of Ayacucho, Frederico Richter Prada. This show of solidarity illustrates peasants placing precedence over victims of violence rather than just “Lagos’s identity as a *Senderista*.”¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 17–18; Shining Path’s acts were designed to make government forces overreact. The insurgents were often successful on capitalizing on the government’s inability to control insurgent regions and their brutal measures use in such attempts. One official estimated that the army killed 60 villagers for every six SP members. By overreacting, the government fed into Shining Path’s narrative.

¹⁸⁸ Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 64.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

Another example that seems to illustrate Shining Path's ability to subvert government actions and influence support was its attacks on government sponsored civil defense groups. Called *rondas*, these groups often used their organization and civil authority not only as a means to defend against bandits and Shining Path, but as a means to exact revenge against rival towns. Many would exact revenge for historic disputes over land usage and missing livestock. Towns persecuted by *rondas*, along with ones that did not want to be forcibly relocated by the government in support of their civil defense plan, would, therefore, turn to Shining Path as a means to counter this threat. In one such case in April 1984, Shining Path led 300 dissidents in an attack on a strategic hamlet in Pampacancha that contained four relocated communities. Those peasants who sided with Shining Path attacked and killed 40 of their own neighbors, not in a show of solidarity for Shining Path, but rather "in an attempt to recover their old lands, communities and freedom." Many Shining Path members and supporters were not necessarily being influenced to wage a Marxist armed struggle as much as they were using Shining Path as a means to gain revenge for historic rivalries between families and villages.

Overall, Shining Path used violence in an attempt to subvert all adversaries, but it did not drive peasants to join them. These cases demonstrate that the peasants often used Shining Path more as a vehicle for their own needs rather than Shining Path manipulating peasants.¹⁹⁰ It also reflects Shining Path's misunderstanding of its competitive influence advantage over the state. Shining Path's use of intimidation and violence often undermined its legitimacy. The group forced compliance rather than cognitive realignment by the very people they are trying win over to their movement. While such tactics inflated numbers and created the perception it was growing, ultimately, it built an organization that had a weak foundation. The loss of Guzman illustrates this weakness.

3. Synchronization and Massing of Deeds and Messages

As demonstrated thus far, Shining Path's use of violence was generally synchronized and mutually supportive of its messages. Regardless of this, the group's

¹⁹⁰ Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 70.

messages often failed to resonate and motivate peasants to their cause. As suggested previously, just because Shining Path's deeds reinforced its message, it did not make the message any more palatable for many peasants.

Additionally, and again counter to many impressions of the group, the group's deeds sometimes did not reinforce its narrative. One former Shining Path supporter from Cangallo province recalled that an army patrol "inflicted massacres and assaults on the communities... they even took livestock... beat peasant men and women... and make them disappear." This same witness also recalled Shining Path's "failure to provide protection from the army's abuses lost the party the support of all but the most committed younger students."¹⁹¹ Feeling betrayed by Shining Path, 32 of Cangallo's communities had over 3,000 families abandon homes and relocate to government camps between 1981 and 1985. Thus, Shining Path simply sought revenge on those who stayed in the communities, oftentimes following the departure of the army into villages and executing "stoolpigeons" and "collaborators." With the collapse of their established committees, Shining Path's acts of violence also lost the façade of the "people's trials." One peasant remarked during an interview, "the people were unhappy because the *Senderistas* committed many stupidities. They killed innocent people... I think that if someone has made mistakes they should be simply punished... not like Sendero has done—killing [the town mayor] like a pig."¹⁹²

In summary, it would seem Shining Path's synchronization of esoteric messages calling for cosmic-conflict and use of violence provided a mixed bag of results. On one hand, its acts of sabotage, assassinations, disruption of political rivals, and armed propaganda generally did reinforce its message and bring about a mixture of devout young followers and compliance from peasants writ large. On the other hand, simply synchronizing its message was insufficient in specific instances to enforce even compliance by the peasants.

¹⁹¹ Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 66.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 68.

Moreover, Shining Path's use of force was so out of touch with social norms and needs, some communities resisted the group outright or rallied behind their oppressive government.¹⁹³ Actions that hurt the population ultimately undermined Shining Path's quest for active and organic support. Only compliance was gained using needs based coercion.¹⁹⁴ Shining Path's deeds hurt exoteric appeals because it destroyed existing economies, social norms, and did not take into account the individual's concerns. In many ways, Shining Path's use of terrorist tactics simply illustrates an acknowledgement that its message would never resonate on its own merit. Its message was a failure. As seen in the next section, its use of force also did much to cut channels of influence that it might have been able to use to generate legitimate, lasting support.

C. CHANNELS

Shining Path's ability to channel influence through local actors with high levels of centrality was largely nonexistent.¹⁹⁵ As with its deeds and messages, channeling was conducted in strict adherence to its cosmic-narrative. Shining Path's ability to use channels was handcuffed by its political culture from achieving the broadest level of anti-state support. Its primary channel of influence was the barrel of a gun and dynamite. It cared little in using natural agents as a conduit of influence and to help reduce a negative

¹⁹³ Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 68. Numerous examples of such responses to Shining Path exist, such as in 1983, when villagers in the village of Chuschi demanded government police or a military presence in their town after Shining Path killed their mayor and four peasants. The peasants of the town ended up self-mobilizing a *ronda* for civil defense. Similar acts occurred in the towns of Lucanamarca and Huancasancos. In Huamanga, *rondas* began to spring up across the province to combat Shining Path. These civil defense forces also did much to undermine Shining Path's artificial "popular committees" within villages and towns. In adjacent regions, such as Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica, towns have also formed government sponsored militias and community organizations to combat Shining Path's influence.

¹⁹⁴ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 109.

¹⁹⁵ McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 70–72; According to McClintock, Shining Path was "extremely hierarchical." There was no acknowledged second in command after Guzman. The "Central Committee" was the formal apex of the group, under which six regional committees existed. Each regional committee oversaw cells comprised of five to nine members operating in sectors or zones. Only one member of the cell would know of or communicate with its higher headquarters.

perception of itself.¹⁹⁶ In lay terms, Shining Path was in a suicide-pact with its own prognosis for change, and because of this, it passed over vast opportunities to tap into local channels of influence. This section demonstrates that it is not so much a question of what Shining Path did, but more of what it failed to do.

To begin, rather than relying on local actors to influence audiences for purposes of expanding its power and influence, Shining Path preferred to use “generated organisms,” which were basically political front groups staffed by its own members.¹⁹⁷ The overarching character of Shining Path’s front groups was artificial in nature. The groups were designed to penetrate the masses and broaden mobilization. Various groups were created to do this, such as the Movement of Classist Workers (MOTC), the Revolutionary Student Front (FER), the Single Trade Union of Educated Workers of Peru, the Popular Women’s Movement (MFP), and the Movement of Poor Peasants (MCP). Many of these groups were instituted not in recognition that natural channels were better, but rather as simple extensions of Shining Path’s attempt to move its movement to urban areas after 1986. Rather than co-opt existing local agents of influence, Shining Path would force its cadre-run front groups in to compete for popular support.¹⁹⁸

Unlike the Viet Cong’s agitprop cadres that embedded with the people, Shining Path often left no one in charge or simply left converted teenaged recruits in charge of the villages. Without an embedded cadre within the villages, many peasants never had a permanent channel of influence. Interviews conducted in 1986 in the department of Ayacucho provide insight on how itinerant Shining Path cadres were negatively perceived. Many Quechua speakers never associated the group as an integral part of their communities. They often labeled Shining Path members as *puriqkuna*, meaning “people who travel.” This term contrasts directly with *llaqtamasi*, the peasants’ term for village

¹⁹⁶ Palmer, *The Shining Path of Peru*, 4; Shining Path was more likely to destroy an existing group and established key communicators and then create an artificial front group or committee in its place rationalizing that educating the young was easier than re-education of adversaries.

¹⁹⁷ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 11.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 11–12.

mates. This drive-by administration of villages, coupled with their brutal methods, led to Shining Path members being seen not just as foreigners to the peasants, but even worse, “as flesh-eating *naqas*.”¹⁹⁹

Attitudes towards Shining Path worsened when most cadres remained in a town just long enough to attract a hostile government response. When they departed the area in an effort to avoid a direct confrontation, many local sympathizers felt betrayed because they were now defenseless. One Huanta villager recalled, “they told us to be prepared for war, to defeat the enemy, and we believed them... they escaped through here and we were screwed. They handed us over; they had practically sold us out. They didn’t act like real men.”²⁰⁰ Despite gaining the support, or most likely compliance of villagers, Shining Path’s use of artificial committees was not only a poor attempt at channeling influence but probably hurt it more if it had done nothing at all.

When teenage members were left as part of Shining Path’s popular committees, the result was often worse. Shining Path relied heavily on its recruitment of young members to grow the organization. It understood the young “have little or no political past” and they “do not have to be reeducated, only educated.”²⁰¹ While this fact helped to assimilate new recruits into Shining Path, the ability of immature youths to channel influence was generally “undermined by their status as junior members of communities in which age was an important element in traditional conceptions of authority.” Despite the fact that many were indeed natural actors, in the sense they had been recruited from the village in which they lived, this notion was undercut by their nonindigenous messaging and because they were immature. Often, their family connections made them interested actors in different family rivalries and feuds.²⁰² A former teacher and Shining Path sympathizer recounted:

¹⁹⁹ Isbell, “Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho,” 76; *Naqas* were Peruvian mythological beasts that fed upon the flesh of peasants.

²⁰⁰ Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 65; such retreats also did much to hurt Shining Path’s narrative of armed struggle—if they were not willing to fight, why should the villagers?

²⁰¹ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 13.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 65.

The worst thing Sendero did was to rely on the very young kids... they left young sons of the community in charge. Perhaps one of their fathers had a dispute with another's father over property boundaries, animals, theft, domestic fights. Since Sendero left kids in charge, they began to take reprisals, to take revenge.²⁰³

Another peasant interviewed from Huamanga province corroborates this perspective, stating "the *jefes* (leaders) were kids, know-it-alls. Then the Party themselves began to lose out. Then the people began to pull back from those [party] affairs."²⁰⁴

Further opportunities to channel natural support are evident in Shining Path's relationship with educational and church organizations. Like the legal left, it viewed the Catholic and Protestant churches, and other religious affiliated organizations, as adversaries that made people dependent on charity and outside support.²⁰⁵ Guzman understood that the Catholic Church retained a high degree of influence in many communities, and did his best to attack its influence rather than co-opt it. Simultaneous to this, Guzman would be able effectively to use the Church's university as a channel to influence and recruit Shining Path members.

The staunchly Catholic department of Ayachucho's University of San Cristobal de Huamanga, one of Latin America's oldest universities, was founded in 1677 as a bastion of religious education. Reopened in 1959 after years of dormancy, Guzman subverted the university for use as a base to recruit and training of Shining Path cadre.²⁰⁶ As the director of philosophy, Guzman also became the administrator of a compulsory

²⁰³ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 65.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 65–66.

²⁰⁵ Billings, "Religion as Opposition: A Gramscian Analysis," 1, 17–8, 22; Billings' research on religion provides a parallel to Shining Path's channeling of churches. In his research on the role of religion in unions, he highlighted the "prominent yet paradoxical role" religion played in class conflict during the early 1900s in the United States. He cites two cases in which union leaders in the United States either used religion as a channel or refused to do so. When one Communist union in Kentucky embraced local religious leaders and the beliefs of coal miners, they were able to channel "religious legitimacy" into effective support that forced mining companies to concede to union demands. When a New England-based textile union attempted to influence workers in North Carolina, they conversely opted not to channel the religious beliefs of its members, which resulted in both the company and the local religious leadership successfully driving a wedge between their workers and the union.

²⁰⁶ Strong, *Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru*, 12.

first year lecture course called *ciclo básico* that taught the “scientific concept” in conjunction with Darwinism. Catholic education was soon undermined by Marxist-Leninist indoctrination. After years of young students abandoning religious activities, the Church then opened the Catholic University of Ayacucho. Guzman simply repeated his earlier method of subversion by planting his teachers into its administration.²⁰⁷ Moreover, Guzman began to build Shining Path’s cellular network among students and staff alike. The courses were designed to influence the Indian students. First-generation Indian migrants to the towns were becoming “disillusioned and alienated” and were recruited in universities to become cadre for a network of front organizations representing secondary school and university students, peasants, and industrial workers and women. Guzman also set up a school of practical studies on communism in the countryside, whereby teaching students could return to their Indian villages to disseminate propaganda.²⁰⁸

More overt examples of Shining Path attacking religious channels of influence include the killing of two Protestants in 1982 while their church was holding a 24-hour prayer vigil for peace. The effect of this attack not only limited a potential channel of influence upon emerging Protestant populations; it had the additional effect of reinforcing the beliefs of churchgoers that their parishioners were martyred in accordance with their beliefs just as Christ was. These religious narratives were simply reinforced and Shining Path was unable to influence the population to support its cause.²⁰⁹

In 1988, Shining Path orchestrated a wave of violence against progressive church organizations. Violence grew steadily in the form of bombings, murders, attacks on economic infrastructure and destruction of property. After destroying three church-managed farms, the net effect was not a degradation of support for these church organizations or submission by the populace to Shining Path, but rather a renewed

²⁰⁷ Billings, “Religion as Opposition: A Gramscian Analysis,” 13.

²⁰⁸ Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, 3; Simon Strong, *Shining Path: The World's Deadliest Revolutionary Force* (Fontana, 1993), 13.

²⁰⁹ Isbell, “Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho,” 69–70.

unification among the peasants. The peasants chose instead to conduct strikes on their own, calling on the central government for reform. Garcia's government relented, and Shining Path was unable to compete successfully in the department of Puno.²¹⁰

In 1989, a column of Shining Path fighters entered Huasahuasi, Junin, demanding to see the 'Yankee' nun, Irene Teresa MacCormack. MacCormack, actually an Australian, was accused of corrupting villagers with free medical care and food. After forcing her to kneel in the town's plaza, she was shot along with other prominent town members. Another example is seen in 1991, with the killing of two Franciscan missionaries from Poland during a raid at Pariacoto, Ancash. Shining Path rationalized their murders as an attempt to prevent "agents of imperialism" and "obliging" servants of the CIA from penetrating the clergy and controlling the masses.²¹¹

Ultimately, Shining Path's campaign against churches provided varied results. It was able to infiltrate and subvert religious educational institutions to its advantage. While its acts reinforced its narrative of destroying competitive groups, in the long run, it did not deny religion as a channel of influence and often reinforced the churches' role in society. The churches were a natural channel of influence Shining Path could have exploited to meet its ends. Despite tactical gains in attacking natural religious channels, churches began to sponsor *vicarías de solidaridad* (vicariates of solidarity) along with social action committees at local levels to highlight the human rights abuses of not only the government forces but also Shining Path. As economic conditions continued to worsen after the implementation of the Fijimori regime's "Fujishock" policy, much of Peru's poor were even more beholden to church-sponsored programs and charities. Lima's *Caritas* charity served over a million Peruvians by 1990 alone, and images of the Virgin Mary weeping tears of blood appeared in many neighborhoods in response to Shining Path attacks. By attacking church groups rather than using them as channels of influence, Shining Path failed to capitalize on religious institutions' resonance among the people and also failed to see that many people were dependent on the church. Peasants

²¹⁰ Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 75, 77.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

were often not left without a viable alternative to church services.²¹² Lastly, the ability to use channeled influence to exploit rifts in emerging evangelical church groups and the Catholic Church were also underdeveloped; both groups were competitors of each other, yet Shining Path saw both as enemies. If Shining Path had co-opted one, it may well have helped provide genuine, rather than artificial, support while limiting the efficacy of a rival.²¹³

Beyond its use of schools and neglecting to channel religion, Shining Path also did much to limit its use of channels by attacking the legal left along with nonstate actors, such as the Chinese and the Soviet Union. It opted not to penetrate wider target audiences with natural channels of influence, but rather eradicate them and occupy the remaining political vacuum. Shining Path even attacked “the meeting of the socialists international, the home of the Cuban military attaché, and the Lima offices of Aeroflot.”²¹⁴ Its own beginning also illustrates its inability to cooperate with groups that desired similar political goals. As mentioned previously, a split occurred within PCP over the use of armed struggle. The splinter group, PCP-Bandera Roja, favored an agrarian-Maoist style of armed struggle against the state. Bandera Roja (Red Flag) saw the nonviolent, legal left as selling out the revolution and as political adversaries. Despite calls for dogmatic intolerance of both the state and legal left, Bandera Roja was slow to practice political violence, and in practice, looked no different from other leftist groups.²¹⁵ Thus, PCP-Bandera Roja itself went through a period of internal rifts beginning in 1967. Many members felt the movement was not acting fast enough upon their call for armed struggle. By 1970, a group of 50 members was expelled for their cult-like devotion to armed struggle and “ideological heresy.” Guzman emerged as the

²¹² Poole and Renique, *Peru: Time of Fear*, 15–17, 22, 25.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 146–147.

²¹⁴ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 25.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 3–4.

charismatic leader of this group. In a move to insulate his 50 followers from the legal left, he relocated it to the University of San Cristobal de Huamanga. During the same year, he assumed leadership of the philosophy department.²¹⁶

Last, and perhaps the most obvious and significant example of Shining Path's use of channeling, is its overly centralized system of leadership. Guzman has been described as "the force behind the scenes." He cultivated himself as a "historic individual" to his followers and presented an image of "genius and omnipresence."²¹⁷ Max Weber would describe an individual like Guzman as a "charismatic mode of authority."²¹⁸ Other social movement theorists would also observe, "charismatic leadership is unstable because it lacks *both* institutional restraints and institutional supports."²¹⁹ Shining Path is an example of this. Ultimately, what Guzman wanted, Shining Path did. The group was a direct reflection of him, and when he was out of the equation, its identity went with him. Since Guzman's pivotal role as founder and leader of Shining Path, the role of secondary and mid-level leadership was relegated significantly. "The principal role of the members was effectively to serve as a link between the leader and those who are sent out to do his bidding."²²⁰ Officially, a publicly recognized second in command never existed. In fact, Guzman's own wife, Augusta La Torre, reportedly mysteriously committed suicide in

²¹⁶ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 4.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

²¹⁸ William H. Swatos, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Society: Charisma* (Altamira Press, 1998), <http://hirr.hartsem.edu/ency/charisma.htm>.

²¹⁹ Thomas Robbins and Dick Anthony, "Sects and Violence," in *Armageddon in Waco*, ed. Stuart A. Wright (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 236–259; Charles Tilly makes a similar point: "charismatic leaders usually produce more effective trust networks, but at the double cost of a) losing resistant members and b) *increasing the likelihood of disintegration or schism at times of succession* (emphasis added)—see Charles Tilly, *Trust and Rule* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 59.

²²⁰ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 7; Shining Path's early leadership's core group has been reduced significantly. Key leaders lost to the government consisted of Osman Morote Barrionuevo and Julio Cesar Mezzich (both believed to have served as 2nd in command), Antonio Diaz Martinez (believed to be 3rd in charge), and Claudio Bellido Huatallia, who is thought to have led its Central Command. Guzman's wife Augusta La Torre was an important ideologue within the group, but died under mysterious circumstances. While the loss of these individuals may have provided for a tactical concern, it was only with Guzman's capture did the group truly decline.

1988 after she openly opposed her husband taking the war to Lima.²²¹ Her mysterious death indicates Guzman's maintained total control on Shining Path's day-to-day activities.

The aftereffects of Guzman's capture illustrate he was the penultimate channel of Shining Path's influence. Having created the group, he proved he could also undo it—the *coup de grace* came in 1993, when he reversed the group's bellicose narrative in a seemingly unprovoked step towards a disengagement from violence. To the amazement of many, especially his devout followers, Guzman called for more peaceful forms of resistance in an apparent attempt to reconcile the group's goals with reality. Subsequent to his call for change, Shining Path splintered in 1994 and formed two subgroups. While one group was able to accept Guzman's call for peace, the other rebranded itself under the moniker "Sendero Rojo" (Red Path) and promised to keep fighting a protracted war against the state.²²² The remaining key leaders who are still committed to violence are arrested regularly. Only an estimated 300-committed fighters remain.²²³ Essentially, Shining Path mystique and strategic parity have been destroyed.²²⁴

In summary, the key lesson from Shining Path's version of channeling demonstrates that artificial channels can be effective, notably in the short term, whereas natural channels provide lasting and true support. Guzman's use of teachers as a means to deliver its narrative to peasants in schools was indeed a success. Using established universities, remolding the curriculum, and sending his converted teachers to then teach at village levels was also effective. It is the closest the group came to incorporating

²²¹ McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 70.

²²² DeGregori, "The Maturation of a Cosmocrat and the Building of a Discourse Community: The Case of the Shining Path," 76.

²²³ "Peru Arrests Shining Path Leader, Two Killed: Report," *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/14/us-peru-guerrilla-idUSTRE69D0F520101014>.

²²⁴ McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 64; By way of comparison, when Ho Chi Minh died, the Viet Cong did not. Such is also seen with Hezbollah, which has lost multiple key leaders, yet remains a viable organization. This comparison is telling. It recommends that the idolized Guzman was the penultimate channel for influence within Shining Path. Additionally, his statements from jail may be interpreted as an acknowledgement that in order for the group to continue, its narrative had to change. The narrative needed to be more palatable to the populace for Shining Path to illicit support and continue its struggle.

organic structures as channels. By channeling the education system, Shining Path did achieve an economy of influence. It was able to both subvert the Church's influence and its educational system while channeling influence to impressionable students.

However, because of its restrictive narrative, it was locked into a method of insurgency that all but prevented it from successfully using other natural channels of influence. Shining Path's message was a "hard sell," which seems to have confused compliance with support. Its divergence from social movement methods of infiltrating local networks and organizations governed and limited its ability to maintain control of a populace beyond tactical success. Attacking the left was Shining Path's biggest failure in terms of channeling. Local groups were eradicated rather than absorbed. Moreover, had its narrative allowed it to do so, Shining Path could have co-opted these organizations, and subsequently, subverted them once power was achieved. Possible support from nonstate actors, such as the Soviets and Chinese, was also spurned.²²⁵ Support from these nations would have arguably provided an asymmetric influence advantage, sustained the movement, and facilitated a takeover of the government.

D. MEDIUMS

Of all the case studies researched in this thesis, Shining Path exhibited the least developed use of mediums. Shining Path showed a primacy to direct violence and "propaganda by the deed"²²⁶ over the use of more subtle, developed, or nuanced mediums. Shining Path's use of these other mediums was minimal and relatively unsynchronized with any overall influence objective. One of the main reasons Shining Path did not identify a need to utilize more advanced mediums is related to its initial focus on rural, isolated, and uncontested villages where modern mediums were relatively nonexistent. In 1991, Christina Meyer from Rand Corporation analyzed that Shining Path did not pursue multiple mediums in its influence approach on the villages "because these

²²⁵ U.S. Department of State, "Background Information on Foreign Terrorist Organizations," <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2801.htm>.

²²⁶ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 25.

villages [were] isolated and insular, [and local villagers] would probably have been immune to propaganda attacks in any medium.”²²⁷ Thus, Shining Path’s primary medium for influence was face-to-face communication.

When Shining Path attempted to use more advanced mediums, such as radio or television, it would violently “coerce a legitimate station into broadcasting its messages.”²²⁸ This methodology was inconsistent and sometimes did not appear to be well coordinated when compared to other Peruvian guerilla groups, such as Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, which would synchronize the takeover of several stations simultaneously to maximize coverage of its message.²²⁹ In most cases, Shining Path spent more time trying to destroy modern mediums than actively utilizing or co-opting them. For example, in 1982, Shining Path operatives purposely destroyed television relay equipment during the World Cup, which won little favor from average Peruvians.²³⁰ Although Shining Path did not actively pursue the use of radio and television, its violent acts still benefited from media coverage from independent media outlets that assisted in propagating Shining Path influence.²³¹

The most prominent example of Shining Path’s use of conventional media when it did incorporate other mediums is its takeover of *El Diario* newspaper in 1985. *El Diario* was more than a medium of influence for the group but also a means to coordinate with its dispersed and clandestine members outside of Lima. *El Diario* was sold at newsstands only, with no subscription lists that the police could use to find members. By 1988, its estimated circulation was approximately 6,000, and claimed an audience of over 30,000 readers. After a new law was passed in December 1988 that outlawed the incitement of terrorism, the paper disappeared from circulation for several months but reappeared as a

²²⁷ Christina Meyer, *Underground Voices: Insurgent Propaganda in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1991), 22, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N3299.pdf>.

²²⁸ Meyer, *Underground Voices: Insurgent Propaganda in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru*, 22.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

²³⁰ Lewis Taylor, *Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru* (Liverpool: Centre for Latin American Studies at University of Cambridge, 1983), 28, <http://www.liv.ac.uk/rilas/Publications/paper2.pdf>.

²³¹ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 25.

weekly in March 1989. The paper was ultimately an effective way to perpetuate the myth of and message of Shining Path while maintaining operational security within the group and its followers. Results from party meetings, such as someone's Party Congress day-to-day contact and influence within the group, could be maintained without compromising the network. Results of the Shining Path Congress could be disseminated knowing that its regional leadership could receive guidance and meet to address similar issues.²³²

In keeping with its concept of cosmic war, Shining Path also often defaulted to using unique print mediums to reinforce its ideology among members and to also threaten its enemies. This form of print media took the form of "death lists." Such letters were generally posted in towns and listed the names of all enemies of the movement to be liquidated with the intent to intimidate and prompt an exodus of local actors from villages. In doing so, Shining Path then hoped to occupy a village uncontested. As was seen in the previous section covering its deeds, Shining Path was often able to use such a medium to intimidate villagers because entire villages had often been massacred due to their cooperation with the government or noncompliance with the insurgents. Mutilation of bodies was also common as a medium designed to amplify fear of Shining Path further.²³³ In one such case, Shining Path shot dead a deputy-mayor in front of her own children and then blew up her corpse with dynamite.²³⁴

The most common mediums used by Shining Path were more nontraditional in nature, such as the use of symbols, effigies, songs, graffiti, and similar methods. One of the most famous nontraditional mediums used by Shining Path was to sabotage Lima's electrical grid, creating a blackout while a large burning hammer and sickle burned on a hill overlooking the presidential palace.²³⁵ Using this medium, Shining was credited with

²³² McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 9.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 19–20.

²³⁴ Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, 16.

²³⁵ Taylor, *Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru*, 27.

detering voter participation by 35% during the first round of 1990 general elections.²³⁶ This method was also used during Guzman's birthday and during the very moment the Pope's plane was landing in Lima.²³⁷

Another memorable implementation of a nontraditional medium was Shining Path's use of dead dogs. The group would hang dead dogs from lampposts in towns and in the capital as a warning to its foes. In December 1980, members of the group hung dead dogs from street signs and lampposts around Lima.²³⁸ Unfortunately (at least from the perspective of the Shining Path) this powerful symbolism, which took Shining Path members considerable work to execute and intended to affect upcoming elections, did not resonate with the Lima populace. Shining Path members attached signs to the dogs stating "Deng Xio-Ping [the conservative successor to Mao Zedong of China] son of a bitch."²³⁹ While this specific medium seemed logical to Shining Path members, the Chinese political reference had mostly esoteric and internal meaning to them. It did not garner the true intended impact with the Lima populace in creating a positive frame alignment with the Shining Path's objectives. Although Shining Path generally failed in terms of effectively using a diverse mix of mediums, it did succeed in using education to drive its influence efforts.

²³⁶ Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, 10.

²³⁷ Palmer, *The Shining Path of Peru*, 244; Rosenberg, *Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America*, 146.

²³⁸ Karena M. Zucha, *Incomplete Developmental Counterinsurgency: The Case of the Shining Path of Peru* (San Marcos, TX: Texas State University Department of Political Science, 2007), 2, <http://ecommons.txstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=polstad>.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.




Figure 4. Maoist Influence on Shining Path's Propaganda²⁴⁰

For Guzman and Shining Path, schools, education camps, and education systems became a quintessential medium in propagating Shining Path ideology and influence. By the early 1970s, Shining Path had a strong foothold in universities, such as those in Ayacucho. It used many of its professors to put students through what it called the “basic cycle,” essentially creating its own classes to indoctrinate students into Shining Path and its ideology.²⁴¹ Over time, universities throughout Peru had students discussing Marxist-Leninism and other communist precepts through dissemination of communist literature through what was given the name of “the handbook revolution.”²⁴² Likewise, Shining Path capitalized on an effort to increase education among the rural Andean population to send its teachers into rural areas to indoctrinate the Andean youth. Initially, this worked well with Andean youth looking for something to replace a “traditional Andean world view,” and Shining Path’s strict ideology was attractive because it provided the “illusion of absolute coherence.”²⁴³

²⁴⁰ Eric J. Lyman, “Shining Path Guerillas Weaker, but Still Considered Threat in Peru,” *Houston Chronicle*, <http://www.ericjlyman.com/shiningpath.html>; “Shining Path Indoctrination School Dismantled in Lima Jail,” *Latin American Herald Tribune*, <http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=349466&CategoryId=14095>.

²⁴¹ DeGregori, “The Maturation of a Cosmocrat and the Building of a Discourse Community: The Case of the Shining Path,” 49.

²⁴² *Ibid.*

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 53, 59.

In general, Shining Path demonstrated its use of mediums were mostly designed for internal, esoteric influence and group communication rather than externally focused for social mobilization. The lack of diverse and orchestrated mediums combined with a monolithic use of violence greatly impacted Shining Path's ability to conduct successful frame alignment needed for building, growing, and maintaining a social movement.²⁴⁴

E. CASE CONCLUSION AND EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES

1. Summary of Shining Path Influence

In summary, Shining Path snatched defeat from the jaws of victory when it had the perfect environment and opportunity for generating a social movement. Shining Path's use of monolithic violence, lack of indigenous resonance, inability to mass and synchronize appropriately, poor use of channeling, and its minimally effective use of varied mediums (as compared to other case studies analyzed in the thesis) created conditions that seems to have hurt its influence efforts. Shining Path was simply unable to exploit political vulnerabilities and grievances fully with the masses, which led to an inability to capitalize on resource mobilization opportunities or structures and provided no effective means for frame amplification, extension, bridging, or transformation.

This case study is not an attempt to "ridicule" Shining Path because it misunderstood social movement methods of influence, Andean culture, and Peruvian societal needs. However, the key takeaway is that its influence strategy reflected a narrative that ultimately did not resonate with the masses. The group's narrative directly reflected Abimael Guzman Reynoso, and like him, was uncompromising in its ideology. The destruction of Peru's status quo was what the group was about, and this did not resonate with vast portions of the population. Moreover, Shining Path's method of influence reflected top-down methodology of influence. "Sendero is derived from the university, not from the peasantry. This means that its perspective on armed struggle is fundamentally intellectual and ideological rather than practical and developmental."²⁴⁵

²⁴⁴ Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 467.

²⁴⁵ Palmer, *The Shining Path of Peru*, 243–244.

2. Message and Deeds

In terms of how well its narrative resonated, Shining Path's messages and deeds often failed to consider Peru's peasants as rational actors. Peasants' support was mainly dependent on their cost-benefit analysis. If it were in the peasants' best interests to submit to Shining Path, they would have. Once it became apparent to them that power had simply transferred to Shining Path and that they were subordinate to foreign insurgents' puritanical conditions, many peasants opted to support the group no longer. Many times Shining Path alienated peasants in their attempts to mobilize them.

In broader terms, what can be gleaned from this case study? As for Shining Path's violent influence, the methods needed to be strictly governed. Violence can just as easily limit influence as gain it. Additionally, submission is not the same as acceptance and should it be confused as such. Once the target audience feels the threat of violence is no longer applied judiciously, the group loses support. It seems likely that Shining Path confused its initial success as a sign that its model of influence (violence) was indeed effective.

Shining Path also violated Mao's guidance on guerilla warfare, which prescribes themes congruent to the hypotheses presented in this thesis for effective influence. Contradictory to Maoist doctrine, the group's inconsistencies were distinct:²⁴⁶ Mao warned that the moment a resistance "disassociates" from the rank and file members of the populace, it also disassociates itself from victory.²⁴⁷ Mao understood the populace must be motivated to cooperate voluntarily and not be forced to; otherwise, their support will be ineffectual.²⁴⁸ "Organization depends largely on local circumstances" and to "not steal from the people" and "be neither selfish nor unjust."²⁴⁹ According to Mao, it is not

²⁴⁶ Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 44.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 82.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 51, 92; Strong, *Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru*, 136. According to Villagers around Uchuraccay, reported rebels stole their food and animals as they traveled through their area. Shining Path also cratered the town's main road with dynamite to implement their strategy of making communities self-sufficient. Shining Path also killed two villagers, then another with dynamite because he wanted to work his small plot of land instead of participating in a Shining Path physical-training event. These same town members had had enough, and lynched 24 Shining Path members in retaliation.

that guerilla war may fail if the populace's aspirations do not coincide with a movement's political objectives, but rather it "must fail." The peoples' cooperation and sympathy are a necessary condition for any movement.²⁵⁰ As was seen in this case study, Shining Path members often violated this tenant.

Beyond its lax adherence to Mao, Shining Path's cosmic-war narrative was also not conducive to social movement methods of influence. If the narrative sees all other groups as antithetical to its goals, attempts at channeling local actors as mechanisms of influence becomes a paradox. Doing so simply undercuts the narrative. Ultimately, as Guzman did from his jail cell, the narrative must be adjusted to facilitate a change in tactics and strategy. Guzman's change of heart may reflect the recognition of the need to incorporate more proven forms of influence.

3. Channels

Front groups are also not the same as local actors, nor are they an acceptable substitute in terms of influence. If the front group does not generate local support, it is just another extension of the group and not a means to grow. Shining Path seemed to believe its "generated organisms" would garner the same level of support as if it had used local actors to infiltrate existing organizations to bend them towards the movement's overall goals. Often Shining Path used its members to penetrate groups not to influence the group but as a way to gain intelligence so that it could later subvert it. Moreover, as Palmer notes, these front groups were also the vehicles through which Shining Path tried to impose foreign set of relationships, or new relationships that were not distinct in the minds of the peasants from the old ones. Peasants began to see these new groups as limiting rather expanding their options.²⁵¹ For Shining Path, effective channels could have provided needed resources and the co-opting of unique social networks and organizations for funding and accelerating its growth and strength as a social movement. By directly attacking entities, such as religious organizations or potential rivals, rather

²⁵⁰ Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 43.

²⁵¹ Palmer, *The Shining Path of Peru*, 244–245.

than attempting to infiltrate and ultimately win them over, Shining Path essentially isolated itself from the power these mobilizing structures could have brought to the movement.²⁵²

4. Mediums

Mediums must take into account the target audience's culture and symbols. Shining Path failed to incorporate Andean themes and symbols sufficiently into their mediums. It is not that peasants did not understand what a hammer and sickle meant, but it was not something to which they immediately related. Had Shining Path used local mediums, they may have been able to channel their message more effectively. A similar example is the Viet Cong's use of local songs and theatre for peasants. By inserting their ideology into peasant songs and love of theatre, the Viet Cong seamlessly weaved their narrative into cultural resonance. Villagers were able to more readily cognitively realign because the mediums used were familiar to them. Mediums provide the gateway to successful frame alignment and help fuel current, or generate additional, grievances useful for propelling social mobilization.²⁵³ In the case of Shining Path, the over reliance on violence and its limited, disjointed use of mediums greatly suppressed its ability to remain flexible. Specifically, the limited use of mediums prevented Shining Path from conducting any effective type or frame amplification, bridging, extension, or transformation needed to shift the cognitive alignment of the Peruvian masses virally toward action.²⁵⁴ In general, the lack of varied mediums gave Shining Path little flexibility to adapt to issues created by the state or to create an emotional connection effectively in a way to create large-scale cognitive shifts across multiple, diverse target audiences.

²⁵² John D. McCarthy, "Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 142–145.

²⁵³ Snow et al., *Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation*, 466.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 467.

5. Shining Path Influence Vulnerabilities

Unlike most failed or failing insurgencies, Shining Path did not gradually lose strength over time; its downfall was relatively dramatic and mimicked the model of decline for a state toppled by insurgency.²⁵⁵ This case study shows that although Shining Path could have used violence to topple the Peruvian government, it highlights that even before Guzman's capture, Shining Path was conducting ineffective influence and losing mass appeal for generating and sustaining social mobilization. Shining Path perceived it was conducting effective influence, but in reality, it was simply acquiring uncontested cognitive terrain. Additionally, a narrative predicated solely on "Gonzalo Thought," where essentially Guzman was the single point of success or failure of the narrative, did not have the flexibility to conduct aspects of frame alignment needed to illicit a mass cognitive shift. Two years after Guzman's capture, the group was no longer in a position to topple or challenge the state. This is not to say that Shining Path could not continue with its use of terror and acts of sabotage, but since the mid-1990s, it has been more preoccupied with its own survival than advancing its ideology. In final analysis, Shining Path was not only "a compensation for impotence" but also that strong-arm tactics do not compensate for ineffective influence methods.²⁵⁶

This case study highlights two of Shining Path's major vulnerabilities that can be exploited. First, groups whose form of influence is predicated on violence are highly vulnerable to demise if the state refuses to fulfill the group's narrative through the application of over reactive counter-violence. The refusal of the state to implement acts of extreme violence can facilitate reduction in the potency of the group's narrative, slowing and potentially reversing its social movement efforts. Secondly, influence strategies (like Shining Path's) predicated on an inflexible, penultimate channel of influence that do not adapt social mobilization techniques become highly vulnerable to defeat with the removal or marginalization of that individual. While this is a critical

²⁵⁵ McCormick and Giordano, "Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerrilla Mobilisation," 295–320; This likely indicates Shining Path's inability to influence constituted a catastrophic failure.

²⁵⁶ McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 69.

vulnerability, a state's counter influence response must ensure it does not inadvertently force the group to implement more decentralized and distributed form of social movement influence. A state must ensure removal of this type of key individual does not generate more political opportunities/grievances, frame alignment opportunities, and mobilization structures increasing the group's overall influence potency.

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IV. THE JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

A. BACKGROUND

Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim populated country and, as such, possesses hundreds of religious and cultural institutions that naturally facilitate collective action. For decades, social and political conditions in Indonesia served as a breeding ground for Islamist insurgencies and violent extremist groups who first used European colonialism as a rallying call to their cause.²⁵⁷ As colonial rule gave way to Indonesian self-governance, the groups justified continued calls to arms by declaring Indonesian political regimes as corrupt and apostate governments. Kumar Ramakrishna, the Head of the Center of Excellence for National Security in Singapore, asserts, "Indonesian society can be conceived of structurally as a collection of overlapping Salafi, proto-Islamist and Islamist social networks built around influential religious figures."²⁵⁸ *Jemaah Islamiyah's* (JI) recognized Indonesian susceptibility and incorporated this tendency as it exploited fissures in Indonesian society. Exploitation of these characteristics enabled the group to grow and action its violent extremist Islamist ideology. To analyze JI's influence effects from 2000 to the present, it becomes necessary to include Islamist groups that emerged following JI's transformation. Following events in Bali in 2002, JI fractured under Indonesian government and international pressure, which gave rise to two more prominent Islamist movements based on JI principles, the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) and *Jama'ah Anshorut Tauhid* (JAT).

Jemaah Islamiyah emerged from the foundations of an earlier Indonesian Islamic movement, *Darul Islam* (DI), which sought the establishment of Islamic Law across

²⁵⁷ In his paper, "Islamism," from multiple entries (including "Islamism," "Christian Identity" and "Abu Sayyaf Group") *Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense*, 2005, Jeffrey Bale defines Islamists as: radically anti-secular and anti-Western political current of contemporary Islamic thought with both revolutionary and revivalist characteristics. This definition coincides with Mehdi Mozaffari's article on "What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept," publ. *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 1 (March 2007): 17–33.

²⁵⁸ K. Ramakrishna, "Constructing" the Jemaaah Islamiyah Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry," (2004): 22, <http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/handle/10220/4471>.

Southeast Asia.²⁵⁹ JI formed from fissures that divided DI leadership and members. Ideological differences between DI leaders and the founders of JI, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, resulted in separate Islamist movements.²⁶⁰ Intent on establishing a regional Southeast Asian Islamic Caliphate, JI was a departure from competing Indonesian Islamic movements. Built on cross-cultural ties and bonds forged during the Soviet-Afghan War, JI used its historical ties to DI, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, and other groups across Southeast Asia to establish a regional presence in the form of the *Mantiqi* system spanning Malaysia, Singapore, Mindanao, and parts of Australia.²⁶¹ JI's organizational framework was decentralized and designed to facilitate coordination at the administrative and operational levels and managed through regional leadership.²⁶² JI became an ideological hybrid based on Indonesian Islamist ideology coupled with the founders' experiences in Afghanistan fighting alongside Islamist fighters from the Middle East who possessed a penchant for secrecy and violent *jihad*.²⁶³ JI's founders believed an Islamist Islamic society could be grown from the bottom up using both *dakwah*²⁶⁴ and *jihad* and felt that their ideal Islamic state could be realized.²⁶⁵

²⁵⁹ S. Jones, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous," *International Crisis Group Asia* 63 (2003), 1–5, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/063-jemaah-islamiyah-in-south-east-asia-damaged-but-still-dangerous.aspx>. DI's goal was the establishment of an Islamic Indonesian state to supplant corrupt Indonesian regimes. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, DI saw an opportunity to grow veteran fighters by waging armed *jihad* abroad. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, mujahedeen recruits were segregated based on geographic origins. Fighters from Southeast Asia were kept together as a group; enabling social bonds to form that would prove an invaluable attribute for JI to leverage after the fighters returned from Afghanistan.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁶¹ B. Desker, "The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25 (2003): i, <http://web.rollins.edu/~tclairson/easia/singji.pdf>, 500.

²⁶² International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates," 2002, 1, <http://www.babylonscovertwar.com/Terrorist%20Groups/Piracy/JemaahIslamiyah.pdf>.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁶⁴ The Central Leadership Council of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah, *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah (PUPJI)*, 5. *Dakwah* is the Indonesian variation of Da'wah, which is Arabic for proselytizing and preaching Islam. The authors obtained a copy of the original JI PUPJI doctrinal document, translated into English, by the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore.

²⁶⁵ Ramakrishna, "Constructing" the Jemmaah Islamiyah Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry," 10.

JI began its bombing campaign in 2000, culminating with several high-profile bombings of hotels and embassies including the Bali bombings of 2002. From 2002–2005, JI was the most lethal terrorist group in the world.²⁶⁶ After killing 202 and wounding another 248 victims (predominantly Australians and Indonesians) through the Bali bombings alone, JI was placed on the UN terrorist watch list and targeted by governments across Southeast Asia.²⁶⁷ After which, hundreds of JI leaders and operatives were arrested, imprisoned or executed, causing it to splinter and fracture. “The Jemaah Islamiyah or JI terrorist organization [sic] is split into two main factions—the bombers and the JI mainstream.”²⁶⁸ The bombers represented the fundamentalist JI population whose action framing espoused violence to expedite an Islamic Caliphate. JI mainstream represented traditionalists who discouraged premature violence in favor of proselytizing and exploiting existing socio-political structures to set the conditions for armed *jihad*. As the two factions fractured, JI lost its ability to coordinate and implement influence warfare at a grassroots level.²⁶⁹

In 2000, JI founder Ba’asyir formed *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) as an umbrella organization for militant Islamist organizations, including remnants of JI. MMI became the political arm of JI, predominantly concerned with conducting *dakwah* and *jihad* using the existing political structure to further JI’s agenda, not unlike the IRA’s use of Sinn Fein.²⁷⁰ Using legal loopholes and Indonesian political inaction, MMI exploited

²⁶⁶ Zachary Abuza, “The State of Jemaah Islamiyah: Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia Five Years After Bali,” *The Jebson Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies* 2, no. 1 (November, 2007): 1, http://www.simmons.edu/undergraduate/academics/departments/political-science/docs/Abuza_JCCTS_ResearchSeries_2.11-2007.pdf.

²⁶⁷ M. Cianflone et al., “Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: An in-Depth Investigation into the 2002 Bali, Indonesia, Bombings,” 2007, 18, http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/50173/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/33258a30-8ad8-43c3-8ca5-f41a882af9c5/en/07_Bali.pdf. The Bali bombings of 2002, along with several other JI related bombings across Southeast Asia, prompted the United Nations to place JI on its list of terrorist organizations noting direct ties to Al Qaeda.

²⁶⁸ Radio Singapore International Interview with Sidney Jones, *An Insight into Jemaah Islamiyah's Factional Structure*, 2006, <http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/sj6jan06.pdf>.

²⁶⁹ N. H. Ismail and C. Ungerer, “Jemaah Islamiyah: A Renewed Struggle?” *ASPI Policy Analysis* 46 (July 16, 2009): 2, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ASPI_JemaahIslamiyah_RenewedStruggle.pdf.

²⁷⁰ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry*, 2008, 4, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/47c6c9912.pdf>.

these opportunities to infiltrate and subvert the political and religious systems. Presently, MMI has grown to 58 branches throughout Indonesia. It also retains its status as a legitimate political organization.

In July 2008, claiming MMI had become too democratic, Ba'asyir stepped down as MMI's leader and formed *Jama'ah Anshorut Tauhid* (JAT).²⁷¹ Ba'asyir organized JAT in a similar fashion to MMI, but altered the group's focus. He focused it toward more transparency, outreach, and Islamic education as a means to "revitalize the Islamic movement in support of full victory for the struggle of the Indonesian faithful."²⁷² Presently, JAT focuses more attention on media and public relations as it seeks to position itself as an above ground organization intended to attract wider Islamic audiences than its MMI and JI predecessors, but continues to pursue militant and nefarious agendas.²⁷³ JAT is associated with terrorist training camps, planned attacks against government infrastructure, and it is the latest Islamist organization to appear in Indonesia's conglomerate cartel of Islamist movements.²⁷⁴ JAT has ties to no less than seven major Indonesian Islamist groups as depicted in Figure 4.

²⁷¹ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)*, 2010, 1–3, [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B107-Indonesia%20The%20Dark%20Side%20of%20Jamaah%20Ansharut%20Tauhid%20JAT.ashx](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B107-Indonesia%20The%20Dark%20Side%20of%20Jamaah%20Ansharut%20Tauhid%20JAT.ashx).

²⁷² *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁷⁴ M. Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *The Rise of JAT*, ICPVTR, 2011, 16.




Figure 5. JAT Organization and Affiliations²⁷⁵

Two prevailing LOIs operationalize JI's initial influence objectives. Since splintering after government crackdowns, MMI and JAT expanded aspects of JI's initial LOIs in an attempt to improve their respective influence operations and achieve their goals, defiance and subversion, and expansion and justification. The LOIs have the potential to provide mutually supporting subordinate influence operations, but appear uncoordinated and asynchronous as evident by the splintering of JI, MMI, and JAT. Similar to the Viet Cong, the JI-affiliated Islamist Cartel intuitively utilizes LOIs in an attempt to employ influence operations utilizing SMT principles (as detailed in Table 3).

²⁷⁵ Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *The Rise of JAT*, 8.

<u>Line of Influence</u>	<u>Message and Deeds</u>	<u>Channels</u>	<u>Mediums</u>
Defiance and Subversion	Terrorism Target Violence Radicalization Political Lobbying (MMI & JAT)	Ba'asyir (Charismatic Leader) Islamist Preachers Islamist Teachers Pesanren Students Pesanren Graduates	Face-to-face JI-linked Pesantrens Mosque & Madrassah Publishing Ba'asyir Internet Webpages (MMI & JAT) eSocial Network & Media (MMI & JAT)
Expansion and Justification	Social Services (MMI & JAT) Govt Grievance Exploitation Intermarriage Targeted Violence Radicalization	Prisoners eSocial Networks	Radio (JAT) Transportable Multi-media

Table 3. JI, MMI, and JAT Combined Lines of Influence (LOIs)

Since fracturing, *Jemaah Islamiyah* has survived by aligning with other Islamist organizations, such as MMI and JAT, and incorporating themselves into the industrial, political, and educational *Pesanren* (Indonesian Islamic school) network throughout Indonesia and across the region. Across Southeast Asia, JI maintains its robust messaging capability and an extensive and sophisticated media and publishing industry as a member of the wider Indonesian Islamist network. Coupled with JI's predominant reliance on its trust networks, it has systematically continued its grassroots social movement influence operations.

B. MESSAGE AND DEEDS

JI, MMI, and JAT use familial ties, divisive education, and social programs to exploit socio-political conditions. *Jemaah Islamiyah*, like the Vietcong, exploits familial ties to spread its influence into new areas and networks to expand resources and audience alignment. Following the Indonesian government's attempt to purge JI after the Bali bombings, JI's trust networks enabled the group to absorb its losses and restructure the organization. As a result of the government offensive against JI, the group morphed from a violence-oriented organization that utilized spectacular and focused violence against western and local government targets, to a decentralized one that has infiltrated political, media, and commercial spheres. After the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesian forces discovered a draft of JI's organizational guide, the *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah* (PUPJI), which detailed JI's administrative infrastructure,

ideology, and religious underpinnings.²⁷⁶ PUPJI provides an operational strategy and framework for recruitment, maintenance of the organization's integrity, and how to establish a counter state systematically, which includes proselytizing through *dakwah*, cooperation and coordination with other Islamic organizations (*jemaah*) of similar ideological attributes, goals, and manipulation of *jihad*.²⁷⁷ JI operationalized both violent and nonviolent methods by exploiting political opportunities and vulnerabilities within the Indonesian socio-political system.

The group's adaptability to changing security environments allowed it to maintain its violence influence mechanism through its militant arm, while also adapting their messaging methodology.²⁷⁸ Prior to Noordin Top's death in 2009, JI employed a violent message and deed influence approach to attack western influence and religious minorities to foment sectarian divide. By attacking religious minorities, JI wanted to incite reprisals as mobilizing mechanisms for aligning Muslim communities with JI. Their desired effect was, and is, the subversion of the existing political framework to a *Sharia*-centric governing system. The group's ability to exploit familial ties, and their subsequent familial obligation, allows JI to prosecute its violent and nonviolent message and deed lines of influence to subvert rival Islamist organizations, the Indonesian government, and the social status quo.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁶ E. Pavlova, *From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI*, 2006, 8, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP117.pdf>.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁷⁸ Zachary Abuza, "JI's Two-Pronged Strategy in Indonesia," *Terrorism Focus* 3, no. 16 (April 25, 2006): 1, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=749&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=239&no_cache=1.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

1. Exploiting and Subverting the Competition

The most significant deed JI has instituted was the creation of its own Islamic school network, known as the Pondok Ngruki network.²⁸⁰ JI manipulated the traditional concept of the Indonesian Islamic boarding schools, called *pesantrens*, as a primary means of indoctrinating recruits. During its formative years, JI established networks of *pesantrens* throughout Indonesia and into Malaysia to preach its Islamist ideology and mobilize resources and manpower to their cause.²⁸¹ By 2002, JI's education network was estimated at over 100 strong, with a core of 'Ivy League' *pesantrens* located throughout Java. The elite JI *pesantrens* were attended by children of core members to ensure consistency of messaging and ideological frames for JI's future leaders.²⁸² The education network as a whole not only propagates JI's ideological frame, it serves to grow a trusted member base across the *Pesantren* network. Not all JI *Pesantren* students enter JI's ranks, but their exposure and their cognitive alignment from their attendance and their immersion within the curriculum creates a network of natural channels and tacit supporters for the organization. Graduates of JI's schools become deed and channel hybrids who return to their communities with JI's messaging and serve to sponsor and recruit siblings and other family members to attend JI's *Pesantren* system, which creates a social network that serves to grow the "counter state" from within.²⁸³ Graduates are also encouraged to marry other members within the network to solidify socio-familial bonds, enabling JI to exploit traditional family obligatory loyalties.

²⁸⁰ Z. Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Lynne Rienner Pub, 2003), 126. JI's endurance during the past two decades is attributable to the system of religious boarding schools that then DI followers, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, eventually located in the town of Ngruki, and known as Pondok Ngruki, in Central Java in 1971. These schools form the ideological base from which all of JI's senior leadership attended starting from a core of 30 students, and eventually producing almost 2,000 by 2003.

²⁸¹ Jones, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous," 3. Before JI could establish a foothold in Indonesia, its founders had been exiled to Malaysia in 1984. In Malaysia, they received sanctuary. These social bonds are the reason that the inter-JI relationships are strongest between the Indonesian and Malaysian governances

²⁸² Jones, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous," 26.

²⁸³ Pavlova, *From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI*, 5.

Intermarriage is one of the most significant deeds that has cemented JI together as an organization. It has allowed JI to establish bridges between similar Southeast Asian Islamist movements and subvert them by co-opting or aligning potential rivals to JI. A complex network of marriages bonds JI with the wider Islamist movement across Indonesia. “In some cases, JI leaders appear to have arranged marriages for their subordinates to serve the interests of the organization.”²⁸⁴ Through marriage ties, JI has bred a social movement from within; ensuring ideological framing is inculcated with future generations. Statements of an arrested JI operative demonstrate the complexities of JI’s familial ties and the propensity to propagate those ties within the greater JI network:

Indonesian permanent resident of Malaysia, now detained there, who in 1998–1999 was the head of the Selangor wakalah. Ferry’s elder sister is the wife of Wahyudin, the current head of Pondok Ngruki. Ferry himself married the stepdaughter of Abdullah Sungkar, a woman named Isnairin binti Abdul Rosyid, in 1987 in what appears to have been an arranged alliance. His wife may be the sister-in-law of Syawal, since Syawal is married to another Sungkar stepdaughter. Ferry, a native of Medan, North Sumatra, met Abdullah Sungkar in Germany in the late 1980s when he was studying at the Technische Fachhochschule in Berlin.²⁸⁵

Familial networks span political boundaries and become mutually supporting, with messaging and narratives, which are ideologically self-sustaining.²⁸⁶ “Kinship is particularly important in a clandestine organization like JI where maintaining relations of trust and confidence is crucial for survival.”²⁸⁷ Familial ties allow JI to control its message, select target audiences, cement loyalties, and select of channels and mediums. JI’s intermarriage deeds are comparable to how Al Qaeda infiltrates new territories to

²⁸⁴ Jones, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” 26.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 28.

²⁸⁶ Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore,” 502.

²⁸⁷ Noor Huda Ismail, “The Role of Kinship in Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiya,” *Terrorism Monitor* 4, no. 11 (June 2, 2006), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=791&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=181&no_cache=1.

establish footholds and mobilize resources.²⁸⁸ The secretive and exclusive nature of JI limits growth, but effectively removes competing ideologies and messages from interfering with the JI narrative.

After the Bali bombings and the subsequent government offensives against JI, the group was suppressed and began to splinter. In its original manifestation, JI was unable to challenge or subvert the wider socio-political status quo successfully. However, its suppression and splintering forced its member base to transform and align under MMI and later JAT. Under these social organizations, which possessed a legitimacy and populace support base that JI never achieved, the Islamist ideology began to spread to a wider popular audience. Surviving JI leadership prevailed within the leadership hierarchy of MMI and JAT, and through these organizations, the Islamist message and deeds took on an increasingly nonkinetic influence methodology.²⁸⁹ Under MMI and JAT, JI's violent message and deed activities were selectively retained for use in exploiting religious contention between Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Nonviolent messages and deeds served to fulfill social and civil needs where the Indonesian government was not present or unable to meet the needs of the population. As an example, both MMI and JAT deploy crisis response teams after natural disasters to deliver needed aid, as well as 'spiritual guidance' to victims. The teams are not explicitly focused on humanitarian work. Their primary goal is to provide spiritual guidance to victims, assist in reconstruction of mosques and madrassas, and guard against the religious and social influence of non-Muslim relief agencies.²⁹⁰ As documented by Abuza, "MMI has grown increasingly combative in dealing with the government which it accuses of leading a witch hunt against Muslims. MMI has begun issuing summons, or official complaints, to the police in order to intimidate them and influence investigations

²⁸⁸ S. Phillips and R. Shanahan, *Al-Qa'ida, Tribes and Instability in Yemen* (Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2009), 6, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/LOWY_AlQaida_Tribes_Instability_Yemen.pdf.

²⁸⁹ Many of JI's leaders hold concurrent positions in MMI (and JAT) giving themselves a patina of legitimacy and political cover. See Z. Abuza, "Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model," *Middle East Quarterly* (2009), <http://www.meforum.org/2044/jemaah-islamiyah-adopts-the-hezbollah-model>.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.

of suspected terrorists.”²⁹¹ Combined with the increasing amount of crisis and civil support activities, MMI and JAT (inclusive of JI) demonstrate an active effort to challenge and delegitimize the government.

2. Indigenous Resonance

After a decade of bombings and assassinations, Indonesia’s government still refuses to outlaw JI as an organization. In part, this is due to the organization’s name, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, which literally means ‘Islamic Community.’ JI’s name was intended to resonate with local Muslim populations. Its very meaning possesses deep religious and social sentiment, making it difficult for the Indonesian government to attack it with its own messaging for risk of alienating the population, or feeding into JI’s allegations of government targeting of Muslim populations.²⁹² Targeting an organization with such a commonly accepted and resonate moniker risked a perception of government injustices against its own constituency; especially considering JI’s operating area is the most densely concentrated Muslim population in the world.

A substantial and growing susceptibility toward Islamist radical ideology exists throughout Indonesia and greater Southeast Asia.²⁹³ As evidenced by the vast quantities of JI and MMI radical publications sold over the past several years, JI and its affiliates’ messages resonate within Indonesia’s Muslim population. Their messages serve as a manifestation of discontent with the socio-political status quo against the corrupt and

²⁹¹ Abuza, “Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model,” 4.

²⁹² S. Osman, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Of Kin and Kind* (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2010), 6, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP194.pdf>.

²⁹³ Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore,” 496. “There are signs that the Muslim community there is also increasingly subscribing [sic] to a world-view where a radical Islamic reading of political issues portrays the west as oppressors and the global *ummah* as under threat... the religious teachers in the *pondoks* of Thailand reject the mainstream Thai cultural identity and stress a global Islamic identity instead... the Cambodian authorities have noted the increasing influence of Wahhabi doctrines among their Cham minority, resulting from Middle Eastern financial support and the use of Arab and Pakistani teachers in their *madrasahs*. While the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia back the governments of the Philippines and Thailand in their fight with Islamic separatist movements, popular support for the insurgents exists at the ground level.”

perceived ‘apostate’ national government.²⁹⁴ Since 2008, *Sharia* law has been adopted in some capacity by 16 of Indonesia’s 32 provinces, with Aceh being completely governed by *Sharia* law.²⁹⁵ This governance is contrary to Indonesian constitutional law. The central government has the power to block provincial laws, but showed little willingness to do so for fear of alienating itself from local populations.²⁹⁶ As of 2008, the Indonesian government had only pledged to review 37 of 600 *Sharia*-based ordinances passed by local provincial governments.²⁹⁷ The seepage of *Sharia* law into Indonesia’s political system at the provincial level below demonstrates the disequilibrium unfolding between the population and the government.²⁹⁸

In 2006, Indonesia’s corruption ranked 144 out of 180 surveyed nations,²⁹⁹ and although a 2010 poll indicated that the situation had improved, the nation remained one of the world’s most corrupt countries.³⁰⁰ The level of corruption rampant throughout the Indonesian political system served as a cognitive rally point for JI’s grievance influence messaging, which called for a return to Islamic teachings and a denouncement of the apostate government.³⁰¹ JI’s messages coincided with Islamist separatist sentiments propagating across the region at grassroots levels:

Disconnects existed between JI’s messages and its use of violence as an influence tactic. Miscalculations with its use of indiscriminate violence, the death of innocent Indonesians, a lack of government targeting, and JI’s lack of brand recognition due to its

²⁹⁴ Specific quantities and time frames will be discussed in the Mediums section. See International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry*, paper for additional details and information.

²⁹⁵ “Sharia-Based Laws Creep into Half of Provinces,” *Compass Direct News*, February 9, 2009, <http://www.compassdirect.org/english/country/indonesia/1949>.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁸ Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 54–60.

²⁹⁹ infoplease, “The 2006 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index,” <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781359.html>.

³⁰⁰ Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2010,” http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results.

³⁰¹ N. A. Yasin and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *Bahasa Indonesia and Malay Language Extremist Websites*, ICPVTR, 2011.

secrecy prevented message and deed pairing. Decentralized radical JI factions, such as Noordin Top's terrorist cell, pre-empted JI's ability to mobilize the population sufficiently through coordinated message and deed influence operations that would be relatable to target audiences. From 2003–2009, Top's bombings against western tourist locations killed and wounded hundreds of fellow Indonesian Muslims. These actions contrasted the group's messaging calling for attacks and the downfall of the acclaimed corrupt and apostate Indonesian government. Message and deed disconnect, coupled with a perception organizational ambiguity and secrecy, resulted in the population doubting JI's formal existence and purpose.³⁰²

In contrast to JI, MMI (and later JAT) have displayed a coordinated and holistic message and deed application. They built on JI's grievance line of influence but have maintained a "near enemy" focus that resonates with local Muslim communities due to the disequilibrium between the populace and the national government.³⁰³ They have expanded their local resonance by focusing violence predominantly on government institutions and infrastructure, and their respective social and civil support programs have served to attract target audiences and alienate the government's relevance and legitimacy in the eyes of the population.³⁰⁴

3. Synchronization and Massing of Message and Deeds

Once JI became an overt organization aimed at mobilizing wider target audiences, its message and deeds lost sufficient synchronization. JI's governing document, PUPJI, states operations should always be conducted in coordination with other operations, and by extension, these operations should be mutually supporting.³⁰⁵ These operations are inclusive of influence, propaganda, kinetic, and nonkinetic activities. The splintering of JI after 2002 into semi-autonomous cells demonstrates the inability of the organization to

³⁰² S. Syah and B. Begawan, "Does Jemaah Islamiyah Exist?" *The Brunei Times*, June 23, 2007, 29, http://www.bt.com.bn/classification/opinion/2007/06/23/does_jemaah_islamiyah_exist.

³⁰³ Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *The Rise of JAT*, 14.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁵ The Central Leadership Council of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah, *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah (PUPJI)*, 8.

coordinate and synchronize its efforts across its decentralized organization. Its messaging could not mass because the relative individual agendas of JI's decentralized network adversely affected its ability to maintain a coherent and meaningful narrative.³⁰⁶

Ji's revitalization within MMI and JAT displays a transformation of previous message and deed synchronization shortfalls. Unlike Ji's uncoordinated and violent tactics, JAT and MMI maintain a grassroots presence through social and civil programs and the Internet.³⁰⁷ Their respective co-opting of Ji and other Islamist organizations shows a massed and synchronous effort to consolidate constituencies, and target the alignment of other vulnerable audiences.³⁰⁸ Although former Ji members lead both groups, the groups are far more open and recognized. Both retain facets of Ji's robust publishing infrastructure and have expanded upon it with other mediums that allow the groups to distribute Islamist ideology through wider-reaching mediums that support the interpersonal influence efforts at the grassroots level.³⁰⁹ While JAT is more militant than MMI, both groups retain the use of targeted violence against the Indonesian government, which is seen as the "near enemy" supported by western apostate states. Several examples include JAT's anti-government messaging, which supported its attacks on the police precinct in Hamparan Perak, the Medan Bank Robbery, and Aceh military training camp.³¹⁰ MMI's militant arm was used to distribute aid and Islamist religious teachings during the 2004 Tsunami throughout areas where the Indonesian government was unable to respond. MMI followed its support activity by successfully lobbying the government for the withdrawal of foreign troops and foreign religious influences.³¹¹ MMI and JAT's

³⁰⁶ International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates," 3. These agendas can be attributed in part to the differing of philosophies between the militant and fundamental elements of Ji. After Sungkar's death, Ba'asyir was criticized for establishing the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), which by definition, was an organization designed to operate from within the Indonesian political framework seen as antithetical by many Ji operatives, who saw any concessions away from *Sharia* as an aberration from Sungkar's teaching.

³⁰⁷ Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *The Rise of JAT*, 6.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ This will be discussed and assessed further during the mediums section of this chapter.

³¹⁰ Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *The Rise of JAT*, 4.

³¹¹ Abuza, "Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model," 6.

actions not only build varied levels of support in targeted areas, the effects of their messages and associated social support deeds undoubtedly spread through the natural channels linking each village and social group exposed to their influence operations.

C. CHANNELS

Social networks permeate every facet of the *Jemaah Islamiyah* structure. JI's ability to adapt can partially be attributed to its use of natural and artificial channels. JI's PUPJI doctrine established *dakwah* as a principle component for developing and using artificial channels as a means of mobilizing a community's and population's natural channels of informal information propagation.³¹² *Dakwah* is supposed to serve as the guiding mechanism to guide the religious preaching and framing of JI's ideology.³¹³ JI's PUPJI and *dakwah* principle exemplify its recognition of the necessity to utilize networks and natural channels by inserting or developing JI representative figures within local communities. Pesantren teachers and religious leaders served as JI's artificial channels meant to mobilize natural information propagation. However, the schism between JI's traditionalist and militant factions prevented a synchronized and coordinated implementation of PUPJI's *dakwah* principles, as evidenced by Noordin Top's terror attacks before JI had mobilized sufficient resources and populace support.³¹⁴ Coupling JI's difficulty in using its *dakwah* methodology to enter and attract new audiences was the group's extensive secrecy. Credibility of JI proselytizing efforts was hamstrung by the group's covert nature and security protocols to protect itself from compromise. Conversely, JI's offshoots, MMI and JAT, approached the *dakwah* principle of engaging audiences more in line with the PUPJI doctrine through more overt and identifiable methods with local populations.

³¹² *Dakwah* is the Indonesian variation of Da'wah, which is Arabic for proselytizing and preaching Islam; JI and its affiliates' use of a *dakwah* to proselytize and preach radical and literal Islamist ideology.

³¹³ The Central Leadership Council of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah, *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah (PUPJI)*, 5.

³¹⁴ According to JI's PUPJI doctrine, the phases of establishing a successful *jihad* are: develop the *jemaah* or core; develop the strength by mobilizing education, *Dakwah*, emigration, recruit, establishing support base, training, intelligence, financing, and aligning other like minded groups; and then issue a warning through *Dakwah* upon entering armed *jihad*. See PUPJI beginning on page 6 for additional details.

Islamic teachers and preachers represent a cornerstone of JI's *dakwah* network. The Pesantren network established by Sungkar and Ba'asyir formed the core of JI's vanguard. Essentially, *pesantrens* became clearinghouses for natural and artificial channels. Due to their positions within local populations, teachers and preachers are leveraged as artificial channels to propagate JI, MMI, and JAT messages and effects.³¹⁵ For example, JI fused its book launches from their affiliated publishing companies with JI teachers and preachers to disseminate messages:

But the most successful distribution may be by word of mouth. As soon as a book is published, the JI network arranges for several launches, usually at mosques, where JI *ustadz* (teachers) will lead a discussion on the contents. It will be the subject of Friday sermons, religious discussion groups variously called *pengajian* or *taklim*, and may get photocopied and distributed in whole or in part. The publishers are not particularly concerned about intellectual property rights; the important thing is for the message to be disseminated.³¹⁶

This leveraging displays the group's ability to identify and utilize key communicators at grassroots levels by exploiting the legitimacy of Islamic teachers and preachers within Indonesia's familial and religiously oriented society.

Ji formed channels across the socio-political spectrum. MMI lobbies for the establishment of *Sharia*, or components of *Sharia*, to all major legislative action in the Indonesian government.³¹⁷ For example, MMI lobbied to align Indonesian penal law to confirm with *Sharia* to support recruitment of suitable members, since Indonesia's penal system was filled with both unlawful prisoners and those detained under questionably corrupt circumstances.³¹⁸

MMI and JAT's operationalized JI's PUPJI through their social programs, which also serve as artificial channels for mobilizing local population natural information

³¹⁵ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry*, 12.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*

³¹⁷ Abuza, "Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model," 4.

³¹⁸ International Crisis Group, "'Deradicalisation' and Indonesia's Prisons," *Asia Report N 142* (November 2007), i, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/142_deradicalisation_and_indonesian_prisons.ashx.

networks. Acting as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their services allow them to implement *dakwah* to local communities under a legitimate banner. The groups seek vulnerable populations who are distressed or lack sufficient support from the Indonesian government. Take, for example, MMI's participation in relief efforts in the wake of both the 2004 tsunami and 2006 earthquake in Indonesia. Following the 2004 tsunami, MMI won a contract from the United Nations World Food Program to deliver disaster relief for victims in the affected areas.³¹⁹ It used its NGO access and funding to not only provide relief services to victims, but also to exploit it as an opportunity to conduct its Islamist variation of *dakwah*:

...these groups saw the disaster as an opportunity to proselytize. Several groups in addition to Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia indicated that their primary goal was to provide "spiritual guidance" to victims, ensure that Islamic law was being followed, and to assist in the reconstruction of mosques. With 400,000 refugees and mosques at the center of rural community relief efforts, the potential for influence was great.³²⁰

MMI's actions exemplify its recognition of vulnerable and exploitable audiences. By focusing its efforts in areas where the government could not access or lacked the resources to support local communities, local populations were vulnerable to align and support MMI (and by extension JI). The lack of government support, coupled with MMI's services, amplified its grievance line of influence, and the local population naturally began to echo the grievances against the Indonesian government. Indonesia's Aceh province suffered horrendously from the 2004 tsunami, after which MMI focused a significant amount of resources to 'aid' the Aceh population. Today, Aceh is the only Indonesian province that has completely implemented Sharia law.³²¹

Following Indonesia's offensive against JI, its operatives began using the prison system as a channeling conduit for its influence operations. Prisoners not only served as potential members, but also as opportunistic channels to spread JI's narratives and

³¹⁹ Abuza, "Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model," 8.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

³²¹ D. Kurniawati, "Shariah in Aceh: Eroding Indonesia's Secular Freedoms," *The Jakarta Globe*, August 18, 2010, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/shariah-in-aceh-eroding-indonesias-secular-freedoms/391672>.

ideology. Corruption in Indonesia's prisons is rampant and conditions facilitate JI recruitment efforts. An interview with a former Indonesian prisoner describes his encounter with imprisoned Bali bomber Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, who was executed for his role in the 2002 Bali bombings:

He [Ahmed] found the JI group sympathetic compared to other inmates: "They always defended the other Muslim prisoners and put other people's interests above their own, in a way that earned them the sympathy of the other prisoners and some of the Muslim guards. Some ... I was smoking the first time I met Amrozi. He advised me to cut back, and I was thrilled—Amrozi had noticed me! After that I began to talk with him frequently about Islam"... Ahmed works as a part-time teacher in a JI school, and clearly sees his contact with the Bali bombers as a positive experience that straightened out his life.³²²

Ahmed's interaction with Amrozi influenced him to adopt JI ideology, and exemplified successful grassroots cognitive alignment. He subsequently became a model natural channel for propagating messaging. This approach is not dissimilar to tactics utilized by Islamist insurgents in Iraq's prisons during Operation Iraqi Freedom.³²³ Although recruitment in Iraq and Indonesia did not denote collaboration of influence and radicalization, it does implicate the existence of influence vulnerabilities within penal systems.

In Singapore, much of JI's initial recruiting effort was accomplished through natural channels, which attracted potential members whose religious needs were unfulfilled. JI recruiters provided an ideologically satisfying narrative: "JI sought to propagate its ideology through religious classes conducted in its members' home... Recommended by friends or relatives, they initially attended these classes out of a desire to deepen their knowledge of Islam."³²⁴

³²² International Crisis Group, "Deradicalisation" and Indonesia's Prisons," 8.

³²³ M. Benraad, "Prisons in Iraq: A New Generation of Jihadists?" *CTC Sentinel* 2, no. 12 (December 2009): 16, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss12.pdf>.

³²⁴ Mohamed Bin Al, *Identifying Key Concerns of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Singapore Context*, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (Nanyang Technological University, 2006), 1, <http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Ideology%20Response/Identifying%20key%20concerns%20of%20JI.pdf>.

JI doctrine recognizes the integral need for channels to spread its influence, but the group did not operationalize the practice effectively. JI's channels existed predominantly within its Pesantren system and did not expand artificial channels to wider audiences, which limited its scope of audiences and reach of its messages. MMI and JAT expanded the audience base with their openness and accessibility that resulted in greater influence effects reaching a greater depth of the Indonesian population.

D. MEDIUMS

Historically, JI has relied on its publishing and interpersonal communication through close social networks as mediums for its influence operations. Presently, MMI and JAT operate in more open and contemporary mediums, such as the Internet, to operationalize their influence. Their use of mediums is beginning to display similarities to groups, such as Hezbollah, in their approach to influence wider target audiences by using mediums to mass their narratives.

According to JI's doctrine, *dakwah's* is a tool for educating Muslims to join the movement and continue building the *Umma*. PUPJI further delineates the primary means of mobilizing the Muslim community through interpersonal face-to-face communication. If unattainable, it directs the use of indirect communication, such as print and electronic media, to reach its audiences.³²⁵ JI developed a vast network of media production and publishing companies aimed at penetrating wider Indonesian and regional audiences.³²⁶ The companies are interconnected through familial relationships and JI-sponsored Pesantren networks. For instance:

³²⁵ Bin Al, *Identifying Key Concerns of Jemaah Islamiyah*, 40.

³²⁶ The Al-Qowam Group founded in 1999, has several subsidiaries including Al-Qowam, Wacana Ilmiah Press, and Mumtaza publishing, all of which are housed at the same address. Other publishing conglomerates include the Arafah Group, the Aqwam Group, the Kafayeh Cipta Media (KCM) Corporation and Al-Alaq that reproduce JI publications for Malaysia audiences. For more detail, see International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry*, 5.

A key figure in the al-Qowam group is Hawin Murtadlo, a man with impeccable JI credentials. He comes from a JI family, and the translator Ubeid is his younger brother. He graduated from Ngruki in 1991, a member of the same class that produced the heads of three JI schools, and stayed on to teach, after marrying a classmate from Tasikmalaya.³²⁷

Jl's publishing industry is a medium for distributing its Islamist publications and disseminating its radical ideology. Jl has secured a sizable portion of the Indonesian Islamic publishing market with distribution reaching across Indonesia, Malaysia, and greater Southeast Asia, and enjoy significant resonance within the local and regional populations.³²⁸

1. Interpersonal Communication

The Jl-JAT-MMI Islamist cartel recognizes interpersonal and face-to-face interaction as the primary means for influencing audiences at a grassroots level, which is evident by its methodology governing *jamaah* (Islamic group) interaction between jamaahs and between individuals and jamaahs.³²⁹ Venues that garnered the most efficacy included lectures, discussions, question and answer sessions, and other forms of communal interaction to communicate messages.³³⁰ In Singapore, where globalization and secularism were hailed as a regional success, the government became concerned about educated and successful Muslim citizens joining Jl.³³¹ There, Jl used face-to-face interaction to exploit local grievances among the Muslim community. Ideologically open and disaffected Muslims were susceptible to Jl's preaching and actively sought guidance from Jl operatives. The founder of the Singapore Jl cell, Ibrahim Maidin stated, "they sought out religious teachers who would be able to guide them in their spiritual quest."³³²

³²⁷ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry*, 5.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, 6. Additional metrics are described later in the chapter.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, 40.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*

³³¹ See Bin Al, *Identifying Key Concerns of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Singapore Context*; Desker, "The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore," 502.

³³² K. Ramakrishna, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Aims, Motivations and Possible Counter-Strategies*, 2002, 1, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/IDSS212002.pdf>.

JAT built upon JI's interpersonal influence methods by extending its interpersonal activities at a more personal level with its target audiences and potential converts. It deployed its teachers and preachers to conduct small group engagements within the social groups of a community.³³³ The meetings were religiously based influence operations designed to establish personal relationships with the attendees.³³⁴

The role of JAT's leader (and JI's former leader-founder) Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as a charismatic leader cannot be underestimated. Since Ba'asyir's rise as an Islamist leader for JI, MMI, and now JAT, he has served as the symbol of Indonesia's Islamist movement. He continues personally to conduct sermons, interviews, host radio shows, lecture, and engage audiences through interpersonal contact.³³⁵ As a medium, Ba'asyir's reputation adds credence to Islamist messages and validates Islamist influence effects.³³⁶ Due to Ba'asyir's fame and personality, he is also able to add a degree of resonance to Islamist messaging, which makes him a channel-medium hybrid.

2. Publishing

Islamic publishing in Indonesia is a thriving business, with more than 10,000 books produced each year specific to Islam.³³⁷ A growth industry in Indonesia, the Jakarta Islamic Book Fair has grown from 73 exhibitors in 2007³³⁸ to over 230 in 2011.³³⁹ Within this industry, JI has established a small, yet formidable presence through its multiple and successful publishing conglomerates.³⁴⁰ Many of its publications have achieved bestseller ratings in accordance with Indonesian print standards. For example,

³³³ Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *The Rise of JAT*, 15.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)*, 11.

³³⁶ Ibid., 1–2.

³³⁷ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry*, 2.

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ "2011 Jakarta Islamic Book Fair," http://www.islamic-bookfair.com/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1.

³⁴⁰ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry*, 2.

the average ‘successful’ Islamic book typically reaches 10,000 copies printed for sale.³⁴¹ JI eclipsed the standard of success with its published works achieving over 100,000 copies.³⁴²

Prior to the current growth in Indonesia’s Internet usage, Islamic publishing in Indonesia was the dominant form of conducting *dakwah* for Islamist groups:

Like all the books produced by the JI group, these are attractively printed on good paper with sophisticated graphics and sell for around \$2 each, putting them well within the reach of most students. A mainstream Indonesian publisher said after examining the books that the price cannot possibly cover the production costs, so they must be subsidized [sic], probably by sales of other books.³⁴³

Since its establishment, JI’s publishing industry is “generally cooperative, not competitive.”³⁴⁴ Although this position displays an aspect of coordinated messages, JI did not fully synchronize its publishing within its wider influence operations. However, its ideological agenda has survived through its publishing efforts following the Indonesian government’s crackdown on JI. The publishing conglomerates remain operated and managed by former JI leaders and JI associated *Pesantren* graduates who are ideologically aligned with the JI narrative, and are operationally aligned with JI’s remnants, MMI, and JAT.³⁴⁵ For example, JAT began publishing a monthly magazine in

³⁴¹ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry*, 2.

³⁴² *Ibid.*; While the number of copies printed does not represent the actual number of copies sold, it does indicate the group’s message resonance, product demand, depth of target audiences, and capitalization of the growing publishing industry within Indonesia.

³⁴³ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry*, 3. One of the first was al-Alaqa, run by Ikhsan Miarso, who at the time of the 2002 Bali bombing, was head of JI’s territorial subdivision (*wakalah*) in Solo. Ikhsan was in Afghanistan from 1987 to 1990, and the company was set up on his return. Among the first books he published was a set of the writings and lectures of “the martyr,” Abdullah Azzam, collectively entitled *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah (Jihad Education)*... The first several volumes, published in 1994, a year after JI was founded officially, notes that the original publisher in 1990 was Maktab al-Khidmat al-Mujahidin in Peshawar, the services bureau through which most foreign fighters passed on their way to Afghanistan... by 2000, several of the volumes were already in their third printing. These books remain the staple of al-Alaqa.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁴⁵ Taufiqurrohmah and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *The Rise of JAT*.

2009 that puts forth more divisive Islamist messaging than its JI and MMI associates.³⁴⁶ Consumers of JI literature represent ideologically susceptible audiences that will potentially seek JI or its affiliates channels for religious or ideological fulfillment.

3. Multi-Media Production

Like many other Islamist groups across the world, JI has taken advantage of video formats, such as Video Compact Discs (VCDs), DVDs, and other transportable audio and audiovisual media to disseminate messages and imagery.³⁴⁷ JI's publishing conglomerates produce for the majority of its VCD and multi-media materials, but the content frequently contains Al-Qaeda and other *jihadi* materials.³⁴⁸ Multi-media products are sold or given away after religious sermons and bookstores, and disseminated alongside other, more innocuous materials, such as pirated copies of movies, music videos and karaoke music. "Others are educational, such as videos of the Islamic holy sites in Saudi Arabia... Some videos aim to recruit members or solicit funding for militant Islamic groups."³⁴⁹ VCDs, DVDs, and such are advantageous because they are inexpensive to produce and accessible to most of the local populations. The popularity and demand for Islamist multi-media in Southeast Asia is high. The following example demonstrates how multi-media impacts target audiences to operationalize their natural channels further propagating the message:

One video is titled *The Bloody Maluku Conflict*. It shows refugee camps and young women making Molotov cocktails. It also shows fighting between Muslim and Christian mobs, which has flared in Indonesia's Maluku province sporadically since late 1999. There is gory footage of wounded being treated in clinics, and pictures of mass graves allegedly containing the bodies of dead Muslims... They would go to a house and

³⁴⁶ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)*, 5–7. JAT's magazine is named *Majalah Ansharut Tauhid*, and also features interviews with Ba'asyir and other prominent figureheads.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁹ "Jemaah Islamiyah Uses Videos to Gather Support," <http://worldnewssite.com/News/2002/December/2002-12-11-5-Jemaah.html>.

show them one of these tapes and people would naturally get very angry at the brutality of what they see... People getting killed and it's [sic] one image after another that's drilled into the heads of the viewers.³⁵⁰

Multi-media discs reinforce and compliment Islamist ideological and religious instruction because of their near universally accessible nature. According to a report documenting Islamist publishing in Indonesia, “Ar-Rahmah’s VCDs began appearing in 2005 with titles such as *Iraq Strikes Back* and *Escape from Baghram*. Unlike JI books, which seem to sell for less than production costs, the VCDs sold for far more, with ar-Rahmah asking Rp.30,000 or Rp.40,000 (\$3 or \$4) for what were just downloads.”³⁵¹

4. Radio, Internet, and Social Media

After Ba’asyir departed from MMI and established JAT, his son, Abdul Rohim “Lim” Ba’asyir, began publishing his father’s sermons on Radio *Dakwah* Syariah and YouTube. Lim established Radio *Dakwah* Syariah and its complimentary website, www.rdsfmsolo.com, to reach audiences not accessible to JI’s former Pesantren network and publishing materials. As Indonesia’s Internet accessibility grew throughout the late 2000s, opportunity existed to transport Islamist ideology across new mediums capable of reaching potential audiences. Radio *Dakwah* Syariah’s website not only describes the radio programming content, but also maintains a blog, contains links to *jihadi* websites, and solicits consumer donations.³⁵²

Ji has been slow to migrate to the Internet as a medium, unlike Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and other Islamic groups. A modicum of evidence exists to suggest that JI has traditionally relied on the Internet for little more than e-mail and web surfing.³⁵³ In contrast, MMI and JAT maintain a substantial presence on the Internet and in social media. The website arrahmah.com (shown in Figure 6) is “owned and managed by Mohamed Jibril, son of Abu Jibriel—one of the key founders of Jemaah Islamiyah and

³⁵⁰ “Jemaah Islamiyah Uses Videos to Gather Support.”

³⁵¹ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry*, 10.

³⁵² “Radio Dakwah Syariah,” www.rdsfmsolo.com.

³⁵³ Osman, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Of Kin and Kind*, 1.

current emir of Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia [MMI].”³⁵⁴ Arrahmah.com is a MMI affiliated site that serves as a principle Islamist medium for JI’s former constituents, as well as JAT’s audiences. Its content is *jihad* centric containing training manuals, Islamist rhetoric, supports online self-radicalization, solicits funding,³⁵⁵ and provides access to “virtual ummas.”³⁵⁶ This practice portends a growing sophistication and alignment with the contemporary use of social media, eSocial networks and even mobile media access (see Figure 6 Arrahmah.Com Mobile).³⁵⁷



Figure 6. Arrahmah Mobile Web Access

³⁵⁴ International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *Monthly Informatics Report: Developments in the Bahasa Indonesia Websites*, 2011, 2.
<http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Terrorism%20Informatics/MonthlyReports/2011/TerrorismInformatics-BahasaIndonesia-March11.pdf>.

³⁵⁵ It is likely these funds contribute to funding terrorist activities: “Mohamed Jibril was also recently arrested for allegedly funding the July 2009 twin hotel bombings in Jakarta through links with Al-Qaeda.” International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *Monthly Informatics Report: Developments in the Bahasa Indonesia Websites*.

³⁵⁶ Yasin and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *Bahasa Indonesia and Malay Language Extremist Websites*.

³⁵⁷ Like other contemporary *jihad*-focused, radical Islamic websites, arrahmah.com offers visitors the option of viewing the material in English.

Arrahmah.com's Facebook page is continuously increasing its membership base. Currently, the site maintains over 35,000 friends or fans that monitor daily.³⁵⁸ In contrast to JI's former channeling and associated mediums, Arrahmah.com operates in the open and interactively with its audiences (see Figure 7, Arrahmah.com Facebook).



Figure 7. Arrahmah.com Uses eSocial Networks like Facebook for Message Propagation.³⁵⁹

Muslimdaily.net (Figure 8) is yet another Islamist website emerging from the JI lineage. It purports to be a legitimate Indonesian news website, but it frequently showcases content sympathetic to Islamist ideology and messages. For example, when the Bali bombers released a pre-execution statement, muslimdaily.net published a video interview of the bombers on its website, which was followed immediately with a press conference by Ba'asyir that was simulcast through the site and condemned the Indonesian government's actions surrounding the bombers' pending executions.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁸ Amarrah's Facebook page is continuing to grow. Between May 3, 2011 and May 12, 2011, their Facebook fan base grew by more than 1,000 additional followers.

³⁵⁹ Arramah.com, "Arrahmah.Com Facebook Page," <http://www.facebook.com/arrahmahcom>.

³⁶⁰ M. H. Hassan and M. R. Salleh, *Bali Bombers' Pre-Execution Statement: How Much Islamic Weight?*, 2009, 2, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1162008.pdf>.



Figure 8. JAT's Effort to Utilize the Internet Openly through Muslimdaily.net.

The website includes feeds into social network sites and possesses a growing following on Twitter and Facebook. Like its Amarrah.com cousin, Muslimdaily.net represents a new wave of Islamist mediums and channeling mechanism to influence wider audiences previous inaccessible to the groups' interpersonal activities.

The Internet is a new phenomenon and rapid growth industry within Indonesia. It is allowing Indonesians and Islamist groups access to information and audiences previously unreachable.³⁶¹ Indonesia ranks as one of the fastest growing Internet consumers in the world. A 2010 global poll conducted by the BBC reported 85% of Indonesians are accessing the Internet for social purposes.³⁶² Indonesians produce more than four million blogs,³⁶³ and in February 2011, Indonesia became the world's second highest consumer of Facebook and third highest consumer of Twitter, generating 15% of

³⁶¹ Yasin and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *Bahasa Indonesia and Malay Language Extremist Websites*.

³⁶² "Four in Five Regard Internet Access as a Fundamental Right: Global Poll," *BBC*, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/08_03_10_BBC_internet_poll.pdf.

³⁶³ "Indonesia Social Media Landscape," *SalingSilang.com*, 2011, <http://www.slideshare.net/salingsilang/snapshot-of-indonesia-social-media-users-saling-silang-report-feb-2011>.

all “Tweets” globally with nearly five million accounts.³⁶⁴ Similar to current unrest across North Africa and into the Levant associated with eSocial networks and social media, these mediums pose a similar exploitable risk from MMI, JAT, and other Islamists in Indonesia.

5. Assessing JI Mediums

JI has the foundation for an extensive array of mediums capable of reinforcing its grassroots influence endeavors. Its publishing industry reaches or has the potential to reach a vast array of audiences throughout Indonesia and Southeast Asia. It offers high quality and inexpensive publications to attract consumers of their messages. The product’s quality is itself a deed because it shows a level of pride and respect for the audience. The disconnect lies with JI’s implementation of its mediums. In contrast, MMI and JAT’s mediums are far more contemporary and align with today’s modern mass media trends, such as eSocial networks, social media, and mobile media.

E. CASE CONCLUSION AND EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES

1. Summary of JI Influence Operations

As of February 2009, half of Indonesia’s provinces have incorporated aspects of Sharia law into their local political systems.³⁶⁵ The implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia has been rejected at the national level, but a trend of increasing implementation of Sharia at the grassroots level does occur.³⁶⁶ The Indonesian government demonstrated unwillingness to enforce laws to prevent Sharia from subverting the present political system.³⁶⁷ It is reasonable to assume links exist between the growing trend in Sharia law with the narratives of Indonesia’s Islamist narratives due to the disequilibrium growing between the population and the government.

³⁶⁴ “Indonesia Social Media Landscape.”

³⁶⁵ “Sharia-Based Laws Creep into Half of Provinces.”

³⁶⁶ R. Bush, *Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?* 2008, <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ShariaRegulations08RobinBush.pdf>.

³⁶⁷ “Sharia-Based Laws Creep into Half of Provinces.”

Jl, MMI, and JAT all display aspects of intuitively utilizing SMT principles within their influence efforts. Although Jl has suffered significant tactical setbacks over the past decade, its narrative for an Islamist society has not lost its potency or position within Indonesian society. The government's ambivalence to interfere with subversive trends, such as Jl's *pesantren* network and the growth of Sharia law, demonstrates an alarming growth of political free space. Groups can exploit this ambivalence to seize greater levels of influence and cognitively align local communities to support the narrative actively or tacitly. Jl exhibits limited coordination of influence operations due to several factors, which include government crackdowns on the organization itself, schisms within Jl, and competing Islamist groups with similar narratives and more resonant framing. Jl's *Pesantren* network allowed its ideology to survive and re-emerge with the establishment of MMI and JAT in its present form that demonstrates a transformation of Islamist framing in Indonesia.

Jl intuitively displays basic concepts for implanting influence operations, and subsequently, facilitating collective action. Although its messages were not synchronized at comparable levels to the Vietcong, they demonstrate a comparable ability for propagating message and influence effects at a grassroots level. However, Jl's exclusivity and use of violent attacks prevent synchronization with its messages and its ability to influence wider audiences to align with the group that was not pre-disposed to violence or radicalization. The lack of collective behavior in line with Jl's influence efforts demonstrated a lack of audience resonance.

In contrast, MMI and JAT appear to have learned from Jl's shortcomings by deliberately targeting wider Indonesian audiences with more comprehensive influence operations. Their open use of websites, radio, and social programs provide them a degree of transparency and legitimacy. Their messages are less overtly violent, and approach audiences using subtle narratives,³⁶⁸ which overshadows their more nefarious militant and finance resourcing. MMI and JAT continue to target individuals predisposed to radicalization but also draw in those seeking religious enlightenment and become

³⁶⁸ Yasin and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *Bahasa Indonesia and Malay Language Extremist Websites*.

progressively susceptible toward participating in or tolerating radical ideology.³⁶⁹ Both MMI and JAT display increasingly effective aspects of influence operations and are run by former JI senior leaders.³⁷⁰ They are emergent Islamist organizations and possess the potential to become far more dangerous than JI in both terrorist tactics and subversion of the Indonesian socio-political system and across Southeast Asia.

2. Vulnerabilities

This case study demonstrates the ability of a terrorist and insurgent group to transform itself in the face of opposition and remain a threat. The JI case suggests that the failure to practice effective influence operation principles impaired it from sufficiently mobilizing. Multiple vulnerabilities exist within JI, MMI, and JAT's operations and LOIs that can be exploited to prevent them from manipulating the population, seizing the influence initiative, and achieving their Islamist goals.

Similar to the Guzman vulnerability for Shining Path, a key vulnerability for JI, MMI and JAT is the charismatic leadership of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Ba'asyir is the lynch pin among prevailing Islamist organizations in Indonesia. He brings continuity and legacy of Islamism in Indonesia. From his roots in DI, to his experience in Afghanistan, persecution by the Indonesian government, his involvement in JI, his establishment of MMI, and subsequent departure from MMI to establish JAT, he has become a symbol for Islamists and Indonesia's general Muslim population. When Ba'asyir left MMI to establish JAT, a substantial portion of MMI's membership and constituency moved with him to JAT wholesale.³⁷¹ When the Indonesian government arrested Ba'asyir, mass protests for his release occurred.³⁷² Marginalizing, or removing, Ba'asyir as a variable has the potential to cause a vacuum within the Islamist conglomerate, and thus, provide an opportunity for the Indonesian government to seize the influence initiative and

³⁶⁹ Taufiqurrohman and International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *The Rise of JAT*, 6.

³⁷⁰ International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, *Monthly Informatics Report: Developments in the Bahasa Indonesia Websites*, 2.

³⁷¹ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)*, 5.

³⁷² "Students Protest Arrest of Ba'Asyir," *Life.com*, <http://www.life.com/image/1548093>.

marginalize the Islamist movement currently seeking to subvert it. Doing so also increases vulnerabilities in Ba'asyir's ideology for more moderate and resonant messages to challenge it through social media, online forums, and massing messages of more amiable and moderate Islamic narratives that also meet the religious needs of the population.

The continued friction between JI, MMI, and JAT is another exploitable vulnerability through their competition over audiences and operational principles. Focused efforts to widen their rifts could weaken their influence and prevent a massing of effort against the Indonesian government. MMI's political system practices are anathema to JAT's fundamental Islamist principles.³⁷³ Continuing to exacerbate the inconsistencies, public debate, and mutual criticisms of the two groups can further marginalize in the eyes of the wider Indonesian local audiences, further eroding their ideologies and influence, which can be done through overt and covert measures. Exposure of JAT's subtle efforts to manipulate the perceptions of Indonesian Muslims and its limited ability to provide the social services promised by its crisis response center, presents yet another opportunity to subvert the group's influence narratives. By directly countering their anti-government messaging, the government possesses superior resources and capabilities to fill the relative ungoverned free spaces JAT and MMI seek to exploit. Although MMI and JAT continue to espouse *dakwah* to achieve their influence objective, these are not altruistic organizations. Further exposure of their respective nefarious activities must be an integral part of the government's counter influence campaign.

As these groups venture further into cyberspace, their ability to control the narrative and maintain influence primacy becomes increasingly competitive. With their use of blogs, interactive web forums, and social media, their messages become susceptible to counter arguments and fallacy exposure due to the openness and accessibility of the mediums. A silent majority of the population does not appear to align or actively support groups, such as JI, MMI and JAT, which is an exploitable variable for

³⁷³ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)*, 3–4.

counter influence efforts so long as those operations are seen as credible, sustainable, and fulfills the needs and expectations of local populations to energize them as a retardant to Islamist influence.

Islamists, like JI, remain on the fringe within Indonesia and Southeast Asia, as the majority of Muslims in that region do not subscribe to the extremist Islamist ideology. The public backlash following JI's bombing campaign from 2000 to 2005 demonstrate that opportunity exists for focused initiatives to exploit the populations' sensitivity to radicalization and terrorism, which can be used to marginalize those affiliated with JI and other Islamist groups to dismantle their support base and influence momentum. Counter narratives and addressing public grievances can subvert radical Islamist messaging. By its nature, the Indonesian government retains a dominant influence market share to challenge the growing trend of Sharia law and Islamist influence directly by asserting itself as the country's legitimate governing body and provider for the people. However, it will need to undertake noticeable efforts to align the population.

V. HEZBOLLAH

A. BACKGROUND

Since its emergence, Hezbollah has arguably become the model guerilla, terrorist, and global insurgent organization in the world.³⁷⁴ Hezbollah solidified psychological warfare as an integral capability for the organization's success, and synchronized it with kinetic military operations to create an influence warfare methodology,³⁷⁵ began Hezbollah's influence operations toward achieving its political-military goals to eliminate Israel, dominate Lebanon, and facilitate a Shia-based pan-Islamic Caliphate. Initially, Hezbollah emerged and survived through its nation state sponsors Iran and Syria. Today, Hezbollah is a global organization socially embedded not only in Lebanon and the greater Middle East, but also in the Americas, Africa, and portions of Europe.³⁷⁶ This case study assesses the effects and application of Hezbollah's influence operations from the 1980s to the present.

Unlike the Vietcong whose focus was primarily at the local village level, Hezbollah simultaneously conducts influence operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic level to implement all facets of its three lines of influence. Over the past 12 years, the terrorist organization has initiated an expansion of its ideological frame. It has successfully become the dominant socio-political-military organization in Lebanon,

³⁷⁴ Edward Cody and Molly Moore, "The Best Guerrilla Force in the World," *The Washington Post*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/13/AR2006081300719.html>.

³⁷⁵ Hezbollah does not shy from acknowledging its use of psychological warfare. While the group does not maintain a truth-based standard as NATO PSYOP doctrine dictates, Hezbollah maximizes its use to the fullest as an integral component of its influence warfare mechanics. Hezbollah's employment of psychological warfare is comparable to western doctrines, but with a more practiced and embedded approach to grassroots influence operations comprising an equal, if not greater, requirement for message validating actions. The closest comparison can be found in U.S. unconventional warfare doctrine, where deliberate kinetic and nonkinetic activities are married to psychologically impacting messaging; from Ron Schleifer, "Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah Versus Israel," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 1 (2006): 1-19, <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/ftinterface~content=a725841460~fulltext=713240930~frm=content>.

³⁷⁶ For more information on social embedding see Alex V. Simmons, *Socially Embedded Insurgencies* (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA514335&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.

achieved transnational reach, and exists as the only military entity to have challenge Israel's military power successfully in the past 40 years. Hezbollah's successes are built on a foundation of effective and elaborate influence operations targeting domestic, foreign, and adversarial target audiences supported by a strategic form of influence warfare to overcome conventional political-military shortfalls,³⁷⁷ which has allowed Hezbollah to grow as a Shia group within Lebanon while attracting non-Shia audiences to align with them. Hezbollah has also been able to evolve from a simple terrorist organization into an internationally recognized nonstate actor.

Following Israel's invasion in 1982 to eliminate PLO terrorist safe havens in Southern Lebanon, a militia of Shia supporters of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini were resourced, trained, and organized to form Hezbollah with the initial goal of forcing Israel to leave southern Lebanon.³⁷⁸ The elements necessary for social mobilization were already present in Lebanon prior to the Israeli invasion of 1982.³⁷⁹ Initially, the Sunni, Shia, and Christian populations in southern Lebanon welcomed Israel's expulsion of the PLO, which was viewed as an opportunity to reclaim control over the south.³⁸⁰ However, when Israel forged an alliance with the Maronite Christians, the Shia felt marginalized under Israel's occupation and became resentful.³⁸¹ In one form or another, the formation of a political-military group to provide Lebanese Shia some form of socio-political-

³⁷⁷ For a more detailed assessment of Hezbollah's primary, secondary, and subordinate target audiences, see Reuven Erlich and Yoram Kahati, "Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds," *Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israel Intelligence, Heritage and Commemoration Center*, June 2007, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_e_0607.pdf.

³⁷⁸ Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007), 33.

³⁷⁹ According to McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, mobilizing structures are defined as "those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action," based upon some galvanizing event, grievance, necessity, and or belief.

³⁸⁰ Eyal Zisser, "Hizballah in Lebanon: At the Crossroads," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 1, no. 3 (September 1997): 4, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue3/jv1n3a1.html>.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

military representation was imminent. Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon catapulted Hezbollah's formation as the preeminent Shia militant organization, and more importantly, its legitimacy.³⁸²

Over the past 40 years, Hezbollah has proven its lethal dedication to its cause through multiple terrorist attacks and support activities against the United States, France, Israel, Canada, Greece, Argentina, Spain, Thailand, UAE, Senegal, England, Panama, Paraguay, Brazil, Mali, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and many others. Hezbollah is responsible for bombing the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon in both 1983 and 1984, as well as killing 241 U.S. servicemen when they launched a suicide bomber attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983. In 1985, Hezbollah ordered the hijacking of TWA flight 847, killing a U.S. Navy diver in the process.³⁸³ Throughout the 1980s, Hezbollah conducted dozens of kidnappings against U.S. citizens and other westerners who were either used for ransom or killed outright.³⁸⁴ In 1989, a 10-man Hezbollah terrorist cell was arrested in Spain while attempting to conduct an attack. Later that year, another Hezbollah cell bombed a French airliner in West Africa, killing another 171 people.³⁸⁵ From 1992 through 1995, Hezbollah expanded its operations into South America where it bombed the Israeli Embassy in Argentina, and subsequently, established finance laundering hubs throughout Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela.³⁸⁶ After Hezbollah's 1996 attack against another U.S. barracks and the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, Hezbollah focused its overt terrorist activities against Israeli civilians and border security forces using suicide bombers, as well as rocket and mortar attacks.³⁸⁷ At first glance, these events appear as unilateral military actions, but by analyzing their purpose,

³⁸² Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History*, 32–35.

³⁸³ Jane's Information Group, "Hizbullah," *Janes' World Insurgency and Terrorism*, http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit/jwit0296.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Hizbullah&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JWIT&#toclink-j3511247586135913.

³⁸⁴ Douglas S. Philippone, "Hezbollah: The Network and its Support Systems, Can They Be Stopped?" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 4, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA483483>.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Robin Wright, *Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam* (New York: Touchstone, 2001).

³⁸⁷ Jane's Information Group, "Hizbullah."

a more deviant and elaborate goal is visible. Hezbollah’s militant and civil activities directly support its ideological framework and goal to expand continuously and sustain Hezbollah as an organization and international entity.

Three prevailing LOIs that operationalize these frames and combine to facilitate Hezbollah’s strategic goals exist: credibility and justification, expansion and control, and defiance and subversion. Each LOI utilizes unique or mutually supporting subordinate influence operations to achieve immediate, intermediary, and end state desired effects. Although Hezbollah employs a variety of nonkinetic and civil service activities within various influence operations, these are not designed or implemented for selfless humanitarian or benevolent purposes. Rather, its influence operations wholly support strategic objectives, which call for the destruction of Israel, the facilitation of a Shia influenced caliphate, and Hezbollah’s continued growth.³⁸⁸ Similar to the Viet Cong, Hezbollah maintains LOIs to focus its influence warfare stratagem (detailed in Table 4).

<u>Line of Influence</u>	<u>Message and Deeds</u>	<u>Channels</u>	<u>Mediums</u>
Credibility and Justification	Terrorism Unconventional Warfare Limited Conventional Warfare Social Services Financial Services		Mutually supporting Interpersonal Communication Print Visuals Television Radio Audio-Visual (DVDs, VCDs, etc) Electronic/web-based
Expansion and Control	Medical Education Religious Propagation Intelligence Activities Martyrdom Resistance	Youth /Students Women Converted Political Opposition Prominent Families Overt Covert Operatives	
Defiance and Subversion	Support and Solicitation Solidarity and Nationalism Anti-Israel and U.S. Legitimacy Subversion		

Table 4. Hezbollah Lines of Influence (LOIs)

The use of specific messages, deeds, channels, and mediums under each LOI at the village level mutually support the other influence lines of effort in pursuit of social mobilization in line with the group’s military and political objectives. Hezbollah’s

³⁸⁸ Since 2001, Hezbollah has aggressively shifted away from a public ideology calling for a Shia influence caliphate, and now publicly promotes a Lebanese nationalism and Arab solidarity theme.

influence operations, in conjunction with its irregular and guerilla warfare activities, have melded into a cornerstone for its continued growth and longevity. It uses a robust methodology for employing message and deeds, channels, mediums across all levels of its operations to present an effective and sophisticated mix of interpersonal and traditional messaging mechanisms, which serve to validate its message and deed influence actions with its channeling techniques by using a diverse array of mediums.

B. MESSAGE AND DEEDS

Hezbollah regards social networks and the civilian populations as decisive entities and vital interests to its political-military objectives. They directly and aggressively target both of these interests using centralized and decentralized influence operations tailored to the characteristics and vulnerabilities of each subordinate audience. Varieties of deeds are subsequently designed to support and validate influence narratives and messages. Terrorism, unconventional warfare, irregular warfare techniques, civil and social services, financial services, medical, education, religious propagation, intelligence activities, intimidation, social marginalization, and coercion are all tool sets integrated into diverse influence operations designed to facilitate a perpetual cycle of narratives and messages. Each one is supported by, and supports, tailored actions and deeds that directly and indirectly build upon each other forming a cyclical dynamic. The same techniques are used to counter or exploit a competitor or adversary's actions. Hezbollah's messages fall into several categories including: martyrdom, resistance, support and solicitation, solidarity and nationalism, anti-Israel, anti-U.S., legitimacy, and subversion. Message narratives (or themes), along with corresponding deeds, are integrated throughout each of Hezbollah's primary LOIs. The group's LOIs provides its tactical and operational influence actors with sufficient flexibility to develop and tailor specific messages and deeds to the local target and objective similar to the Viet Cong's cadre cells.

1. Exploiting and Subverting the Competition

Influence warfare is Hezbollah's preeminent method for challenging an adversary. It uses psychological warfare techniques combined with violent and nonviolent actions to

destabilize the opponent's socio-political support base. Hezbollah's military strategy is unique and effective because of the way it combines unconventional and psychological warfare. "[W]hen deciding on and planning an operation the [Hezbollah] would calculate its psychological impact on the enemy."³⁸⁹ Hezbollah has created an organizational structure that merges influence into all elements of its plans and activities. This structure not only maximizes the influence effect on targets and target audiences, but also enables the group to coordinate its messages and deeds holistically across the tri-spectrum of tactical, operational, and strategic operations.

a. Subverting Amal in Southern Lebanon

One of the first examples of Hezbollah systematically subverting competition transpired in the late 1980s and early 1990s during its political-military feud with the Lebanese sub-national group Amal. Determined to become the dominant voice and power in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah competed with Amal for controlling influence of the Shia population and southern Lebanon as a whole.³⁹⁰ In contrast to Hezbollah's Islamic revolution ideology, the secular and reformist Amal was focused on becoming the new bourgeoisie in Beirut. Over a period of five years, Hezbollah's direct military clashes with Amal evolved into a combination of direct military and influence operations intended to erode Amal's power base. Hezbollah exploited Amal's raids on Palestinian villages and camps throughout southern Lebanon by framing Amal as oppressors and comparing them to Israel and the United States. While simultaneously vilifying Amal to the Palestinians using vanguard face-to-face influence cells, Hezbollah simultaneously framed itself as Palestinian liberators and resistance fighters. When Amal launched the "war of the camps" against Palestinian refugees in southern Lebanon in 1985, Hezbollah backed the Palestinians militarily and politically. The group spoke publicly throughout Lebanese and Arab political and religious forums on behalf of the Palestinians, as well as facilitating increased Palestinian access to the Lebanese economy and other political outlets. These endeavors solidified Palestinian loyalty and provided Hezbollah with a

³⁸⁹ Schleifer, "Psychological Operations," 8.

³⁹⁰ Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History*, 43.

civil and social support base far surpassing anything with which Amal could compete.³⁹¹ Assuming a Robin Hood persona with the southern Lebanese Shia, “Hezbollah was busy creating an array of public services, such as clinics and construction companies, while Amal offered its support base a “patronage system.”³⁹² Hezbollah’s interpersonal influence actions within the Shia and Palestinian populations had secondary effects within Amal’s spheres of influence. As word spread across social networks regarding Hezbollah’s perceived benevolence, Amal began to hemorrhage social and personnel support. Amal’s inability to match Hezbollah’s resonating messages, correlating actions, and growing influence, increasingly ostracized Amal in the eyes of the southern Lebanese population. As an example, an increasing number of Hezbollah’s growing recruits were converts from Amal.³⁹³ The lessons Hezbollah learned early on in holistically incorporating its influence warfare practices across the political and military spectrum became inculcated into its political-military doctrine. The doctrine paid dividends in following its ongoing confrontations with Israel.

b. Subversion Through Social Services

Since the late 1990s, Hezbollah has liberalized its strict Shia religious governance to accommodate a more pluralist approach intended to foster a side-by-side coexistence with Lebanon’s other prominent social groups: the Sunnis, Christians, and Druze.³⁹⁴ While the group continues to use religion as an ideological frame to align core supporters and their rank-and-file cognitively, Hezbollah is increasingly pragmatic with whom it aligns itself to further their political-military efforts. It bridges ideological frames to maintain and build support that ensures weapon proliferation, financial growth,

³⁹¹ Augustus R. Norton, “The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics,” *The International Spectator* 42, no. 4 (2007): 477, <http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/f09/The-Role-of-Hezbollah.pdf>.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, 478.

³⁹³ Kenneth Katzman, “Hizbollah: Narrowing Options in Lebanon,” *Terrorism: National Security Policy and the Home Front* (1995): 7, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/download.cfm?q=275>.

³⁹⁴ Casey L. Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard, “Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, January 3, 2011, 9, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41446.pdf>.

and socio-political alliances.³⁹⁵ The group's ideological frame transformation and bridging has allowed it to assuage the risk of potential rivals, such as the Sunnis and Christians, and in turn, influence former opponents to align with Hezbollah under a nationalistic framework. One means Hezbollah employs to bridge the ideological frames between Hezbollah and its rivals in Lebanon is its social service programs. The group operates medical and dental clinics, pharmacies, and hospitals for its fighters, supporters, and constituents. Mobile clinics are sent into Hezbollah controlled areas and periphery areas, especially to areas along the Israeli border, in an effort to solidify its influence and growth continually.³⁹⁶ Hezbollah also supports more than 30 schools throughout southern Lebanon. Like all schools in Lebanon, the Hezbollah-run schools are not free, but are provided at reduced rates that the poor and financially stricken can afford, which is in stark contrast to the Lebanese government's deteriorating social systems and those of Hezbollah's former rivals, such as Amal, the former IDF backed South Lebanese Army, and even the Syrians.³⁹⁷ As Hezbollah increased its nationalist influence operation focus, the group ensured its sponsored schools adapted as well. Hezbollah limited the amount of religious instruction and increased the focus on math, sciences, and foreign languages, such as English and French.³⁹⁸ Hezbollah's social service program narratives emphasize the group's commitment to aiding local communities and its "resistance" against Israeli oppression of the Lebanese.³⁹⁹ This gradual shift from Hezbollah's Khomeinist roots toward a more contemporary nationalist approach gained astounding momentum following the 2006 war with Israel.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁵ Lisa M. Brennen, *Hezbollah: Psychological Warfare Against Israel* (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 39, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA496916>.

³⁹⁶ Hala Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance* (England: Columbia University Press, 1997), 158.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 163.

³⁹⁸ Matthew Coburn's discussion with Ziad Hashem, a Lebanese Army Officer in Matthew Coburn, *Irregular Techniques for Controlling Under-Governed Space* (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 39, http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2007/Dec/07Dec_Coburn.pdf.

³⁹⁹ Schleifer, "Psychological Operations," 10.

⁴⁰⁰ Addis and Blanchard, "Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress," 9.

c. Subverting Israel's Domestic and International Support

Hezbollah's 2006 war with Israel is riddled with examples of its approach to influence operations combining grassroots influence operations along with strategic influence operations and strategic communications. Militarily, Hezbollah suffered significant losses against the Israeli military. By the time the war ended, it was "pushing for a cease-fire, which winners do not normally do."⁴⁰¹ Israeli forces had boxed in the bulk of Hezbollah military capabilities and the IDF was poised to destroy Hezbollah's remaining forces, but Israel's eventual tactical accomplishments were obscured and halted by the perceptions of local, regional, and global audiences. Hezbollah succeeded in subverting the perception of Israel through vilification and exploitation of the war's effects, resulting in Israel's alleged wanton destruction throughout southern Lebanon. By design or happenstance, the 2006 war became an influence mechanism for Hezbollah.

Hezbollah fought its 2006 conflict with Israel as a "guerrilla war waged as a psychological operation."⁴⁰² It attacked Israeli soldiers as an end unto itself rather than as a means for seizing conventional objectives. By striking at the Israeli soldiers serving in Lebanon, publicizing their deaths, and providing accurate casualty names and other information, it reaped immense psychological impacts among the targeted Israeli civilian audience.⁴⁰³ Hezbollah's information became more timely and revealing than any other information source during the war. As a result, international and Israeli news and political organizations turned to Hezbollah's media outlets for information on the war's progress, which fed into Hezbollah's intent to control the information flow and influence target audiences to pressure Israel to end the fighting, which in turn, furthered its lines of influence.

Hezbollah's second enemy audience during the war was the Israeli-backed Southern Lebanese Army (SLA), a historic competitor to Hezbollah hegemony

⁴⁰¹ Daniel Byman and Steven Simon, "The No-Win Zone: An After-Action Report from Lebanon," *The National Interest* no. 86 (December 2006): 56, www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/simon-byman.pdf.

⁴⁰² Schleifer, "Psychological Operations," 5.

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*

throughout southern Lebanon. Using local paid informants, Hezbollah gathered social and military intelligence on the SLA's support base and rank-and-file fighters. The group then exploited vulnerabilities within the SLA to generate a false perception of rampant Hezbollah infiltration throughout the SLA to subvert the SLA's trust and loyalty within its own ranks. Hezbollah also exploited fractures within the SLA's social and military hierarchy.⁴⁰⁴ After discovering systemic SLA financial shortfalls to pay its members, forced drafting of recruits, and a lack of cohesiveness within the SLA, Hezbollah successfully expanded its SLA spies through paid recruitment and social program incentives for SLA converts.⁴⁰⁵ For example, in May of 2000, Hezbollah was credited by international news media for the defection of 46 SLA members in one day.⁴⁰⁶ Conditions within the SLA snowballed as Hezbollah expanded its subversive influence campaign as it amplified public Israeli political debate calling for Israel to quit Lebanon.

Taking advantage of Israel's public debate over its invasion of Lebanon, Hezbollah began a systematic coercion campaign against SLA leadership. The group kept extensive records on SLA soldiers and officers, cataloging them by geographic and family ties. Hezbollah used these records to publish names of SLA leadership "threatening to punish them, not if, but when it caught them."⁴⁰⁷ Targeting the SLA's social support base and capitalizing on poverty conditions throughout southern Lebanon, Hezbollah paid its soldiers substantial wages, which undercut any financial and civil service incentives of which the SLA was capable. Hezbollah sponsored welfare and education systems (as described previously) that catered to all local residents without ethnic or religious discrimination. The group made extensive investments in resources to publically take care of and rebuild any home, be it Christian or Muslim, damaged by Israeli military action. Logically, this action led to further marginalization of the SLA and

⁴⁰⁴ Schleifer, "Psychological Operations," 8.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ "SLA Abandons Strategic Posts," *Lubbock Avalanche-Journal Online*, May 22, 2000, http://lubbockonline.com/stories/052200/wor_052200098.shtml.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., 8.

directly fed into Hezbollah's Lebanese nationalism framework. As Lebanon's disparate populations began to rally around Hezbollah, the SLA became increasingly marginalized and Israel could not escape the perception of an excessively hostile invader.

d. Subverting Israeli Support Through the Press

Hezbollah actively seeks to subvert international media and perceptions as a means for reinforcing its tactical and operational level influence endeavors. During its 2006 war with Israel, the group's propaganda achievements included its manipulation of foreign journalists from Arab and western nations alike. It instituted strict constraints on the press, ensuring journalists and their camera crews only covered what Hezbollah wanted them to cover or staged for them to see.⁴⁰⁸ Hezbollah herded the media to and from preselected sites ensuring the focus remained on select civilian casualties and infrastructure damage all allegedly caused by indiscriminate Israeli military strikes.⁴⁰⁹

During the war, the group treated every engagement as an Influence/Psychological Act (PSYACT) by deploying cameramen with every unit to record combat operations. After making appropriate edits—such as deleting scenes, merging images, or adding music and narration—the clips made their way back to Hezbollah's propaganda leadership and were broadcast on al-Manar TV with revised versions sent to Radio Nur. The footage was selective in that it only showed scenes displaying Hezbollah successes and perceived Israeli failures. Even if its fighters were eventually defeated by the IDF in a particular operation, Hezbollah altered the perception through its editing process and organic media mediums.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁸ Marvin Kalb and Carol Saivetz, "The Israeli—Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict," *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 12, no. 3 (2007): 12, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2007/0217islamic%20world/2007islamforum_israel%20hezb%20war.pdf.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁴¹⁰ Laura Z. Eisenberg, "Israel's Lebanon Policy," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 1, no. 3 (1997), <http://meria.idc.ac.il/JOURNAL/1997/issue3/jv1n3a3.html>.

Hezbollah achieved Israeli resonance by targeting the families of Israeli soldiers serving in Lebanon.⁴¹¹ Hezbollah overcame skepticism and captured the attention of the Israeli civilian population, Israeli media, and international media by broadcasting its TV and radio programming with information about Israeli casualties, as well as containing varying levels of intelligence and information value. Israeli, Arab, and international media began to rebroadcast Hezbollah's videos and stories because they were the only visual record of the war.⁴¹² Israel and Hezbollah both maintained strict controls on information during the 2006 war, but Hezbollah actively sought to release selective and manipulated information in near real time conditions in an effort to seize and maintain the influence initiative. Additional manipulation of foreign media is during Hezbollah's mediums assessment.

2. Indigenous Resonance

"Hezbollah is a popular national-Lebanese nonsectarian movement that conducts political, social, and cultural activities and is well-integrated into the fabric of Lebanese life."⁴¹³ To grow its grassroots influence operations, Hezbollah shies away from its strict Shia character and aggressively tries to alter the perception that the group is a pawn of Iran that continues to provide massive military and financial aid. The organization is also very sensitive to attempts to undermine its messages.⁴¹⁴

Hezbollah's social programs, financial services, Lebanese nationalism narratives, vilification of Israel, downplaying of Iranian ties and support, all resonate with its target audiences in meaningful ways through Hezbollah's careful framing and aligning of personally attuned messages. Hezbollah's approach to indigenous resonances incorporates multiple seemingly disparate social and population groups. The group

⁴¹¹ Broadcasts were translated into Hebrew to further refine the message and effects on the Israeli audience.

⁴¹² Schleifer, "Psychological Operations," 13–14.

⁴¹³ Erlich and Kahati, "Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds," 22.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

organizes its influence approach to address the relevant issues and idiosyncrasies for each target audience. Much of the social programs, anti-Israel propaganda, and nationalism influence endeavors are discussed throughout this case study.

For the Lebanese Shia audience, Hezbollah focuses its influence message and deeds around its role as the defender of Lebanon and the only provider for Shia civil and social necessities. The group extended these services under its “Lebanonization”⁴¹⁵ operations to include Christian, Sunni, Druze, and Palestinians alike, portraying no bias or overt favoritism in the process, which proved to be an effective strategy toward bridging and aligning disparate social groups to Hezbollah’s influence frame. Within the Shia population, Hezbollah’s social and civil sources pay dividends in continually generating support for Hezbollah. Among the Christian, Sunni, Druze, and Palestinians, the social and civil support programs (categorized as social influence programs for the purpose of this case study) fill a gap in services unavailable at comparable levels from the Lebanese government. Hezbollah’s social and civil support programs validate its narratives as the benevolent and omnipotent provider for the Lebanese. When combined with its exploitation of Israel as a scapegoat, the social influence program’s resonance becomes almost self-replicating.

Hezbollah’s former leader (who also serves as a channel and medium) was used as a key artificial channel and medium to rally Palestinians to Hezbollah, using emotionally relevant and directed messaging. Using the Arab Al-Jazeera television medium, Nasrallah explained in an interview that he considered Hezbollah “as the ‘vanguard’ (at-tali’a) of the Palestinian armed struggle.”⁴¹⁶ Hezbollah’s bridging technique (as discussed previously with the Palestinians) that targeted support from the Palestinians was later modified and applied to expand Hezbollah’s presence within Lebanon’s complicated political system. When Hezbollah began its overt political party

⁴¹⁵ Tony Badran, “Hezbollah’s Agenda in Lebanon,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 8 (2009), 52, http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/101540/ichaptersection_singledocument/3bef0c84-5ee2-4141-b20a-940450d9801e/en/CT_8_chapter4.pdf.

⁴¹⁶ Mona Harb and Reinoud Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception,” *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2005): 176, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3993770.pdf>.

activities, the group instituted its Lebanonization/Nationalization narratives to publicly distance itself from Iran and begin targeting historical rivals for alignment. After 2006, Hezbollah began receiving increasing degrees of active and tacit support from Lebanese Sunni, Christian, and Druze populations.⁴¹⁷

3. Synchronization and Massing of Deeds and Messages

Hezbollah targets a vast array of diverse ethnic, religious, demographic, and geographic target audiences simultaneously. Three integrated steps characterize its strategy: tailoring messages for each social sector established by organizational penetration, penetration of Lebanese society by exploiting the lack of services provided by the government and synchronizing the messages across all social sectors it controls. By synchronizing these messages across different sectors, its operations have the effect of cross-validating and reinforcing Hezbollah's overall narrative. This section focuses on the process of penetration and its impact on influence operations. Social services and organizations are addressed in depth in the following section. Each audience is targeted with tailored messages supported by kinetic or nonkinetic activities that resonate in Hezbollah's favor. Influence rivals and competitors are undermined while potential audiences are simultaneously solicited for their support, which creates a massing of combined influence effects that enables Hezbollah to envelope and overwhelm its targets. Using Israel as a cognitive rally point for its narratives, Hezbollah uses Israeli politics, military activity, and lack thereof, as a unifying and synchronizing narrative mechanism requiring minimal maintenance and re-alignment.

In coordination with its social programs, Hezbollah maintains shadow government civil service functions throughout its controlled territory, as well as adjacent areas that experience direct and indirect influence effects. Hezbollah controls and expands the Lebanese government's ungoverned free space by creating administrative services, assuming police functions, installing a civil court system to settle disputes, and developing other administrative functions through mosques and religious facilities. By providing these services, many Lebanese, including the Christians, Druze, and Sunnis,

⁴¹⁷ Schleifer, "Psychological Operations," 13–14.

have become dependent on Hezbollah. The resulting condition creates a monopolizing effect that fills potential seams and prevents local rivals from challenging Hezbollah.⁴¹⁸

Hezbollah's social and civil services provide a synchronized massing of subversive, coercive, and supportive influence affects across the local tactical and operational levels. The group's media operations enable it to synchronize and validate its attuned tactical and operational influence operations across the socio-political rugged landscape because its media establishment is designed to match and support its grassroots influence programs. When combined, its grassroots and strategic operations executed across its LOIs create a massed effect that establishes an influence and information bulwark against Hezbollah's current and potential adversaries.

Hezbollah's social influence programs are operationalized through their sponsored schools, medical, and financial programs. Although the Lebanese Shia remain the primary support base, Hezbollah's benevolent approach to social and civil services (as described above) enables the group increasingly to affect populations across social divides. To galvanize its grassroots interpersonal approach to influence, Hezbollah's media relations directorate is responsible for reviewing and managing media coverage of Hezbollah, whether it includes its newspapers, television, radio broadcasts, or directly controlled or sponsored websites.⁴¹⁹ A Hezbollah political statement in 2001 displays the group's acknowledged role in using top-down managed media messaging to solidify its bottom up grassroots influence efforts:

We feel that the media can be effective in creating a special climate in public opinion on the main issues of interest . . . We are heading toward a new sensitive security situation (in the region) which means we need to follow events very closely so that we can informatively help shape international and Arab public opinion . . . We believe that the media has an important role in the conflict, as important as the military wing.⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁸ Frederic M. Wehrey, "A Clash of Wills: Hizballah's Psychological Campaign Against Israel in South Lebanon," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 13, no. 3 (2002): 58, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/3327_793890206_791393511.pdf.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Nicholas Blanford, "Hizbullah Steps Up Psychological Warfare: Party Believes that the Media Plays Critical Role in Palestinian Uprising," *Daily Star*, September 8, 2001.

Hezbollah took its view of the media a step further during the 2006 war with Israel when it deployed video recording and camera teams with every Hezbollah unit to capture its operations.⁴²¹ After manipulating footage—such as deleting scenes or adding music and narration—the clips would then be broadcasted on Al-Manar. Video imagery was produced to show scenes selectively to present inflated Hezbollah achievements, even if its fighters were defeated by the IDF during the actual engagements.⁴²²

Hezbollah is also making inroads toward bridging ideological and religious frames across the globe. In the United States, due to the taboo topic of religious manipulation, Hezbollah exploits a critical vulnerability in U.S. politics where hate speech and freedom of religion overlap. The largest contributor of constituent donations comes from the Western Hemisphere, with the largest coming from South America and the United States.⁴²³ In South America, Hezbollah uses cross-cultural marriages and religious missionaries to subvert and grow a population of Hezbollah aligned Muslims in the tri-border area of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina.⁴²⁴ The political-military free space between the nations allows Hezbollah to infiltrate and subvert local population groups.

C. CHANNELS

Of the four case studies analyzed in this thesis, Hezbollah demonstrates the most comprehensive use of channels. The group incorporates a litany of natural and artificial channels across social structures, organizations, and networks. Hezbollah's channel exploitation enables it to support all three of its LOIs systematically, which also enhances the impact of its mediums. Through channels, target audiences are continuously and consistently affected through information sources perceived as trusted and credible. Each channel serves to reinforce and validate the information and messages originating

⁴²¹ Schleifer, "Psychological Operations," 6.

⁴²² Ibid.

⁴²³ Matthew Levitt, "Hezbollah: Financing Terror through Criminal Enterprise," United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, May 25, 2005, 4–11, <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/313.pdf>.

⁴²⁴ Matthew Levitt, "Hezbollah: A Case Study of Global Reach," *Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.)*, September 8, 2003, 4, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia//ENGLISH/IRAN/PDF/SEP08_03.PDF.

through adjacent or otherwise networked channel. Not only does this shape conditions for cognitive alignment, it also creates a massing and synchronization of Hezbollah's message and deeds. "Hezbollah operatives are experts at gaining entry to their target locations through extremely subtle infiltration," which allows them to gain trust, recruit, and begin more advanced operations.⁴²⁵

Hezbollah develops most of its natural channels through its social influence operations. One method is the construction and operation of schools and education centers across Lebanon, such as the Imam Mehdi schools and the Education Centre of the Martyr Bojeji. The group's educational centers are run by, or affiliated with, Hezbollah controlled companies and range from nursery age to secondary-level education programs. Hezbollah directly and indirectly affects well over 100,000 Lebanese children through its schools and education programs.⁴²⁶ Many Lebanese consider the schools among the best in Lebanon and enroll their children in them rather than in Lebanese government sponsored schools.⁴²⁷ The schools include indoctrination programs that incorporate Hezbollah ideology, so that it penetrates wider audiences and future generations alike. With their current nationalism focused influence operation, all Lebanese ethnicities and religious creeds are increasingly exposed to selected Hezbollah indoctrination and cognitive alignment processes. As one Lebanese father affiliated with UNIFIL and Amal noted:

Many of us are not Hezbollah, nor are we in the least affiliated with their ideologies or political views, but we cannot deny them their achievements and we realist that theirs schools are currently better than anything else in the area. Not only is my son getting a better standard of educations, but at a young age he was practically reading English alphabet on some of the English adverts and billboards as we drove past one afternoon. I could not believe it, but they place as much emphasis on the teaching of foreign languages as they do Arabic, despite all their rhetoric about the West.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁵ Levitt, "Hezbollah: A Case Study of Global Reach," 4.

⁴²⁶ Catherine Le Thomas, "Socialization Agencies and Party Dynamics: Functions and Uses of Hizballah Schools in Lebanon," *Returning to Political Parties?* 2010, <http://ifpo.revues.org/1093>.

⁴²⁷ Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance*, 164.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

Children naturally propagate Hezbollah's influence messages and effects throughout its social structures and networks, such as family and friendships. Talal Atrisi, an analyst studying Hezbollah at Lebanese University, cited schools as a "complete system" to prepare the next generation to ensure they are close to Hezbollah, propagate its messages and deeds, and proselytize its narrative within Lebanon and internationally.⁴²⁹

Hezbollah exploits women as natural channels through its Husseinias, centers for observing Hussein's martyrdom.⁴³⁰ Hezbollah promotes Hussein's sister, Zainab, as an icon for women's behavior.⁴³¹ Designed specifically for women, these centers build on the dynamic of women gathering separately from men. These centers are unique in that they specifically seek to develop women as channels who then return to their families and propagate Hezbollah messages. They also serve as communal gathering places to celebrate the martyrdom of locals, as well as provide additional education services, childcare, and medical services.⁴³² Since Lebanese women often yield immense power within families,⁴³³ these centers facilitate the propagation of Hezbollah's messages.

Hezbollah has dedicated operatives for creating artificial channels that penetrate rival and nonpermissive social networks to propagate messages. Members receive training in exploiting intelligence sources from Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) al-Quds Brigades.⁴³⁴ In places, such as Singapore and South America, Hezbollah members marry local women for trusted access into local social networks.⁴³⁵ This practice also enables

⁴²⁹ Badran, "Hezbollah's Agenda in Lebanon," 60.

⁴³⁰ Hussein, son of Ali (the cousin of Muhammad and believed to be the rightful successor to Muhammad by Shia Muslims), was killed in the battle of Karbala and became a powerful symbol for the cause of and promotion of martyrdom in Shia Islam.

⁴³¹ Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History*, 56–57.

⁴³² Hezbollah views anyone who dies in its fight against Israel (not limited to suicide bombers or fighters) as martyrs. Husseinias become emotionally charged locations where Hezbollah can capitalize on the grief of the participating women. For a complete view on Hezbollah and use of martyrdom, see Naim Qassem and Dalia Khalil, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (Saint Paul: Saqi Books, 2005), 100–109.

⁴³³ Joseph Suad and Susan Slyomovics, *Women and Power in the Middle East* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 3, 36.

⁴³⁴ Levitt, "Hezbollah: A Case Study of Global Reach," 4.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*

the group to establish legitimate businesses for the purpose of raising money, providing intelligence for future operations, increasing Hezbollah's political support globally, and/or serving as smuggling and laundering conduits.⁴³⁶ Inside Lebanon, Hezbollah infiltrates rival groups, such as various Christian and Sunni organizations, to manipulate them from within these groups. When rival religious groups begin to support Hezbollah's political ideas even tacitly, greater overall social legitimacy and power is given to Hezbollah.⁴³⁷ From these efforts, Hezbollah can reinforce the progress made via additional messages and deeds and through support from multiple mediums. As it has learned and adapted over the years, one of its most innovative uses of artificial channels has been in penetrating networks inside of Israel.

Hezbollah is actively developing influence channels within Israel. The group uses foreign citizens, such as Germans, British and others, to travel to Israel to conduct operations.⁴³⁸ These individuals range from naturalized citizens of Arab descent to natural born citizens of local ethnicity who converted to Shia Islam. Hezbollah also utilizes Israeli born Arabs for their access capabilities inside Israel versus that of foreign visitors.⁴³⁹ These individuals not only provide intelligence for future terrorist-related targeting, they also provide valuable social intelligence for use in Hezbollah's influence programs. Due to their access to unique crime, youth, and other underground networks inside Israel, Israeli-based channels are also developed to sell illicit narcotics to Israelis, downplay hatred toward Hezbollah, and breed general discontent across Israel.⁴⁴⁰

Hezbollah penetrates networks of allied organizations to ensure its objectives and interests are properly supported. According to open-source material based on leaked

⁴³⁶ Levitt, "Hezbollah: A Case Study of Global Reach," 4.

⁴³⁷ Badran, "Hezbollah's Agenda in Lebanon," 61.

⁴³⁸ Schleifer, "Psychological Operations," 8.

⁴³⁹ Matthew Levitt, "Hezbollah's West Bank Terror Network," *Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.)*, August–September 2003, 2, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/IRAN/PDF/aug_03.pdf.

⁴⁴⁰ Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.), "Hezbollah: Profile of the Lebanese Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria (Part 2)," July 2003, 102–105, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/ENGLISH/IRAN/PDF/JULY_03.PDF.

Israeli classified information indicates that since 2001, Hezbollah's penetration of the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been used to disrupt the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by attempting to prevent cease-fire agreements by directing attacks to draw Israeli aggression. In return, Israeli reactions feed Hezbollah's nationalism, vilification, and solidarity message and deed programs.⁴⁴¹

Regional and international news media outlets are targeted for use as strategic channels and mediums, which facilitates a naturally infiltration effect favorable for Hezbollah's local influence operations and its strategic agenda. For example, Hezbollah used as Ghassan bin Jiddo (the Al Jazeera Beirut chief) and Ibrahim al-Amin (a respected journalist who worked for several of the leading newspapers in Lebanon) to propagate Hezbollah messages outside of Lebanon. The group used Hussein Nablusi⁴⁴² to gain the trust of the western media networks covering the 2006 war to manipulate press coverage that resulted so that reports favored Hezbollah.⁴⁴³ Yet another example is Octavia Nasr, the senior editor of Middle Eastern affairs for CNN, who was fired in July 2010 for posting her respect and inferred support for Hezbollah icon Sayyed Mohammad Hussein on Twitter.⁴⁴⁴ Hezbollah's deliberate targeting of the media reflects the depth of the group's focus on nonlocal channels to generate desired effects.

The organization's political activities serve as channels to bridge its grassroots and top-down influence strategies. In 1992, it began actively participating in Lebanon's political framework. Its political activities have transformed over time and began to distance itself publicly from Iranian affiliation, with the intention of improving its image within Lebanon and the greater Arab world.⁴⁴⁵ The group's political involvement has evolved into a channel-medium hybrid, when in 2008, it supplanted the Lebanese

⁴⁴¹ Levitt, "Hezbollah's West Bank Terror Network," 2–3.

⁴⁴² Erlich and Kahati, "Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds," 77–80.

⁴⁴³ Kalb and Saivetz, "The Israeli—Hezbollah War of 2006," 16–18.

⁴⁴⁴ Lindsay Gellman, "Octavia Nasr Leaving CNN After Controversial Hezbollah Tweet," *Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/07/octavia-nasr-leaving-cnn_n_638510.html.

⁴⁴⁵ Wehrey, "A Clash of Wills: Hizballah's Psychological Campaign Against Israel in South Lebanon," 58.

government.⁴⁴⁶ Capitalizing on the perception of its omnipotence in Lebanon, Hezbollah used its political channels to position itself quietly to seize government control. It not only infiltrated Lebanese political channels; it developed controlling influence over the entire political network.⁴⁴⁷

Hezbollah's creativity, innovation, and mutually supporting influence operations have created an environment of self-replicating channels that extend beyond specifically targeted audiences, which enhances Hezbollah's progressive use of mediums that directly supports the group's diverse message and deeds influence operations. Hezbollah's penetration of channels and adept use of mediums extends the cognitive shelf life of its message and deeds, and reduces maintenance requirements for its influence operations.

D. MEDIUMS

Fueling its almost viral propagation is Hezbollah's strictly controlled media empire, unrivaled by most nation states and designed to directly support its tactical and operational political-military influence operations.⁴⁴⁸ Hezbollah's mediums are broken down into three distinct categories: organic Hezbollah-owned mediums, nonorganic Hezbollah direct and indirect influence mediums, and interpersonal mediums. Each medium is interrelated and interoperable. Unlike the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War, Hezbollah possesses a robust methodology for employing mediums simultaneously across all levels of its operations. It uses a sophisticated mix of interpersonal, local media, and mass media mediums to solidify its influence effects with its channeling techniques. Hezbollah controlled mediums include TV, radio, publication houses, Internet websites, blogs, and more that are used to actively manipulate, infiltrate, and or influence third party media organizations to adopt Hezbollah's influence messages and imagery passively to further spread its influence effects. Interpersonal mediums are used

⁴⁴⁶ James B. Love, "Hezbollah: A Charitable Revolution," *Army Command and General Staff College*, 98, 102, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA499513>.

⁴⁴⁷ Harb and Leenders, "Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception," 184.

⁴⁴⁸ Hezbollah's mediums serve to support, reinforce, and introduce new influence operations and their effects simultaneously across the tri-spectrum of tactical, operational, and strategic political-military operations.

to generate and solidify effects at the grassroots level. These mediums include recruiting through civil service programs, propagating messages and accounts of deeds through Hezbollah owned/sponsored mosques and madrassas, ideological manipulation of local education programs, and its most innovative medium to date—a Hezbollah theme park dedicated to the group’s ‘David versus Goliath’ so-called defeat of Israel during the 2006 war.

1. Organic Hezbollah Owned Mediums

a. *Hezbollah TV*

Hezbollah’s multi media empire flagship is its satellite TV Station Al-Manar.⁴⁴⁹ Established in 1991 with funding from Iran’s revolutionary guards, Al-Manar has become the cornerstone of Hezbollah’s strategic influence endeavors to manipulate influential information and perceptions of various target audiences deliberately. Al-Manar has grown from a fledgling TV station into a global satellite broadcast company with an active audience of 10–15 million viewers daily.⁴⁵⁰ The significance of Al-Manar is not the size of the station’s viewership, its global reach, or its influence on the mass media market. Its true impact rests with how interwoven the station is into Hezbollah’s grassroots influence operations. For example, in the 2006 war with Israel, every Hezbollah unit included a cameraman who recorded military and civil support operations.⁴⁵¹ Regardless of the type operation and results of unit actions, the footage was manipulated for use on Al-Manar. After selectively editing the footage, adding in emotionally attuned music, and professional quality narration, the footage was included as centerpieces for Al-Manar’s daily broadcasts,⁴⁵² which were subsequently picked up and re-broadcast by other mass media companies throughout the region and the world. During the war, Al-Manar’s broadcasts and newsfeeds appeared so factual and persuasive

⁴⁴⁹ Erlich and Kahati, “Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” 3.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid., 41–45.

⁴⁵¹ Schleifer, “Psychological Operations,” 5.

⁴⁵² Ibid., 6.

that they gained significant viewership in Israel and the United States.⁴⁵³ In a number of cases, information supplied by Al-Manar directly impacted Israeli civilian audiences and the decision-making cycles of the Israeli Armed Forces (IAF).⁴⁵⁴ “Eventually, all of Israel’s TV stations began to broadcast Hezbollah’s videotapes because they were the only published visual record of the war.”⁴⁵⁵ Al-Manar is the codex for Hezbollah’s other strategic mediums.⁴⁵⁶

b. Radio-Journalism-Publishing

Hezbollah also owns an Iranian funded radio station, Radio Nur,⁴⁵⁷ which became active with Hezbollah’s inception in 1982. Since then, Radio Nur’s station name has operated under several identities, each of which is a foretelling of Hezbollah’s ideological frame and primary target audiences. Originally known as The Voice of Islam, the station changed to The Voice of Faith, The Voice of the Oppressed, and now The Voice of Light (Sawt al-Nur or Radio Nur).⁴⁵⁸ Radio Nur now operates in a mirror format to Al-Manar TV, but with the Lebanese population as the primary target audience. Each radio news broadcast provides a mirror of comparable stories with manipulated or selectively presented information to those broadcasted on Al-Manar. These stories are then conveyed to target audiences with exaggerated drama, emotionally charged music, and emotionally inciting verbiage. Examples of manipulated materials are discussed in further detail under Hezbollah’s nonorganic influenced mediums.

⁴⁵³ Maura Conway, “Terror TV? An Exploration of Hizbollah’s Al-Manar Television,” *Working Papers in International Studies* (Dublin City University, 2008), <http://doras.dcu.ie/2147/1/2008-10.pdf>.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁴⁵⁵ Schleifer, “Psychological Operations,” 13–14.

⁴⁵⁶ Al-Manar created a department comprised of Hebrew speakers to monitor Israeli radio and television continuously throughout the day to assess information originating from Israeli media to surpass its quality and information provided; from Wehrey, “A Clash of Wills: Hizballah’s Psychological Campaign Against Israel in South Lebanon,” 66.

⁴⁵⁷ Erlich and Kahati, “Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” 59.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Arabic translations for Radio Nur aliases—Sawtal-Islam (The Voice of Islam), and sometimes Sawt al-Iman (The Voice of Faith) or Sawt al-mustadh’afin (The Voice of the Oppressed). In 1991, it changed its name to Sawt al-Nur (The Voice of Light).

Complimenting Hezbollah's radio and TV stations is its elaborate journalism and publishing operations. The group produces weekly papers and journals focusing on the organization's ideological goals and monthly publications focused on religious topics. It employs sponsors and supports a pool of journalists inculcated into, or sympathetic to Hezbollah's cause, the majority of whom work for one of Hezbollah's major news publications. In addition to news publications, Hezbollah maintains no less than four publishing companies that produce a myriad of books, information pamphlets, social service information booklets, child education material, radical religious education materials, ideologically aligned coloring books, posters, and many other print-based projects.⁴⁵⁹ Together with their news media, radio and TV capabilities, the group's publications provide updates to news broadcasts disseminated over Hezbollah's TV and radio stations. These mediums combine to serve as a general support mechanism for Hezbollah's influence operations and supporting psychological warfare endeavors.

c. Internet Presence

With funding and technical support from Iran, Hezbollah first appeared on the Internet in 1997.⁴⁶⁰ The group has grown its overt and covert Internet presence to hundreds of websites with audiences and Internet addresses in countries on every continent of the globe. Its Internet presence incorporates local languages and dialects for foreign audiences targeted by the group's psychological influence activities.⁴⁶¹ Erlich and Kahati break Hezbollah's Internet activity down into five groups: central news, Hezbollah-explicit media, Hezbollah sympathetic news, local town and village sites in South Lebanon, and sites belonging to or dedicated to social organizations.⁴⁶² Hezbollah's Internet footprint not only grants Hezbollah near limitless access to a global

⁴⁵⁹ Erlich and Kahati, "Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds," 60. Two of the largest, most famous, and overt Hezbollah publishing companies, include the Dar al-Hadi Publishing House and the Imam Khomeini Cultural Center.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁴⁶¹ Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.), "Terrorism and the Internet: Hezbollah's Widespread Use of the Internet," December 3, 2006, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/english/eng_n/html/hezbollah_int_e.htm.

⁴⁶² Erlich and Kahati belong to an Israeli-based think tank, the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

audience, it allows Hezbollah to propagate synchronized propaganda live or in near real time, which allows it to transmit its psychological warfare imagery and information throughout the world as it is developed through their grassroots influence operations. Footage from Al-Manar, stories from Hezbollah backed or sponsored publications, discussion forums, blogs, and other social media activities are incorporated into Hezbollah's cyber influence and psychological warfare programming. While each format may not be identical, the message themes and imagery of the group's activities provide a holistic set of influence effects.

Hezbollah employs hackers who scour the Internet, exploiting vulnerable private and commercial Internet sites as a means of establishing temporary communication and broadcast hubs. Each time a hacked site or Hezbollah sponsored site is eliminated, another one pops up somewhere else.⁴⁶³ "Hezbollah then gets the word out through e-mail and blogs" that it can be found at the new IP address and the next hacker hijack is underway.⁴⁶⁴ These hijacked sites are used to run recruitment videos, re-broadcast Al-Manar TV programming, and broadcast numbers and finance information for supporters to deposit donations.⁴⁶⁵ Hezbollah's overt websites and its sponsored hijacked sites provide the group with nearly unlimited access to multiple target audiences.⁴⁶⁶ These websites, including those belonging to Al-Manar, became a primary source of information for Israelis, Lebanese, and the world during its 2006 war with Israel.⁴⁶⁷ In doing so, Hezbollah's web and TV mediums enabled their messages and manipulated information to infiltrate naturally across global audiences because of third party media and journalist channels.

⁴⁶³ Hilary Hylton, "How Hizballah Hijacks the Internet," *Time*, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1224273,00.html>.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ Gabriel Weimann, "Hezbollah Dot Com: Hezbollah's Online Campaign," *New Media and Innovative Technologies*, 2008, 17, <http://web.bgu.ac.il/NR/rdonlyres/34396BDB-6C0E-4931-A077-697451885123/34393/Weimannedited.pdf>.

⁴⁶⁶ Secondary audiences would undoubtedly have an adverse reaction to the hacker attacks, but the hacking is designed to reach audiences already aligned with Hezbollah through this medium.

⁴⁶⁷ Brennan, *Hezbollah: Psychological Warfare Against Israel*, 22.

Hezbollah's widespread Internet activity reinforces the group's ability to conduct the tactical-operational-strategic tri-spectrum for influence operations. The group's overt and covert cyber influence operations enable Hezbollah to exploit political opportunities, facilitate ideological frame alignment, sponsor resource mobilization, and enhance audience consciousness through frame amplification. The Internet medium synergizes Hezbollah's messages, deeds, and channels more comprehensively than nearly any other medium. Although face-to-face interpersonal interaction remains the dominant tie for its social networks, Hezbollah's use of social media has developed into a second tier of interpersonal connectivity (eSocial networks) allowing the group to infiltrate diverse audiences and mobilize global eSocial networks.⁴⁶⁸ Hezbollah's activity on Facebook is a prime example of its contemporary influence efforts.

d. Facebook

More than any other violent extremist group, Hezbollah arguably exploits Facebook's global reach allowing the group to access new audiences and solidify its relevance to current audiences.⁴⁶⁹ Beginning in 2008, Hezbollah began its Facebook existence and now maintains an active presence through hundreds of Facebook pages and accounts. Some accounts are Hezbollah sponsored; many are accounts of leaders, members, and sympathizers to include Hezbollah's vast leadership hierarchy.⁴⁷⁰ Hezbollah's Facebook fan and friend base is far reaching with over 100,000 fans spread across hundreds of Facebook pages.⁴⁷¹ One of the most alarming and insightful views of Hezbollah's Facebook medium are the displays of ongoing indoctrination of future

⁴⁶⁸ Second-tier interpersonal connectivity, as defined by the authors', delineates face-to-face and electronic interpersonal communications as parallel real time social networks. It distinguishes traditional social networks that exist in real time and electronic social networks through social media that originate within the Internet on electronic social network sites, such as Facebook, for the purpose of spreading, sharing, and discussing information relevant to the network's interested nodes and actors.

⁴⁶⁹ Site Intel Group, "Social Network Jihad: Hezbollah's Capitalization of Facebook," <http://news.siteintelgroup.com/component/content/article/8-social-network-jihad/477-social-network-jihad-hezbollahs-capitalization-of-facebook>.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., Hezbollah's Facebook accounts exist in no less than a dozen languages to include English, Arabic, French, Turkish, Spanish, Hebrew, Albanian, Urdu, and Farsi.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

generations of Hezbollah terrorists, insurgents, activists, and supporters. Figure 9's images of children personify Hezbollah's deep-rooted indoctrination and influence programs.



Figure 9. Examples of Hezbollah's Facebook Impact⁴⁷²

2. Nonorganic Mediums

Hezbollah's nonorganic mediums include CNN, Al-Jazeera, the BBC, the Associated Press, and a litany of other global TV, print, and radio news agencies and journalists. As discussed during the message and deeds section, the group deliberately attempts to influence foreign media and foreign audiences to justify its actions and further develop Hezbollah's image. An example of Hezbollah's adept awareness of foreign media and audience susceptibility was displayed during its 2006 war with Israel; the group spared no effort in attempting to seize the influence advantage by staging

⁴⁷² Site Intel Group, "Social Network Jihad: Hezbollah's Capitalization of Facebook."

emotionally charged scenes for foreign media.⁴⁷³ Photos and videos of the conflict were deliberately altered to create the perception of vast civilian casualties. The material was aired on international television and Internet feeds for several days until the doctored material was exposed in the international media.⁴⁷⁴ In some cases, foreign and regional media, along with civilian audiences, adopted Hezbollah information feeds from Al-Manar TV and Internet sites and then used the manipulated information as primary sources for the war's progress.⁴⁷⁵ Evidence of Hezbollah's information manipulation and capabilities emerged during and after the 2006 war when Anderson Cooper of CNN identified several instances of media manipulation while attending Hezbollah sponsored press events. In one example, Cooper commented on Hezbollah's deceptive use of ambulances to generate perceptions of mounting civilian casualties:

One by one, they've been told to turn on their sirens and zoom off so that all the photographers here can get shots of ambulances rushing off to treat civilians....These ambulances aren't responding to any new bombings. The sirens are strictly for effect.... Young men on motor scooters followed our every movement. They only allowed us to videotape certain streets, certain buildings.⁴⁷⁶

Other examples from the Israel Project nonprofit organization include:

Australian Herald Sun published smuggled photos of Hezbollah militants conducting military operations in densely populated areas, which is illegal according to international law.⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷³ Kalb and Saivetz, "The Israeli—Hezbollah War of 2006," 11.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴⁷⁵ Harb and Leenders, "Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception," 173.

⁴⁷⁶ Rich Noyes, "CNN's Anderson Cooper Exposes Hezbollah's Media Manipulation," *Newsbusters*, <http://newsbusters.org/node/6574>.

⁴⁷⁷ Chris Link, "Photos that Damn Hezbollah," *Australia Herald Sun*, July 30, 2006, <http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,,19955774-5007220,00.html>.

A New York Times photograph of a Lebanese man in Tyre being rescued from the rubble of a bombed building was altered. Days later, the Times noted a potential error in the photograph after bloggers noticed the same man appeared in other photographs at the same scene looking clean and composed.⁴⁷⁸

A Lebanese civil rescue worker identified as Saleem Daher was shown in German newspapers and television in late July carrying the body of a dead boy from one location to another in an apparent attempt to enable various groups of cameramen to shoot the scene. On another occasion, Daher was shown reloading a body into an ambulance so journalists could “get a better shot.” Daher regularly steered journalists to “better” pictures of Lebanese casualties.⁴⁷⁹

3. Interpersonal Mediums

Hezbollah’s education, religious, medical, youth programs, and infrastructure improvement efforts also provide interpersonal mediums that reinforce the resonance of narrative. Naim Qassem, the Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah, made the following statement referencing the power of Hezbollah’s civil and social support organizations:

While such services do have a considerable effect on the populace, the essence of participation ultimately resides in belief in the overall path. Social work serves to enrich supporters’ confidence in the viability of the Party’s cause and course, as it cooperates, collaborates and joins forces to remain strong and tenacious in its political and resistance roles.⁴⁸⁰

These services are also duplicated throughout Hezbollah’s larger international enclaves. Hezbollah’s grassroots social service mediums are active in Paraguay, Africa, France, Canada, and even in the United States. Hezbollah-funded mosques and madrassas are obvious mediums, but they also serve as combined message and deeds, channels, and medium mechanisms. Hezbollah resourced Islamic education centers serve as mediums and channels that target the youth by mixing traditional sciences with its ideological and

⁴⁷⁸ “Framing the Story,” *The Washington Times*, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/aug/9/20060809-090136-3068r/>.

⁴⁷⁹ Israel Insider Staff, “Media Experts Convene to Discuss how Mideast War is Waged in Blogosphere at Herzlyia Conference,” *Israel Insider*, <http://www.spme.net/cgi-bin/articles.cgi?ID=1645>.

⁴⁸⁰ Qassem and Khalil, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within*, 165.

religious teachings.⁴⁸¹ Similarly, Hezbollah's micro-finance and credit services provide a medium for recruitment, rapport building, and ultimately, enable the group's influence efforts to subvert local status quo as it draws in non-Shia supporters.

Hezbollah's latest example of the interpersonal medium-channel-message-and-deed phenomenon is its theme park, "Landmark for the Resistance." Established in 2010 south of Beirut in the Mleeta area, the park cost approximately \$4 million to construct. In the first month of operation, more than 500,000 people visited the park.⁴⁸² Figures 10 and 11 exemplify the brilliance and alarming effects this medium has provided for Hezbollah.



Figure 10. Today Show News Report on Hezbollah's Theme Park⁴⁸³

The theme park's documentary provides a glimpse of its multi-tiered influence effects supporting Hezbollah's anti-Israel and Lebanese nationalism influence narratives

⁴⁸¹ See Hezbollah social service discussion in the message and deeds section.

⁴⁸² Alistair Lyon, "Devoted Crowds Throng Hezbollah's Lebanon Theme Park," *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/11/us-lebanon-hezbollah-idUSTRE67A2RF20100811?pageNumber=1>.

⁴⁸³ "Hizballah's New War Theme Park," *TIME.com*, http://www.time.com/time/video/player/0,32068,593331362001_2013651,00.html.

(see link in footnote for Figure 10). It is an organic interpersonal medium for Hezbollah that facilitates influence messages and documented deeds to resonate at an emotional level with visitors, which is not unlike war memorials incorporating personalized documentaries in other countries. The park provides a three-dimensional medium that freezes an astutely cultivated perception about Hezbollah. Through elaborate and artistic use of music, emotionally interactive and staged personal accounts, as well as the use of captured Israeli war materials, such as tanks, rockets, etc., the park conveys Hezbollah as a champion of all Lebanese. Images of ‘resistance’ against Israel are combined with imagery of alleged Israeli atrocities intended to generate powerful and emotional influence effects to support Hezbollah.



Figure 11. Time Video Screen Captures Documenting Hezbollah’s Anti Israel Theme Park⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸⁴ “Hizballah's New War Theme Park.”

4. Assessing Hezbollah's Mediums

Hezbollah's diverse use of mediums enables the group to conduct influence operations across diverse social landscapes, while simultaneously facilitating Hezbollah's centrally controlled influence narratives and operations.⁴⁸⁵ The group's vast collection of mediums enables the group to disseminate its influence messages and accounts of its influence actions in real and near real time. The array of mediums also enables them to synchronize messages and deeds on a global scale through various target audience languages. Simultaneously managing and supporting divisive, subversive, and defensive influence operations, Hezbollah's tactical and operational level influence operations alternate in primacy, as their strategic mediums provide over arching reinforcement and validation.

E. CASE CONCLUSION AND EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES

1. Summary of Hezbollah Influence

Hezbollah is a calculating organization that ensures its military, influence, political, social, and economic operations maximize psychological impacts on the enemy, its constituency, future supporters and neutral audiences alike.⁴⁸⁶ Its influence operations intuitively use SMT principles but also displays a complimentary and supporting use of PIM, which provides it with an overwhelming influence effect.⁴⁸⁷ It essentially employs uniquely tailored influence operations for each target audience and its respective sub audiences, while maintaining a centrally controlled influence narrative from the organization's leadership through its owned and controlled mediums.

⁴⁸⁵ For a complete definition and presentation, see Steven R. Corman and Kevin J. Dooley, "Strategic Communication on a Rugged Landscape," 2008, <http://comops.org/article/121.pdf>.

⁴⁸⁶ Schleifer, "Psychological Operations," 8.

⁴⁸⁷ From a modeling perspective, Hezbollah demonstrates a hybrid of Arizona State University's strategic communication on a rugged landscape model with aspects of ASU's critical assessment of a simple Strategic Communication landscape methodology. For more information, see Corman and Dooley, "Strategic Communication on a Rugged Landscape."

Hezbollah's has used Israel as it framing anchor point since 1982. It has exploited Israel's military interventions, settlement practices, air strikes, counter rocket fires, and political policies to galvanize Hezbollah's primary and secondary audiences in line with the group's Lebanonization influence campaigns. This tactic, in conjunction with its relaxation of strict Shia fanaticism, alleviated elements of Hezbollah's burden toward continuous frame maintenance. Following the 2006 war, Israel became a cognitive rallying point for Hezbollah's nationalization narrative, bringing Lebanese Sunnis, Christians, and Druze together (to a degree) with Hezbollah's Shia and Palestinian constituencies.⁴⁸⁸ Israeli vilification is such a powerful influence narrative for Hezbollah that the group can minimize tactical influence operations previously needed to subvert or eliminate local competitors because its influence effects become nearly self sustainable.

The organization spends hundreds of millions of dollars on social service programs that serve as its primary grassroots influence and mobilization mechanism for varied population groups, rival political factions, and rival religious factions.⁴⁸⁹ Its use of message and deeds, channels, and mediums are synchronized to such a degree that it affects SMT principle simultaneously.⁴⁹⁰ Its alignment of ideological goals with other social groups under the premise of common grievances and expectations has enabled the group to marginalize competitors while also gathering support from seemingly disparate populations and political groups. The social and civic influence programs not only facilitate continued resource support from state sponsors (Syria and Iran), but also generate populace resource mobilization through participation in the social programs, financial institutions, semi-private schools, and open solicitation for constituent donations. Hezbollah loosened its strict Islamic governance in its controlled areas,

⁴⁸⁸ According to the Beirut Center for Research and Information's polling during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, 87% of Lebanese supported Hezbollah's "retaliatory attacks on northern Israel," which included statistics from non-Shia communities. Reportedly, 80% of Lebanese Christians voiced support for Hezbollah, 80% of Druze supported, and 89% support from Lebanese Sunnis. Given Hezbollah's history and embedded nature through Lebanon's political, social, and economic sectors the statistics are questionable, but even if the numbers are inflated by no less than 50%, they depict a growing alignment of former rivals to Hezbollah. From Blanford, "Hizbullah Steps Up Psychological Warfare."

⁴⁸⁹ Erlich and Kahati, "Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds," 40.

⁴⁹⁰ Hezbollah's message and deeds also directly impact political and economical stability through its micro financing, credit cards, and the group's active role in Lebanese politics.

specifically with clothing and limiting the amount of religious instruction in its schools while focusing on secular topics, such as math, sciences, and foreign languages (to include English).⁴⁹¹ The social embedded nature within the Shia population, and now throughout southern Lebanon, has made Hezbollah an intractable body within Lebanese society and politics.⁴⁹²

2. Message and Deeds

Hezbollah is successfully developing a nationalism effect among the disparate population groups by vilifying and exploiting Israeli military actions, in conjunction with the Lebanese government's inability to compete with Hezbollah's social and political mechanisms. Israel's invasions have served as an influence catalyst for Hezbollah's successes, more so than perhaps Hezbollah could have achieved without Israel's invasions. Hezbollah learned from its operations and distanced itself from unpopular terrorist activities to only target Israeli soldiers, Lebanese Christian militiamen, and select Israeli civilian centers.⁴⁹³ Although Hezbollah continued to launch rockets into Israel in tit-for-tat responses, it appeared much more successful in perception management.⁴⁹⁴ During the 2006 war, messages targeting international and Israeli audiences, focused on civilian losses and Hezbollah resistance, generated influence dominance as Israeli media, international media, and local channels increasingly adopted the group's messages.⁴⁹⁵ All

⁴⁹¹ Shawn T. Flanigan and Mounah Abdel-Samad, "Hezbollah's Social Jihad: Non-Profits as Social Resistance," *Middle East Policy* 16, no. 2 (June 11, 2009): 126, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2009.00396.x/pdf>.

⁴⁹² Simmons, *Socially Embedded Insurgencies*, 30.

⁴⁹³ Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History*, 83–88.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 85.

⁴⁹⁵ After the war, Hezbollah launched an extensive propaganda campaign to inculcate target audiences with the perception of their "divine victory." The campaign was based on three elements: the IDF's failure to stop or significantly reduce Hezbollah rocket fire throughout the war; the harsh internal criticism exposing IDF failures and mistakes made public for Hezbollah's continued exploitation; and Israeli achievements and Hezbollah's failures were not sufficiently emphasized, and subsequently, not carried into Lebanon and the Arab world preventing an undermining of Hezbollah's victory myth. From Adam Elkus, "The Hezbollah Myth and Asymmetric Warfare," *Small Wars Journal* (August 15, 2010): 4, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/497-elkus.pdf>.

these efforts created a massing of message and deed resonance across Hezbollah areas of influence and into areas of Hezbollah interest, such as the Lebanese political system and international opinion.

3. Channels

Penetrating numerous friendly, neutral, and adversarial socio-political structures and networks through the manipulation of organic channels produces an array of effects and meanings embedded in an interrelated religious and political framework.⁴⁹⁶ This penetration enables the development of situational awareness and flexibility to respond to changing or emerging social and political opportunities allowing the group to adapt to changing environments, which SMT theorists refer to as “tactical innovation.”⁴⁹⁷ By developing social and political intelligence, the group maintains an asymmetric advantage to exploit or affect social networks and ensure “political conditions are ripe for successful and sustained contention.”⁴⁹⁸ Hezbollah’s artificial channels targeting social networks outside of Lebanon (such as in South America and Israel) allow it to maintain and expand the organization’s resources.⁴⁹⁹ By penetrating numerous networks through channels, the group continuously manipulates collective action, movement diffusion, and flexibility, which fuels local and global resource mobilization.⁵⁰⁰

Hezbollah’s use of channels is a catalyst for framing. Its employment of channels is methodical and sophisticated. Channels provide a validation and credibility ingredient, enabling the organization to adapt and synchronize messages, deeds, and mediums in a mutually reinforcing fashion. Hezbollah’s use of channels not only increases the validity of its message and deeds, it integrates the organization into local communities and social

⁴⁹⁶ Harb and Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception,” 174.

⁴⁹⁷ Doug McAdam, “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency,” *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 6 (1983): 736, <http://www.nd.edu/~rmcveigh/change/McAdam.pdf>.

⁴⁹⁸ Colin J. Beck, “The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism,” *Sociology Compass* 2, no. 5 (September 2008): 5, http://pages.pomona.edu/~cjb14747/pdfs/Beck_SMTandTerrorism.pdf.

⁴⁹⁹ Levitt, “Hezbollah: A Case Study of Global Reach,” 4–5.

⁵⁰⁰ Beck, “The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism,” 14.

structures.⁵⁰¹ The end result is increased solidarity, improved desired effects, and increased alignment with Hezbollah's stated and unstated objectives, all of which become a cyclical series of influence operations and effects.⁵⁰²

4. Mediums

It all connects. Hezbollah's mediums serve the message-deed-message-deed cycle by enabling a massing of effects across the operational spectrum. Hezbollah's TV, radio (a local tertiary mechanism), publishing houses, journalists, Internet, and eSocial mediums reveal the depth of Hezbollah's ability to spread its messages across target audiences and locations. Its widespread Internet activity reinforces the group's ability to conduct the tactical-operational-strategic tri-spectrum for influence operations. The Internet medium synergizes its messages, deeds, and channels more comprehensively than nearly any other medium. Although face-to-face interpersonal interaction remains the dominant social network tie, Hezbollah's use of social media has developed into a second tier of interpersonal connectivity allowing the group to infiltrate diverse audiences and mobilize global eSocial networks.⁵⁰³ Ultimately, mediums ensure the group's primary and secondary audiences are continuously bombarded by Hezbollah's three lines of influence.

5. Hezbollah Influence Vulnerabilities

While this case study focuses on the sophistication and successes of Hezbollah's influence methodology, many shortfalls and vulnerabilities do exist. Hezbollah's current monopoly over its primary target audiences makes exploiting the group's vulnerabilities

⁵⁰¹ Roger V. Gould, "Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871," *American Sociological Review* 56, no. 6 (1991): 716, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2096251.pdf?acceptTC=true>.

⁵⁰² Beck, "The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism," 9.

⁵⁰³ Second tier interpersonal connectivity, as defined by the authors', delineates face-to-face and electronic interpersonal communications as parallel real time social networks. It distinguishes traditional social networks that exist in real time and electronic social networks through social media that originate within the internet on electronic social network sites such as Facebook for the purpose of spreading, sharing, and discussing information relevant to the network's interested nodes and actors.

challenging.⁵⁰⁴ Hezbollah remains rooted in a radical, or literal, Islamist movement, but the group has also placed itself into the world of conventional politics with its nationalization and Lebanonization narratives and actions.⁵⁰⁵ Any Hezbollah transformation away from ‘armed resistance’ is a potential challenge to its hegemony over the Lebanese Shia and emerging influence of the Christians, Sunni, and Druze.⁵⁰⁶ In both instances, Hezbollah is vulnerable by its own political creation. Its Shia ties will be increasingly intolerable and threaten the group’s fragile influence over rival religious and social groups, thereby opening political and social gaps for third-party exploitation. As the group continues to dominate Lebanese politics, it risks becoming the ruling political machine for Lebanon. Doing so would place Hezbollah in the unenviable position of responsibility for all Lebanese, and place the group in a corner of responsibility readily exploitable with the correct methods and tools.

Historically, when contradictions and weaknesses in Hezbollah’s messages were exposed and exploited, the group responded with anger in emotion.⁵⁰⁷ Although the group’s rivals failed to exploit these contradictions in the past, the attempts expose potential avenues of approach to counter and subvert Hezbollah within its own sphere of influence. Israel is ill positioned to exploit Hezbollah’s influence vulnerabilities due to its perceived antagonistic role. A credible competitor and its heterogeneous growth remain Hezbollah’s largest vulnerabilities. A sustained investment through a perceived benevolent benefactor is required to subvert Hezbollah’s influence efforts against Lebanese target audiences.

⁵⁰⁴ For example, Hezbollah lost legitimacy in the mid-1980s when it attempted to enforce Islamic order and practice the Sharia within its controlled areas. Hezbollah banned the sale of alcohol in shops and restaurants and prohibited parties, dancing, and offensive music. These actions facilitated economic distress in southern Lebanon as tourism and commerce rapidly dwindled. Hassan Nasrallah would capitalize on these lessons learned by Muhammed Fadlallah to create more advanced influence efforts (both subtle and overt). From Judith Miller, “Faces of Fundamentalism: Hassan Al-Turabi and Muhammed Fadlallah,” *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (1994): 129–131, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20046933.pdf>.

⁵⁰⁵ Harb and Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception,” 185.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Erlich and Kahati, “Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” 32.

Pushing Hezbollah's nationalism narrative and political control beyond the group's ability to manage and manipulate is potentially the most practical course of action. Forcing the group farther along the road of legitimacy, ownership, and political responsibility for Lebanon could stress present interpersonal, social, and religious friction points within the group and among its constituency. The IRA and the Muslim National Liberation Front in the Philippines serve as prime examples. Internal struggles, social and political bias, greed, corruption, and third-party sponsors, such as Iran, are critical vulnerabilities and influence pressure points. The situation can be cultivated to employ influence operations through unconventional and irregular warfare, but would require a comparable synchronization and investment to Hezbollah and its benefactors. Once Hezbollah is sufficiently embedded as an official political power holder responsible for the good, bad, and ugly of the nation, it can be canalized to become further benevolent or repressive. The latter places Hezbollah at risk for facilitation of competitive social movements to capitalize on the growing heterogeneity and political grievances generated through Hezbollah's expansion. Through effective counter influence operations using resonant framing of messages/deeds, and generation of counter channels within Hezbollah's influence, it may be possible to lessen Hezbollah's influence over time. Specific prescriptive implications to exploit Hezbollah's growing influence and other similar movements and organizations are presented in the following chapter.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the strengths and weaknesses of each case are addressed and compared. Specifically, how message and deeds, channels, and mediums affected each case, as well as the common trends across the case studies. The exportable opportunities and vulnerabilities shared by the cases, or specific to a particular case, are discussed to identify replicable counter measures and preemptive influence operations. The way forward is then presented with associated limits and constraints inherent in U.S. prevailing influence methodology, followed by policy recommendations and future research opportunities.

The influence strategies of the Viet Cong, Shining Path, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Hezbollah all exemplify successful and unsuccessful influence operations as defined in this thesis. Their respective successes demonstrate the application of effective influence operations based on the principle of bottom-up mobilization and coordinated resonance to achieve their desired effects. Conversely, uncoordinated top-down attempts at influence operations resulted in losing the influence initiative, generating counter influence vulnerabilities, and prevented mobilization toward the desired end state. Each case exemplifies the importance of deeds validating the message, viral propagation through channels, and the need for mediums to mass the influence effects to achieve decisive influence and generating the desired effects from target audiences.

B. CASE STUDY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

1. The Viet Cong

The Viet Cong case represents a strong case of effective influence operations based on their combined and coordinated use of message and deeds, channels, and mediums. Viet Cong strengths rested with their messages and deeds, and use of artificial and natural channels. Their use of mediums relied heavily on interpersonal face-to-face

mediums to keep messages and deeds credible, whether benevolent or threatening, which epitomized the carrot-stick methodology. Embedded cadre (special influence) teams maintained physical and omnipresence within local villages to align them through a systematic plan to subvert the social and political status quo. Coordinated infiltration of communities across provinces massed the Viet Cong's influence and undermined competing initiatives. Their influence effects spread naturally through channels and subverted or absorbed local competition to achieve sufficient mobilization. Without comparable counter-influence initiatives, the Viet Cong's influence operations were relatively unimpeded.

The Viet Cong were vulnerable to variations of their own tactics and techniques, and susceptible through their own lines of influence being replicated and used against them. Counter narratives not predicated on violence were more resonant. For instance, Marine CAPS and similar SOF influence programs directly challenged VC influence efforts (message and deeds, channels, and mediums) by embedding at the village level, where they displayed isolated examples of success as opposed to the wider U.S. war effort. These successes demonstrate that the VC influence program was ultimately susceptible to counter-influence efforts at the grassroots level.

2. Shining Path

Shining Path was the weakest of the case studies; its one redeeming strength was its ability to achieve an effective economy of influence by infiltrating and manipulating rural educational systems. In doing so, Shining Path often drew in young local actors from rural areas, indoctrinated them, organized cadres, and then reintegrated them back into communities' artificial channels. However, it should be noted that this success had more to do with the absence of competition than Shining Path's doctrine of influence operations.

Shining Path's general use of influence displayed limited aspects of effective influence and SMT methods. The group displayed dogmatic and hierarchical adherence to Guzman and his ideology, but its susceptibility to losing Guzman was a critical vulnerability that led to its demise. Shining Path's primary target audience was

indigenous, but its use of symbols and messages were not, which limited its resonance. Furthermore, the group was generally unconcerned about the needs of the populace it was trying to influence. Shining Path's narrative illustrated its inability to use local actors and groups effectively as channels of influence, demonstrated by the group's prevalence for violence. Additionally, its use of violence often led to a backlash from peasants. The leverage gained from using violence as a coercive tool was also mitigated by the government's own willingness to use it. Ultimately, Shining Path obtained compliance through fear, but once Guzman was jailed, it became clear that compliance out of fear is no substitute for actual cognitive realignment.

3. Jemaah Islamiyah

JI demonstrates a mix of effective and ineffective influence operations. SMT principles were displayed through their effectiveness as a mobilization tool and their subsequent transformation into MMI and JAT. JI's strengths were its doctrine and *Pesantren* education network. However, its secretive nature impaired its ability to employ effective influence operations. JI's fracturing and evolution to MMI and JAT demonstrated a change in its influence paradigm. Previously, JI was predicated on violence and secrecy as an influence strategy; MMI and JAT expanded its scope to become more grassroots focused, displaying improved coordination of influence efforts using outreach and exploiting the Indonesian socio-political system. MMI and JAT messages exploit social grievance vulnerabilities supported with relative and responsive initiatives. They mask the groups' aberrant Islamist objectives, which facilitates narrative adoption and propagation by natural channels. Their mediums show increased sophistication, synchronization, and resonance with the groups' target audiences, but intergroup friction presents obvious vulnerabilities for exploitation.

A significant vulnerability to JI-MMI-JAT is the Indonesian government's inaction to counter the growing Islamist influence initiative. Meaningful efforts by the Indonesian government to address shortfalls, political grievances at local levels and confront Islamist narratives create opportunities for marginalizing the Islamist insurgents. One of the largest vulnerabilities is Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as a spiritual Islamist leader and

the ideological connector for JI, MMI, and JAT. His removal could exacerbate existing friction between the groups and escalate their rivalries. Presently, little evidence of counter influence initiatives against the groups exists, especially within their growth industries of eSocial networks and social media. Delving into these mediums creates additional opportunities for ideological challenges and criticism that can entangle them in debates to justify their ideological framework. The increasing interconnectivity in Indonesian Internet service provides opportunities to subvert and exploit JI through the use of eSocial mediums by generating channels through social media networks.

4. Hezbollah

Of the analyzed case studies, Hezbollah represents the most effective example of influence operations. Since its inception, it has transformed from a simple terrorist organization and implemented a coordinated, evolving, and proactive influence model, enabling the group to align disparate audiences and competitors. It is the most adept at message and deeds with its subversion of competitors as it coordinates influence operations across villages and population groups through indigenously relative activities and narratives. Its grassroots bottom up approach to influence supported by overarching top down singularly controlled messaging creates a massing effect. Hezbollah's indigenous resonance facilitates its artificial channel infiltration and natural channel adoption to create self-sustaining influence mechanisms. Its mediums are innovative, diverse, and interpersonal, which creates synergy when incorporated with message and deed and channel variables.

However, weaknesses do exist within Hezbollah's influence model. The larger and more political responsibility the group assumes, the more susceptible it becomes to social expectations. Essentially, the more Hezbollah assumes the burden of governing, the more susceptible it is to the creation of new grievances and the exploitation of those grievances through counter social mobilization movements. Hezbollah remains a Shia-centric group with dependent ties to Iran. Its relationship with Iran is a concern of the Lebanese population and is a potential line of influence against it if implemented in an

indigenously resonant strategy. Forcing the group into continued political responsibility coupled with comparable influence competitors (who will require external support for long-term operations) has the potential to subvert Hezbollah’s influence model.

5. Trends

Pursuant to the methodology proposed in the first chapter (see Figure 12), case study analysis supports the efficacy of this model. In general, the case studies indicate the necessary and/or sufficient conditions of the three variables (and subsequent hypotheses) in the model. Analysis indicates message and deeds, channels, and mediums are all necessary to achieve effective influence. However, groups can conduct influence at the grassroots level without a robust use of mediums, but incorporating a multitude of resonant mediums serves as an accelerant to the overall influence effort. When all three variables are maximized to the greatest extent possible, decisive influence is achieved. Of the cases assessed, the Hezbollah case study most closely approximates decisive influence operations by maximizing the application of all three variables.




Figure 12. The Influence Operation Model

To the degree each case study demonstrated the use of influence, based on the principles of this model, they achieved desired effects toward their ultimate objectives. They show that deliberately planned and synergized actions that validate messages across multiple lines of influence are essential to effective influence warfare. However, they also demonstrated that when groups attempt to validate deeds rather than messages, they are significantly less successful. The combined use of physical and nonphysical actions selectively aimed at target audiences' social and cognitive vulnerabilities exemplifies the advantages of operating at a grassroots level. States or national power holders who typically display a trend of neglecting or ignoring good governance and influence at local levels sacrifice a natural advantage to defend local populations from subversion.

C. OPERATIONALIZING THE INFLUENCE MODEL

The United States can adapt the techniques demonstrated in the case studies and proposed influence operations methodology to directly challenge and subvert the influence activities of insurgent and terrorist groups at a grassroots level. The influence operation methodology is a natural component of SOF missions, with the use of psychological warfare for influence operations to drive the operational environment for UW, FID, IW, COIN, and other mission requirements. In 2008, SOCOM reversed the lines of operations in CONPLAN 7500 from direct to indirect approaches as the main effort for future operations, recognizing the necessity of influence as the primary strategy in future counterterrorism efforts.⁵⁰⁸ However, since 2008, SOCOM has yet to operationalize this change fully, demonstrating a capability and cultural gap within the interagency structure. Figure 13 illustrates operationalized influence operations as a primary effort (if given the appropriate attention and resourcing) by synergizing replicable attributes of the thesis within current SOF constructs, and the adaptability across the spectrum of operations.

⁵⁰⁸ R. Comer, "Fighting Global War—Indirectly," *Defensemedianetwork.Com*, October 21, 2010, <http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/fighting-global-war-%E2%80%93indirectly/>.




Figure 13. Operational Implementation

By its very nature, SOF operates within local grassroots environments. SOF actors are ideally situated to embed locally and generate social intelligence. Social intelligence is incorporated into wider coordinated influence operations across time and space to affect multiple target audiences and continuously shape the operating environment, which can include the full range of kinetic and nonkinetic actions. The social intelligence gathered facilitates the creation of indigenously resonate efforts where deeds directly support messages to generate multiple desired influence effects. Simultaneously, SOF coordinates with Title 10 and Title 50 intelligence coupled with special influence assets to develop and employ artificial channels to energize natural channels that then penetrate local networks and propagate influence effects. JIATF and/or SOTF elements, and their influence agents, ensure influence efforts are coordinated across the operational environment that creates the necessary massing and synchronization to affect multiple target audience and adversary vulnerabilities. While

completely replicable, which can be implemented to varying degrees of success throughout present operations, several constraints and limitations prevent optimal implementation.

D. LIMITS AND CONSTRAINTS TO IMPLEMENTATION

The DoD does not possess an offensive special influence capability needed to fully actualize the influence prescription above. Current U.S. information actors are inherently defensively focused and reactive in influence application. Recent Bottom-Up Reviews (BUR) and Capabilities Based Assessments (CBAs) identify shortfalls in training and integration of intelligence support within the influence career fields.⁵⁰⁹ Influence operations are a methodology that requires more deliberate focus. To conduct influence operations as prescribed above, current authorities, doctrine, and organization design must adapt to asymmetric influence threats, as well as the need to develop an offensive influence capability to directly engage emerging terrorist, insurgent, and other nonstate actors. Although influence is frequently used in contemporary plans and policy, its scope and relevance is not fully encapsulated at all levels of operations. Implementing adequate influence through a bottom-up approach is increasingly problematic given the blurring of roles and responsibilities. Unconventional warfare, Special Forces' distinctive core competency, cites influencing behavior, attitudes, and perceptions of targeted audiences as a key task. This task is the distinctive core competency of psychological operations whose mission is to selectively influence an audience's behavior, disposition, and perceptions. However, PSYOP needs to evolve from predominantly defensive nature to a specially trained and selected force focused on offensive influence against an adversary's influence operations. The current U.S. influence focus is traditionally asynchronous, as described in Chapter I, and the compartmented relationships of

⁵⁰⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept (JOC) v2.0* (Washington, DC: United States Government, 2010), 7, 12–13, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc2_0.pdf.

Department of State, Strategic Communications, Psychological Operations, Public Affairs, and Information Operations are predominantly defensive in nature in terms of executing influence operations.⁵¹⁰

E. THE WAY FORWARD

A capability gap exists within the DoD and SOCOM to execute offensive influence operations and defeat adversaries' endeavors to subvert U.S. support through malicious influence and mobilization of populations. Coupled with continued indirect approach requirements to maintain and expand influence initiatives, a special influence capability with appropriate authorities is needed to conduct influence operations effectively. This capability fulfills the operational requirements needed to execute the indirect approach by coordinating and massing full spectrum influence effects, and attacking adversaries within their own influence and information safe havens. Just as special mission units within the SOF community are inherently offensive in nature, it is time for the creation of a Special Influence Unit (SIU) for the express purpose of executing and synergizing offensive influence warfare as part of an enduring indirect strategy against asymmetric threats. Similar to the Hezbollah model, message and deed synergy is required from the tactical to strategic levels. Greater interagency coordination is required for a holistic focus on the importance of influence and achieving a synchronized whole of government approach to support bottom up/grassroots influence mobilization. To develop the way forward fully and identify necessary requirements to establish special influence capabilities and realign the U.S. approach to influence operations, a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) study is needed at the DoD and SOCOM level.

⁵¹⁰ PSYOP's recent name change to Military Information Support to Operations (MISO) generates further confusion regarding purpose and role in relation to Influence Operations, STRATCOM, Public Diplomacy, and the nebulous construct of IO to coordinate the information actors rather IO trying to become operational actor itself.

F. FUTURE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES

Several opportunities exist to expand the scope of research, which can be broken down into the following topics.

- Organizational design analysis of SIU.
- Organizational design of other influence organizations' efficacy within the DoD and Interagency.
- The use of influence methodologies by other actors, such as Iran and its sponsorship of social unrest throughout the Middle East, China's approach to influence, Singapore's Community Engagement Programme [sic] (CEP), as well as other historical case studies.
- Study of social influence theories outside of SMT.
- Social Network Analysis within offensive and defensive influence warfare to align population groups and communities.
- Other influence methodologies incorporating social media, eSocial networks, mobile communications, religious narratives and counter narratives, and guerilla marketing techniques.
- What does the whole of government approach to influence look like, such as a compare and contrast of the U.S. approach to influence between the Cold War and today?
- Is there a correlation between influence operations model proposed in this thesis, and state successes, such as El Salvador, the Philippines (including JSOTF-P, the Huk rebellion, and Pershing suppression of the Moro rebellion), Malaysia in 1954, Singapore, and Columbia vs. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

G. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Influence Operations are a fundamental strategic component for the United States to meet current and emerging threats. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the U.S.'s vulnerability to confront sub-national groups and nonstate actors as they continuously strive to subvert the United States using asymmetric influence advantages. The incorporation and specialized implementation of influence operations across the operational spectrum serves to address vulnerabilities that routinely take decades and billions of dollars to overcome. Based on Congressional SECDEF and interagency assessments, it is widely acknowledged that unity of effort and a change in methodology

is required to fix current shortfalls in U.S. influence and information warfare. By studying current and future threats, similar to those studied within this thesis, influence operations can be improved and tailored to meet threats at a community level, across geographic divides, and within inaccessible areas of operations to ultimately facilitate U.S. national objectives and gain influence superiority. All operations by their nature achieve influence, but superiority will only be achieved when influence drives operations.

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